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Making Sense of Environmental Governance: A Study of E-waste  
in Malaysia 
 
Tengku Adeline Adura Tengku Hamzah 
 
ABSTRACT 
The nature of e-waste, which is environmentally disastrous but economically 
precious, calls for close policy attention at all levels of society, and between 
state and non-state actors. This thesis investigates the roles of state and non-
state actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia. This is undertaken through 
analysis of e-waste governance, particularly focusing on the locally generated 
industrial and household e-waste, from the perspective of multiple actors, 
levels and modes of governance.   
 
From the perspective of multiple actors governance, this thesis recognises three 
main actors of e-waste governance in Malaysia – the state actor, and two types 
of non-state actors – the Private Sector Actors and the Civil Society 
Organisations.  Although it appears theoretically simple to classify actors of 
governance into one of these categories, in practice the line separating these 
two categories is blurry.  
 
From the multiple modes perspective, empirical evidence from this research 
has shown that state and non-state actors are involved in four modes of 
governance – the hierarchical, persuasion, self-governance and co-governance 
mode; with the roles of state actors being more prominent in the hierarchical 
modes, while the roles of non-state actors are more significant in the 
persuasion, self-governance and co-governance modes. State and non-state 
actors are jointly involved in one variant of co-governance which is the public-
private partnership (PPP).  Although the inclusion of non-state actors in 
governance is usually on ‘acutely constrained terms’ (Murdoch and Abram 
1998: 49), they may influence the process of decision making. 
 
From the perspective of multi level governance, it is apparent that power and 
authority in e-waste governance transcend beyond the boundary of sovereign 
states with the introduction of supra-national legislation such as the Basel 
Convention, WEEE directive and RoHS directive. This has direct implication 
on Malaysia as she is a party to Basel Convention, and produces electrical and 
electronic equipment for global market. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 E-waste: An Introduction 
 
One of the consequences of life is the generation of waste. In today’s modern 
life, the generation of a new type of waste - the waste of electrical and 
electronic equipment or e-waste - is growing exponentially due to the 
increasing penetration of electrical and electronic devices into every aspect of 
modern lifestyle. It is estimated that the world’s production of e-waste is about 
40 million tonnes per year (UNEP 2010, Schluep et al. 2009). E-waste is said 
to be the fastest growing waste stream in the world (Nnorom and Osibanjo 
2008, Jain 2008, Cui and Forssberg 2003), with the growth rate at 3% to 5% 
per year (Secretariat of the Basel Convention 2005 in Mohan et al. 2008), 
which is three times faster than the general waste (Pucket et al. 2002), thus 
creating a great management challenge to most countries worldwide. 
 
Managing e-waste is a challenging task, not only due to its rapidly increasing 
volume, but more importantly because of its hazardous nature. E-waste 
contains numerous hazardous substances which may pose a threat to the 
environment and human health if they are not disposed of in the correct 
manner. On average, 9% of the weight of e-waste is made of hazardous 
substances such as lead, cadmium, mercury (heavy metals) and other toxic 
chemicals (Umweltbundesamt 2006, in Sarkar 2008). For example, beryllium 
is used to make computer motherboards, cadmium in semiconductors, and lead 
is found in computer monitors as well as batteries. A desk top computer with a 
15-inch CRT (cathode ray tube) monitor has an average mass of 25 kg 
(Robinson 2009), may contain as much as five pounds (about 2.3 kg) of lead 
(Pinto 2005). Due to its hazardous nature, e-waste needs to be disposed of in 
an environmentally sound manner. However, several factors such as lack of 
information on how to dispose e-waste properly, lack of facilities for proper 
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disposal, and the absence of effective regulation mean that e-waste is 
frequently discarded together with normal household waste.  
 
Once in the household waste stream, e-waste may be disposed of in landfill or 
through incineration. The presence of e-waste in landfill may bring disastrous 
environmental impacts. This is because the hazardous substances in e-waste 
may leach into watercourses, causing contamination of soil and water and 
associated health risks. Even a small amount of e-waste entering landfill sites 
can contain a relatively high amount of heavy metals and halogenated 
substances (Janz and Bilitewski 2008) due to the high concentration of the 
materials. A research study by NGOs in the United States of America (USA), 
such as Basel Action Network (BAN) and Silicon Valley Toxic Coalition 
(SVTC) revealed that 70% of heavy metals found in landfills in the USA come 
from e-waste (Puckett at al. 2002). E-waste is also disposed of in incinerators. 
The presence of flame retardants and chlorine elements in plastic (which is 
used as casings in many electrical and electronic products) can lead to the 
release of dangerous gases such as dioxins, furans, polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs), polyhalogenated aromatic hydrocarbons (PHAHs) and 
hydrogen chloride in the burning process which could contaminate the air 
through smoke and dust (Robinson 2009), and may enter human’s system 
through ingestion, inhalation and skin absorption (Mielke and Reagan 1998 in 
Robinson 2009). 
 
In addition to entering household waste streams, some e-waste is also recycled. 
However, as e-waste is classified as hazardous waste, the cost of recycling it in 
an environmentally sound treatment plant is high; urging owners of e-waste 
recycling business to opt for cheaper alternatives. One possible alternative is 
for e-waste to be recycled in less economically developed countries where the 
cost of labour is cheaper. As e-waste recycling provides job opportunities and 
lucrative business for many people in these countries, e-waste has become a 
 3 
 
sought after ‘commodity’. This has triggered the proliferation of e-waste 
trading.  
 
E-waste trading between the more economically developed countries (mostly 
from the European Union (EU) and USA) and the less economically developed 
countries (mostly in Asia and Africa) burgeoned during the 1990s, despite the 
restriction on export and import of hazardous waste imposed by the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal (hereinafter, Basel Convention). An unknown quantity of 
e-waste enters the informal recycling industry in the less economically 
developed countries (Robinson 2009) such as India, China, Pakistan, Malaysia 
and a few African countries (Johri 2008). Often in this case, a very crude way 
of e-waste dismantling and processing are involved such as acid bath (where 
printed circuit boards are immersed in sulphuric acid and nitric acid solution), 
and burning of wire cablings to recover copper. Although some valuable 
elements (such as gold, silver and copper) are recovered in the process, a large 
proportion of toxic materials (heavy metals, brominated flame retardants, other 
chemicals) are dumped into the vicinity. The hazardous substances may be 
released into or accumulated in the environment, and create risk for other 
people. For example, rainwater may wash off these toxic substances to the 
low-lying agricultural land, thus raising the probability of bioaccumulation by 
crops, polluting the groundwater and contaminate the underground aquifers 
(Sarkar 2008). The toxic chemicals may therefore not only affect the workers, 
but also pollute the environment (Pucket et al. 2002). 
  
The widespread, intricately complex and risky nature of e-waste demands calls 
for close policy attention at all levels of society, and between government and 
non-governmental actors. In this respect, it is a classical issue of environmental 
governance rather than of government. Most of the literature in environmental 
governance (and e-waste governance in particular) has focused on its 
emergence and development in the more economically developed countries in 
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the Global North such as the European countries and the USA. There is an 
obvious gap in the literature on the governance of e-waste in the less 
economically developed countries in the Global South, and this thesis intends 
to fill the gap. 
 
South East Asia region in the Global South is exposed to the possibilities of 
leakage of hazardous waste from the movement or transit of e-waste from 
countries in the West to countries in the East, and the possibilities of e-waste 
smuggling activities, due to its location which lies in the middle of the e-waste 
trading route.  Most of the studies on e-waste governance have looked at the 
issue of managing transboundary e-waste movement especially its impacts on 
the receiving countries in the Global South, thus reinforcing the idea of an 
affluent Global North and a destitute Global South as black and white 
categories. However, e-waste trading is more than ‘a story of rich countries 
dumping waste in poor countries’ (Lepawsky and McNabb 2010: 177) as there 
are evidence of e-waste trading among ‘poor countries’ (Lepawsky and 
McNabb 2010), and affluent sections of the societies in the Global South 
which are generating e-waste at an increasingly rapid rate; which have been 
overlooked in many studies. In a country like Malaysia, for example, the 
volume of e-waste in the waste stream is a combination of those generated by 
the local industries and households, and also imported from other countries. 
This research intends to fill in the gap by focusing on the governance of 
domestically generated e-waste in Malaysia. It seeks to examine this issue 
through the debates on governance where governance is understood as a 
process of societal steering which involves the state and non-state actors. Its 
aim is to investigate the roles of state and non-state actors in e-waste 
governance in Malaysia and to reflect on the consequent implications for how 
we might understand the nature of environmental governance ‘beyond’ the 
most economically affluent parts of the world. 
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In the next section (Section 1.2), a brief review of e-waste crisis in Malaysia is 
presented. This is followed by descriptions of the research aim and the research 
questions emanated from it in Section 1.3. Finally, in Section 1.4, the outline 
of this thesis and a brief description of each chapter are presented. 
 
1.2 E-waste Crisis in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia plays a dual role in e-waste trading – as an importer and exporter of 
e-waste. The geographic location of Malaysia, which lies in the middle of 
international e-waste trade route (refer Figure 2.4) makes it an attractive target 
for e-waste smugglers. According to Puckett (2005), Malaysia is one of the 
countries which receive the e-waste from the USA other than China, India, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Nigeria and Ghana (Puckett 2005), Brazil 
and Mexico (Robinson 2009). Other than receiving e-waste, Malaysia is said to 
export e-waste to other less economically developed country such as India. In a 
short documentary on e-waste recycling activities in India, which was filmed 
in summer 2008 by SVTC (Silicon Valley Toxic Coalition, an NGO based in 
Seattle, USA), one of the e-waste recycling operators who was interviewed 
admitted that he received supply of e-waste for his business from Malaysia, 
other than the USA (SVTC website at http://svtc.org/our-work/e-waste/). This 
is happening despite the fact that Malaysia is a party of Basel Convention, and 
restricts import/export of e-waste with national level law (Section 34B of 
Environmental Act 1974).   
 
Malaysia is also facing problems with rapid growth of domestic e-waste 
volume. With the increasing number of Malaysia’s population living in urban 
areas and adopting modern lifestyles (due to economic transformation from 
agricultural-based to industrial-based socio-economies in the 1980s), the 
generation of domestic e-waste is expected to grow. An inventory of domestic 
e-waste generation in Malaysia conducted by Malaysian Department of 
Environment (DOE) with the cooperation of EX Corporation, Japan has 
 6 
 
revealed that Malaysia generated 688,000 metric tonnes of e-waste in 2008, 
and the volume is forecasted to reach 1.11 million metric tonnes in 2020 (E-
waste Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009). Other than the increasing 
amount of e-waste, another issue regarding e-waste in Malaysia is improper 
disposal of e-waste (refer Plates 5.1 to Plates 5.6) and illegal e-waste recycling. 
These activities have the potential to pollute the environment and pose 
significant health hazard to the society.  
 
1.3 About the Research 
 
The main aim of this research is to investigate the roles of state and non-state 
actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia, particularly focusing on the 
governance of the locally generated industrial and household e-waste. Based 
on this aim, five following research questions emanate which are; 
 
1. Who are the actors involved in e-waste governance in Malaysia? 
2. How, why and with what implications are these actors involved in 
e-waste governance? 
3. What and how significant are the roles of state and non-state actors 
in different modes of governance?  
4. How, why and with what implications are state and non-state actors 
working in partnership? 
5. What is the most dominant and significant mode of e-waste 
governance in Malaysia, and what are the consequent implications? 
 
This research is based on qualitative research methodology. Qualitative 
research methodology was chosen over quantitative research methodology 
because of its suitability with respect to the research questions stated above. 
One particular type of qualitative research approach, i.e. the case studies 
approach was applied in conducting this research. Data for the research were 
collected by adopting three main data collection techniques: in-depth 
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interviews with the key players in e-waste governance from the public sector, 
private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs); observations (of the 
public-private partnership (PPP) programmes); and the review and analysis of 
policy documents and grey literature. These data were analysed by adopting 
the thematic analysis method.   
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis Structure 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 discusses the complexity of e-
waste as an environmental issue. This chapter begins with the analysis of the 
different nomenclature and interpretations surrounding the use of the term ‘e-
waste’ in the literature. It provides information on the context of the growing 
problem of e-waste, especially the rapid increase of e-waste volumes 
worldwide and their hazardous content.  Due to the high economic value of 
some of the materials in the e-waste, it is being traded (and smuggled) between 
countries and treated (recycling and material recovery) legally and illegally in 
many countries worldwide. This chapter discusses this issue and its impact. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the conceptual and theoretical framings of this research. 
It explores the literatures on governance, and develops a framework that 
regards governance as operating through multiple actors, levels and modes. It 
examines the application of this concept in environmental governance, waste 
governance and e-waste governance, and identifies the key issues for empirical 
investigation. This is followed by Chapter 4 which focuses on the research 
methodology. In this chapter, the rationale for choosing a qualitative research 
methodology, and specifically a case study approach, are presented. The data 
collection methods (in-depth interviews, observations and review of 
documents) and data analysis technique (thematic analysis) are discussed, and 
their strengths and weaknesses evaluated, alongside an analysis of the 
experience of conducting the research.  
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Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 present the empirical findings of this 
research. Chapter 5 is centred on the roles of state actors while Chapter 6 is 
focused on the roles of non-state actors. The roles of state (in Chapter 5) and 
non-state actors (in Chapter 6) are presented based on the different modes of 
governing identified in Chapter 3 as involved in the process of environmental 
governance: hierarchy, persuasion and self-governance modes. Chapter 7 
presents the results of analysis of the roles of state and non-state actors in one 
variant of co-governance mode, the public-private partnership (PPP). Two PPP 
case studies were selected for in-depth research and are analysed in this thesis. 
Chapter 7 reports the background of these PPPs and related data analysis 
results, such as the limitations and implications of PPPs. In conclusion, 
Chapter 8 analyses the multiplicity of e-waste governance (in terms of levels, 
actors (and their roles) and modes) in Malaysia. In addition, it reflects on the 
theoretical and methodological limitations of this research, its potential policy 
relevance and recommendations for policy and future research.  
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Chapter 2: E-Waste: A Consequence of Modern Life? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Waste is defined in EU Directive as ‘any substance or object which the holder 
discards, or intends to discard, or is required to discard’ (Directive 
75/442/EEC, Article 1(a)). Generally, waste is understood as something that is 
not needed by the current owner and is ready to be thrown away (Davoudi 
2009). To facilitate the process of waste management, wastes are classified 
into categories. Three most common systems of classifying waste are based on 
level of toxicity and risk, chemical composition and source of generation. The 
first system (based on level of toxicity and risk) divides waste into two groups 
of hazardous and non-hazardous waste; the second system (based on chemical 
composition) divides waste into inorganic or organic/ microbiological waste; 
and the third system (based on the source of waste generation) divides waste 
into municipal, industrial, clinical, agricultural, commercial, and construction 
and demolition waste (Williams 2005). The way waste is understood and 
defined, affects the way it is governed (Davoudi 2009). In Malaysia for 
example, the governance of waste is based on the level of toxicity of waste; 
which is used as the basis for the categorization of waste into two broad groups 
of hazardous and non-hazardous waste.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis (Section 1.1), hazardous waste 
from used electrical and electronic equipment (or e-waste) has entered the 
waste stream at a rapid rate since early 1990s. This chapter seeks to examine 
the effect of e-waste from an environmental perspective. The discussion begins 
with a discourse on the definition and the different interpretation of the term 
‘e-waste’ in Section 2.2. This is followed by Section 2.3, where the discussion 
is focused on the environmental consequences of e-waste. E-waste is 
considered as a crucial environmental issue due to its rapidly growing volume 
and hazardous content which may leak into the environment if it is not 
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properly disposed of, and cause adverse effect on human health and the 
environment. The toxicity effects (which may occur immediately at the point 
of release, or cause long term chronic toxicity) and the environmental 
persistence of hazardous compounds are the critical issues in the management 
of e-waste. Issues of e-waste management are discussed in Section 2.4. Due to 
the nature of e-waste which is hazardous, but valuable at the same time, 
recycling and recovery of materials are often adopted as a management 
strategy by many countries around the world. However, the economic value 
which is attached to e-waste has brought many problems such as e-waste 
smuggling and the growth of recycling activities by the informal sector 
especially in the less economically developed countries. Finally, in Section 2.5, 
the challenges of e-waste management in Malaysia are reported, including 
improper disposal, illegal import and unlicensed e-waste recycling activities; 
providing the specific context within which the research for this thesis has 
been based.  
 
2.2 E-waste: Definition and Nomenclature 
 
E-waste is a global issue and in the international arena, it is governed by the 
United Nations (UN) through the Basel Convention. The Basel Convention 
defines e-waste as; 
 
‘Waste electrical and electronic assemblies or scrap containing 
components such as accumulators or other batteries included in list A, 
mercury switches, glass from cathode ray tubes, or other activated glass 
and PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) capasitors, or contaminated with 
Annexe I constituents (for example, cadmium, mercury, lead, PCB) to 
an extent that they posses any of the characteristics contained in 
Annexe III’ (UN Basel Convention). 
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As the authority to govern e-waste trickles down from the global authority 
(UN) to the governments at lower levels such as regional (example European 
Union), state and local levels, so has it influenced the interpretation of e-waste.  
In Malaysia for example, e-waste is defined by the law as: 
 
‘Waste from the electrical and electronic assemblies containing 
components such as accumulators, mercury-switches, glass from 
cathode-ray tubes and other activated glass or polychlorinated biphenyl 
capasitors, or contaminated with cadmium, mercury, lead, nickel, 
chromium, copper, lithium, silver, manganese or polychlorinated 
biphenyls’ (Guidelines for the Classification of Used Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment in Malaysia, available at www.doe.gov.my). 
 
At the regional level, within the EU the term WEEE (Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment) is widely used instead of e-waste to refer to end-of-life 
and disposed electrical and electronic equipment. WEEE is understood in the 
EU under the Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(Directive 2002/96/EC, Article 3(b)) and the Directive on Waste (Directive 
75/442/EEC, Article 1(a)) as ‘any electrical and electronic equipment 
(including all components, subassemblies and consumables which are part of 
the product at the time of discarding) which the holder discards or intends to or 
is required to discard’. The Directive on Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(Directive 2002/96/EC, Article 3(a)) also provide the definition for electrical 
and electronic equipment (EEE), which is as the following (with emphasis 
added in square brackets): 
  
‘Electrical and electronic equipment’ or ‘EEE’ means equipment which 
is dependent on electric currents or electromagnetic fields in order to 
work properly, and an equipment for the generation, transfer and 
measurement of such currents and fields falling under the categories set 
out in Annexe 1A [to the WEEE Directive], and designed for use with 
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voltage rating not exceeding 1000 volts for alternating current and 1500 
volts for direct current’ (Directive 2002/96/EC, Article 3(a)). 
  
Under EU legislation, WEEE is divided into ten categories as listed in Table 
2.1. Based on this categorization (and interpreted together with the definition 
of WEEE and EEE in Directive 2002/96/EC, Article 3(a) and Article 3(b)), 
several scholars such as Robinson (2009), Streicher-Porte et al. (2005) and 
Johri and Basu (2008) consider only category 3 (Information Technology and 
telecommunication equipment) and category 4 (consumer equipment) from this 
list as e-waste, leading to an interpretation that e-waste is a subset of WEEE.  
However, the majority of studies in e-waste (see Steubing et al. 2010, 
Chancerel and Rotter 2009, Khetriwal et al. 2009, Deathe et al. 2008, Nnorom 
and Osibanjo 2008, and Davis and Heart 2008, Puckett et al. 2002) interpret e -
waste as a term encompassing a broad and growing range of electronic and 
electrical devices, which have been discarded by their owners. As such, with 
this understanding, the terminology (e-waste and WEEE) is analogous; which 
means the terms can be used to refer to the discarded electrical and electronic 
equipment. There are also scholars (see Dwivedy and Mittal 2010 and 
Bandyopadhyay 2008) who view the terms from another perspective (i.e. from 
the formality aspect) and consider e-waste as an informal, but a more popular 
name for WEEE, but both would bring the same meaning; while Chancerel and 
Rotter (2009) suggest that e-scrap is another synonymous term to WEEE and 
e-waste. 
 
Table 2.1: The ten categories of WEEE under EU directive  
 
No Category Label 
1 Large household appliances Large HH 
2 Small household appliances Small HH 
3 Information Technology and 
telecommunication equipment 
ICT 
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No Category Label 
4 Consumer equipment CE 
5 Lightning equipment Lighting 
6 Electrical and electronic tools (with the 
exception of large scale stationary industrial 
tools) 
E&E tools 
7 Toys, and leisure and sports equipment  Toys 
8 Medical devices(with the exception of all 
implemented and infected products) 
Medical 
equipment 
9 Monitoring and control instruments M&C 
10 Automatic dispensers Dispensers 
Source: EU Directive (Directive 2002/96/EC)  
 
Besides the confusion regarding the terminology, determining whether a 
product is an electrical or electronic device can sometimes be confusing. A 
clear delineation between electrical and electronic equipment is becoming 
increasingly difficult to achieve due to the wide incorporation of electronic 
programmable micro processors into equipment which have traditionally been 
regarded as electrical devices such as refrigerators, washing machines and 
ovens, thus transforming them into electronic devices (Robinson 2009, Hilty 
2005, and Kohler and Erdmann 2004). As such, UNEP’s definition that 
interprets e-waste as ‘a generic term encompassing various forms of electrical 
and electronic equipment (EEE) that are old, end-of-life electronic appliances 
and have ceased to be of any value to their owners’ (UNEP 2007) is the most 
practical and reasonable in the context of this study and will be adopted in this 
chapter and throughout the thesis. 
 
2.3 E-waste as a Contemporary Environmental Issue 
 
E-waste has become a serious environmental issue since the early 1990s due to 
two reasons - its rapid growth in volume and its hazardous content. As a new 
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addition to the waste stream, the emergence and rapid increase of e-waste 
demands a comprehensive management system. Although the amount of 
hazardous substances in e-waste is generally small (they constitute 2.7% of the 
total elements of e-waste (Bandyopadhyay 2008) or 9% of the weight of e-
waste (Umweltbundesamt 2006, in Sarkar 2008)), they have significant impact 
due to the hazardous nature, high concentration level and their persistence 
when discharged to the environment which may have long term effects on 
public health and the environment.   
 
2.3.1 The Rapid Growth of E-waste  
 
As mentioned in the introduction (Section 1.1), e-waste is one of the fastest 
growing waste streams in the world (Nnorom and Osibanjo 2008, Jain 2008, 
Cui and Forssberg 2003), with estimated world’s generation rate at 40 million 
tonnes per year (UNEP 2010, Schluep et al. 2009). Although there has been 
several attempts to estimate the growth of e-waste in several countries in the 
world (such as  the work of Cobbling (2008) in USA, Sinha-Khetriwal et al. 
(2005) in Switzerland, Liu et al. (2006) in China), the estimation and reporting 
system applied are not uniform, hence is not precise for comparison purposes. 
Robinson (2009) claims that the growth of e-waste is strongly correlated 
positively with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country. Robinson 
(2009) found that his finding agrees with the prediction of e-waste production 
in Europe by Hischier et al. (2005), who noted that the annual e-waste growth 
rate in Europe in the three-year period (between the years 2005 to 2008), is at 
3% to 5%, during which the average increase of GDP is 2.6%. According to 
NGOs – the Basel Action Network (BAN) and the Silicon Valley Toxic 
Coalition (SVTC) – the rate of e-waste increase is three times faster than the 
increase in regular municipal waste (Puckett et al. 2002). The rapid increase of 
e-waste is due several factors.  
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One factor is the exponential rise of personal computers ownership due to the 
emergence of the internet in early 1990s (Campbell and Hassan 2003). 
Countries like the USA, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Scandinavian 
region have the highest recorded number of personal computers per head 
worldwide, with more than five hundred computers per thousand people 
(Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Source:  Rekacewicz, 2004 [http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/personal-
computers-per-1000-people] 
 
Figure 2.1: The concentration of personal computers ownership across the 
globe 
 
With computer manufacturers competing intensely in terms of innovation, the 
raw processing power of computers is rapidly increasing, resulting in a large 
number of machines becoming obsolete in increasingly short periods of time 
(Campbell and Hassan 2003) and subsequently contributing to the increase in 
the amount of e-waste production. Moreover, as more computers are 
manufactured, economies of scale have given way to much lower prices for 
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computers, thus increasing the global demand (and contributing to more e-
waste generation). While the increasing sales of computers in the less 
economically developed countries is due the success of penetration market, the 
increase in the more economically developed countries is due to replacement 
market. In the USA for example, the life span of computers was four to six 
years in 1997, but by 2005 had been drastically reduced to less than two years 
(Babu et al. 2007). As such, Robinson (2009) suggests that the driving force 
behind e-waste production is the rapid growth of computers and computing 
systems. 
 
Other than computers, another factor which is contributing to the rapid 
increase in the volume of e-waste worldwide is innovations in televisions, such 
as the migration from analogue to digital and from CRT to flat-screen 
technologies. Televisions’ owners are discarding their old device for new flat- 
screen- digital sets to keep up with the advance technology. Another factor 
which contributes to the trend is the wide usage of mobile phones as 
communication via satellites was made easier in the 1990s.  Tremendous 
technology revolutions in communication industry, and its very rapid 
advancement (where mobile phones are doing more than just connecting 
people, but are also multi functioning as camera, audio visual recorder and 
player and much more besides), have resulted in the increase in e-waste 
volume as people frequently opt for the latest version of devices with upgraded 
features.  
 
In the process of planning for e-waste future management, e-waste managers 
normally make estimates of future e-waste generation amount based on the 
amount of equipment sold. Logically, the impact to the environment rises with 
the increase in the amount of e-waste. However, this may not necessarily be 
always true for two reasons. Firstly, the total quantity of e-waste, especially in 
the less economically developed countries, is not only contributed by domestic 
sources but also from legal and illegal imports, mostly from more 
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economically developed countries (Streicher-Porte et al. 2005, Widmer et al. 
2005). And secondly, the impact of e-waste to the environment differs 
depending on the type of devices (Robinson 2009). According to Robinson 
(2009), the impact of e-waste to the environment depends on a combination of 
several factors such as the mass or the weight of the item and its average 
lifespan, and is not linearly dependent on the amount of items disposed. He 
suggests that the contribution of an item to annual e-waste generation can be 
reduced to a formula, as follows: E (kg/year of waste) depends on the mass of 
the item M (kg), the number of units in service N and its average lifespan L 
(years) [1] ; or E = MN/L [1] ( Robinson 2009: 184). 
 
As such, a computer, which has an average lifespan of three years and weighs 
25 kg, contributes a higher proportion of e-waste compared to a refrigerator 
which weighs 35 kg and has a life span of ten years. Table 2.2 lists the weight 
and typical life span of common electrical and electronic items which can be 
used to estimate annual e-waste generation more precisely according to 
Robinson’s formula. 
 
Data on current amount and projection of future production of e-waste are 
paramount in e-waste management. Disposal of e-waste is more complicated 
than normal household waste because of its hazardous content; and is 
definitely more than just lack of space as commonly the case of solid waste 
management. Lack of appropriate facilities, weak enforcement (or lack of) law 
and regulation, and low level of awareness among the society may lead to 
indiscriminate or improper disposal (such as disposing e-waste together with 
households solid waste). The following sub-section discusses the consequence 
of improper e-waste mangement to the environment and human health.  
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Table 2.2: The weight and expected life span of some common e-waste items 
  
Device Weight of device 
(kg) 
Typical life span 
(year) 
Computer¹ 25 3 
Facsimile machine² 3 5 
Mobile phone³ 0.1 2 
Electronic games³ 3 5 
Photocopier² 60 8 
Radio³ 2 10 
Televisionº 30 5 
Video recorder and DVD player³ 5 5 
Refrigerator³ 35 10 
Microwave oven³ 15 7 
Air conditioning unit² 55 3 
Sources: 
º Li et al. 2009 
¹ Betts 2008 
² Robinson 2009 
³ Cobbing 2008 
 
2.3.2 The Hazardous Content of E-waste  
 
E-waste is composed of a mixture of metals - particularly copper, aluminium 
and iron - which are attached to, covered with or mixed with various types of 
plastic and ceramic (Hoffmann 1992). However, according to Widmer et al. 
(2005), a detail account of e-waste content, produces a list of more than one 
thousand chemical substances. These substances are grouped into three 
categories based on their relative amount in e-waste, such as: bulk elements 
(such as lead, tin, copper, silicon, carbon, iron and aluminium), elements in 
small quantity (such as cadmium and mercury), and trace elements (such as 
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platinum, arsenic, silver, gold, lithium, titanium, cobalt, manganese and many 
others). The composition of e-waste (including the type and percentage of 
materials) varies depending on the type of equipment, as shown in Table 2.3.  
As evident from Table 2.3, ferrous metal (iron) made up the bulk of most of 
the electrical and electronic devices compared (except for mobile phones 
where the percentage of copper is higher than ferrous metal). 
  
As mentioned in Section 1.1, e-waste content is a significant environmental 
issue due to its toxicity (Widmer 2005). The adverse health effects of major 
hazardous substances in e-waste are presented in Table 2.4.  Besides the 
hazardous substances, there are several types of trace elements in e-waste 
(such as platinum, silver, gold, and titanium) which are precious materials, 
while some are both precious and hazardous (such as copper, mercury, lead 
and cadmium). The contradiction between environmental and economic value 
of e-waste has made e-waste management a daunting challenge. 
 
Table 2.3: Percentage of iron, aluminium, copper and lead content in different 
electrical and electronic devices 
Type of 
metal 
Percentage of content in devices (%) 
Personal 
Computer¹ 
Television² Mobile 
phone³ 
Portable 
audio² 
DVD 
player² 
Iron (Fe) 20 28 3 23 62 
Aluminium 
(Al) 
14 10 <1 1 2 
Copper 
(Cu) 
7 10 15 21 5 
Lead (Pb) 6 1 <1 0.14 0.3 
Sources: 
¹ Devi, Shobha and Kamble (2004) 
² Hageluken (2008) 
³ http://www.envocare.co.uk/mobile_phones.htm 
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The toxic elements in e-waste may be released to the environment in three 
ways. Firstly, due to improper disposal of e-waste, where e-waste is commonly 
disposed of together with municipal solid waste and ended in non-hazardous 
landfill or being incinerated, and some are just dumped indiscriminately. In 
these instances, the toxic elements in e-waste may enter the soil and 
contaminate the groundwater, or enter the atmosphere as toxic fumes if 
burning is used as a way of disposal. In the USA, it is estimated that 70% of 
mercury and cadmium pollution, and 40% of lead pollution in landfills are 
caused by leakage of e-waste (Puckett et al. 2002). Secondly, toxic substances 
are released into the environment through improper dismantling and precious 
material recovery processes, where open burning and acid baths are used to 
recover precious material, which release toxic substances into the air, soil and 
water, while the less precious (but highly hazardous materials) are disposed of 
in an unsafe manner. Finally, hazardous substances have the potential to enter 
the environment through possible leakage in the process of movement of e-
waste from one country to another.  
 
Table 2.4: Hazardous substances in e-waste and its effects on health 
Substances/contaminants Use in electrical 
and electronic 
devices 
Adverse health effect * 
 
Copper (Cu) Wiring ¹ 
 
May damage liver, kidney 
and nervous system, and 
affecting protein metabolism 
in the brain causing 
Alzheimer disease. 
 
Nickel (Ni) Batteries An uptake of too large 
quantities of nickel may 
cause cancer of the lung, 
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Substances/contaminants Use in electrical 
and electronic 
devices 
Adverse health effect * 
 
nose, larynx and prostate, 
dizziness, respiratory failure 
(such as asthma and chronic 
bronchitis, birth defects, and 
allergic reactions such as 
skin rashes. 
Lithium (Li) Batteries Corrosive to the eyes, skin 
and respiratory tract.  
Chromium (Cr) Data tapes and 
floppy disks.¹ 
Irritates eyes, skin and 
mucous membranes and 
DNA damage. 
Lead (Pb) Solder ², CRTs, 
batteries¹  
 
Damages the central and 
peripheral nervous system, 
kidney and endocrine system. 
Cadmium(Cd) Batteries, toners,  
Plastics ¹ 
 
Affects the kidneys, 
cardiovascular system, bones 
and testicular function, and 
damaging the DNA. 
Mercury (Hg) Fluorescent 
lamps, batteries, 
switches¹, circuit 
board, 
semiconductors. 
Toxic to lungs, kidney, 
nervous system and digestive 
system. 
Barium (Ba) Getters in CRTs¹ 
 
Swelling in the brain, muscle 
weakness and damage to the 
heart, liver and spleen. 
Beryllium (Be) Silicon-controlled  
rectifiers¹  
Lung and skin disease. 
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Substances/contaminants Use in electrical 
and electronic 
devices 
Adverse health effect * 
 
Aluminium (Al) Chips, data 
storage disks 
Affects brain and kidneys 
and may be associated with 
Alzheimer and Parkinson 
disease. 
Antimony Flame retardants³  Affects cardiovascular 
system, stomach, joints, 
muscles and bones. 
Sources: 
*Sarkar (2008)  
¹ Robinson (2009) 
² Kang and Schoenung (2005) 
³ Ernst et al. (2003)  
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2.4 E-waste Management      
 
In order to cope with the increasingly demanding and complex waste issues, 
waste management practices have become more holistic in recent years; thus 
resulting in new approaches and principles such as the waste management 
hierarchy, integrated solid waste management and zero waste concepts. This 
section explains the concept of the waste management hierarchy and its 
influence in e-waste management. 
 
The waste management hierarchy is a strategy which is based on a ranking of 
waste management solutions from the most to the least desirable options (see 
Figure 2.2) (Davies 2008, Tchobanoglous et al. 1993). The ranking is based on 
environmental values such as energy conservation, resources conservation, 
pollution prevention or minimisation, and health and safety protection (Davies 
2008, Tchobanoglous et al. 1993). Although the ordering of waste management 
hierarchy varies in different countries, the format which is generally accepted 
worldwide places waste prevention at the top of the hierarchy and waste 
disposal at the bottom of the hierarchy with energy recovery and recycling/re-
use of materials sandwiched between the two (Davies 2008). The five main 
elements of waste management hierarchy are summarised in Table 2.5.  
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Figure 2.2: Generally accepted format of waste hierarchy 
 
Table 2.5: Description of five main techniques of waste management hierarchy 
 
Process Description 
Waste 
prevention/reduction/ 
minimisation 
• A process of reducing the amount and/or toxicity of 
waste.  
• May occur through the design, manufacture and 
packaging of products with minimum toxic content, 
minimum volume of material or a longer useful life. 
• The most effective way to reduce the quantity of 
waste and the cost associated with its handling and 
its environmental impacts.  
Reuse • A process which involves using the items in another 
way, when their primary use is finished.   
• It extends the life cycle of an item, which may 
eventually be discarded. 
Recycling • A process which is possible in helping to reduce the 
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Process Description 
demand on resources and the amount of waste 
requiring disposal by landfilling. 
• It involves three stages: the collection and separation 
of waste materials; the preparation of these materials 
for reuse, reprocessing and manufacture; and the 
reuse, reprocessing, and remanufacture of these 
materials. 
Energy and material  
recovery 
• Involves the physical, chemical or biological 
alteration of wastes to improve the efficiency of 
waste management operations, to recover reusable 
and recyclable materials or to recover conversion 
products and energy in the form of heat and 
combustible biogas. 
• Usually results in the reduced use of landfill 
capacity. 
Disposal (Landfill) • It is the last option in waste management.  
• Is used to handle waste that cannot be recycled, the 
residual matter remaining after wastes have been 
separated at materials recovery facilities or after the 
recovery of conversion products or energy. 
Source: adapted from Tchobanoglous et al. (1993). 
 
In managing e-waste, the substantial factor which has been crucial in 
determining the decisions on e-waste management is the nature of the waste 
which is highly hazardous (which means disposal without treatment must be 
avoided at all costs), and the potential for recovering economic value through 
the re-use of the precious metals which e-waste contains. Due to these 
considerations, the majority of countries are adopting strategies which lie in 
the middle of the waste management hierarchy triangle, (which are reuse, 
recycle and material recovery) to manage e-waste, with the exception of 
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countries in the EU region which have begun to apply the waste 
prevention/reduction/ minimization strategy  with the introduction of two 
directives – the Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(2002/96/EC) (or the WEEE Directive) and the Directive on Restriction of the 
Use of Certain Hazardous Substances (2002/95/EC) (or the RoHS Directive). 
The WEEE and RoHS directives entered into force on 27 January 2003, 
although the first draft was conceived since 1995 (Khetriwal 2008). The 
WEEE directive calls for overall reduction of e-waste and the adoption of 
sound disposal methods, while the RoHS calls for comprehensive management 
of e-waste by product regulation and restriction on certain hazardous 
chemicals.  
 
The RoHS Directive is meant to prevent the generation of hazardous waste. 
This is achieved by substituting various heavy metals (lead, mercury, 
cadmium, hexavalent chromium) and two brominated flame retardants (BRF) - 
polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) and polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDE) 
- with less hazardous material in the new electronic and electrical equipment 
which were put on the market from 1 July 2006. The RoHS Directive specifies 
the maximum concentration values allowable for each substances; which is 
0.01% by weight for cadmium and 0.1% by weight of the other five substances 
in production of homogeneous material (such as individual types of plastics, 
ceramics, glass, metals, alloys, paper, board, resins and coatings).  
 
On the other hand, the aim of WEEE is to limit the total quantity of waste 
going to final disposal site by increasing the recycling of electrical and 
electronic equipment (EEE), where producers (including EU based 
manufacturer, reseller and importer of equipment) are required to set up a take-
back system so that WEEE can be returned free of charge and collected 
separately. This has resulted in increasing adoption of Extended Producers 
Responsibility (EPR) principle in e-waste law of EU member countries; which 
has also penetrated into countries outside EU such as China (Wagner 2009, 
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Khetriwal et al. 2009). Apart from product take-back, WEEE also places two 
other responsibilities upon producers; first, for spreading awareness among 
private household users about the directive’s separate collection and return 
system and its role in contributing to reuse, recycling and other forms of 
recovery of WEEE, the hazardous nature of WEEE, and the meaning of the 
symbols used on the products; and second, for designing products in a way that 
facilitates the reuse, recycling and recovery of materials. Targets on collection 
of e-waste (Article 5) and on recovery of e-waste (Article 7) of WEEE 
directive are set based on weight, which overlooks the fact that some 
hazardous substances possess environmentally-disastrous potential even if they 
are present in small quantity and have a low physical weight (Khetriwal et al. 
2008).  
 
The RoHS Directive is complementary to the WEEE Directive in the attempt 
of EU to regulate e-waste in the region. Both directives require EU member 
states to adopt and implement national laws by 13 August 2004 or face action 
in the European Court of Justice (Mohan et al. 2008). This has forced all 
member countries to come out with national law on WEEE and RoHS. For 
example, UK’s regulations on e-waste control were laid before the Parliament 
on 12 December 2006, and entered into force by ‘The Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment Regulations 2006’ (amended 2007), on 2 January 2007 
(UK Environment Agency website, http://www.legislation.gov.uk).  
 
E-waste recycling as a management option which is strongly encouraged under 
EU’s WEEE directive, and is also adopted in many other countries outside the 
EU (for example, in Japan under the Home Appliances Recycling Law 2001 
and Korea under EPR in Recycling Law 2003) has clear environmental 
advantages based on the Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) study on two Swiss take-
back and recycling systems in Switzerland conducted by Hischier et al. (2005). 
However, due to its economic value, e-waste has also been recycled without 
environmental considerations, particularly in the less economically developed 
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countries such as in India (Sarkar 2008, Sinha 2008, Sinha-Khetriwal et al. 
2005) and China (Li et al. 2008, Wong et al. 2007) creating social and political 
issues. In the following sub-section (Section 2.4.1), the process of e-waste 
recycling in an environmentally sound manner and in an environmentally 
improper manner (Section 2.4.2) are described and compared. Descriptions of 
the potential environmental and health hazards in crude e-waste recycling 
process are also presented. In Section 2.4.2 discussions are focused on the 
trading of e-waste (including smuggling, pretext donation and genuine 
donation) from the Global North to the Global South.  
 
2.4.1 E-waste Recycling and Material Recovery Processes  
 
Generally, e-waste recycling process is understood as the processes of 
dismantling and destructing end-of-life electrical and electronic equipment to 
recover useful materials (Cui and Zhang 2008) (see Plate 2.1 and Plate 2.2 
which shows the dismantled components of a computer and of a mobile phone 
respectively, which are ready to undergo a series of processes before materials 
are recovered). However, a more detail study of e-waste recycling process 
revealed that it is an intricate and complex process which involves 
interconnecting steps (see Figure 2.3) including collection, testing and sorting, 
dismantling, shredding, smelting and refining of various materials and metals, 
before new material can be recovered (Hageluken 2008). Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the major steps and flows of the recycling process of obsolete computers and 
the end products.  
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Plate 2.1: Dismantled components of a 
computer. (Source: author - courtesy of 
Tes-Amm (M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
Plate 2.2: Dismantled components of 
a mobile phone. (Source: author - 
courtesy of Tes-Amm (M) Sdn. 
Bhd.) 
 
The efficiency and level of success of a recycling process depends not only on 
the efficiency of each single step in Figure 2.3, but also determined by many 
other factors such as availability of adequate infrastructure (which includes 
transportation, collection, recovery and resale establishments), availability of 
trained workers, awareness  among consumers and recyclers of the potential 
hazards of e-waste, availability of appropriate technology and experience at all 
levels from collection to processing and disposal (Hageluken 2008, Kang and 
Schoenung 2004).  
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Figure 2.3: The computer recycling and material recovery processes and 
outputs.  
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According to Hageluken (2008), most of the precious metals in e-waste such as 
gold, silver and platinum are found in the printed circuit boards (refer Figure 
2.3 and Plate 2.3); however, printed circuit boards also contain most of the 
toxic substances found in e-waste, thus making e-waste recycling a very risky 
activity. An example of the route undergone by a printed circuit board in 
material recovery process is explained below. In a recovery plant, printed 
circuit boards will first undergo mechanical crushing and stripping process (see 
Plates 2.4 and Plate 2.5) for several times until it is finely crushed (see Plate 
2.6). The finely crushed printed circuit boards will then undergo eddy current 
separation (where different material separated based on relative weight) and 
collected for further processes, before precious materials (see Plates 2.7, Plate 
2.8 and Plate 2.9) as final output are recovered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.3: A printed circuit board of a used computer and the precious materials 
that can be recovered from it. (Source: Theng 2006) 
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Plate 2.4:  Coarsely 
crushed printed circuit 
boards. (Source: author 
- courtesy of Tes-Amm 
(M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
Plate 2.5: Medium 
crushed printed circuit 
boards. (Source: author - 
courtesy of Tes-Amm 
(M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
Plate 2.6: Fine crushed 
printed circuit boards is 
ready for eddy current 
separation process. 
(Source: author - 
courtesy of Tes-Amm 
(M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
Plate 2.7: Gold after the 
recovery process. 
(Source: author - 
courtesy of Tes-Amm 
(M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
 
Plate 2.8: Silver after 
recovery. (Source: 
author - courtesy of Tes-
Amm (M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
 
 
Plate 2.9: Recovered 
copper from e-waste. 
(Source: author - 
courtesy of Tes-Amm 
(M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
Recycling can recover up to 95% of useful materials from a computer and 45% 
of materials from cathode ray tube (CRT) monitors (Ladou and Lovegrove 
2008). Other than recovering valuable materials from e-waste, recycling also 
contributes to significant energy savings, as mining of virgin materials can be 
 33 
 
avoided. Table 2.6 shows the different percentage of energy than can be saved 
by recycling of materials. 
 
Table 2.6: The percentages of energy savings from the recycling and recovery 
of different materials in e-waste 
 
Material Energy savings (%) 
Aluminium 95 
Copper 85 
Iron and steel 74 
Lead 65 
Zinc 60 
Paper 64 
Plastic  >80 
Source: Cui and Forssberg (2003) 
 
E-waste recycling operations in more economically developed countries are 
carried out formally and initiated by a high level of awareness of 
environmental protection. In countries like Japan, the USA and Switzerland, 
recycling operations are carried out using modern techniques (as described 
above) and produce very little environmental impact (Aizawa et al. 2008, 
Andreola et al. 2007). This process involves advanced technology and huge 
financial cost. For example, Jain (2008) quoted that a study by the USA 
Environmental Protection Agency has shown that the cost of e-waste recycling 
in USA is ten times more expensive than in Asia. The significant difference in 
the recycling cost in USA and Asia is due to the different level of technology 
involved. E-waste recycling in less economically developed countries such as 
in China (Eugster and Fu 2004) and India (Sinha 2008, Rochat et al. 2008, 
Streicher-Porte et al. 2005,) is often carried out in the informal sector, where 
extraction of copper, lead, gold and silver are done crudely, (including manual 
dismantling of components, wet chemical processing such as immersing in 
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sulphuric and nitric acid solutions, and incineration) (Sarkar 2008), which 
poses significant environment and health effects.  
 
In India for example, e-waste recycling is conducted predominantly by 
informal private companies or individuals. The common flow of e-waste 
recycling process in India is presented in Figure 2.4. 
 
   
  Figure 2.4: Sequence of events in a recycling chain in India 
 
The e-waste recycling chain in India begins with the collection process by 
individual waste dealers which are locally known as kabadiwallahs (Sinha 
2008). Kabadiwallahs collect not only e-waste but all types of recyclable items 
from multiple sources and sell them to large waste dealers or traders. The 
waste traders then segregate the waste according to type. E-waste is 
cannibalized for usable parts which are sent back to market for reuse (Sinha 
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2008). The waste is then sold to the dismantlers who will further dismantle 
each component and salvage the usable components like integrated circuits 
(ICs), capacitors and so on. These dismantlers are finally linked to the 
recyclers, who are interested in specific components and are engaged in final 
material recovery.  
 
The process of recovery of precious material from printed circuit boards in a 
formal environmentally sound recycling plant, as discussed above, involves 
repeated crushing and eddy current separation (which is done mechanically) 
before metals are recovered. However in India, the process of metals recovery 
from printed circuit boards is carried out either by open burning or acid bath 
(Sinha 2008). Processing through the acid bath method requires the printed 
circuit boards be dipped in a solution of hydrochloric acid for a few hours, 
before being boiled with caustic soda solution. It is then manually scrubbed by 
bare hands to remove the paint, and dipped in acid solution (a combination of 
nitric and sulphuric acid) for a few hours. The reaction of acid and copper 
formed copper sulphate (in form of sludge), which is then drained from the 
acid (and copper is recovered) while the acid solution is thrown into nearby 
river or land.  The metals extracted are usually sold to smelters who purify the 
metals and sell them in the market for reuse. 
 
As will be clear, the activities as described above pose an extreme health 
hazard to the worker, (and other people) and a significant risk to the 
environment. Other computer components and their related health and 
environmental hazards are listed in Table 2.7. From a socio-economic 
perspective, the activities in this chain are responsible for providing livelihoods 
to a significant number of urban poor. The system also plays an important role 
in managing the huge amount of e-waste which is not only domestically 
generated, but also imported from more economically developed countries, 
which would otherwise been sent to the landfill. The following sub-section 
discusses the movement of e-waste from the more economically developed 
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countries to the less economically developed countries and its implications, in 
more detail. 
 
Table 2.7: Potential occupational and environmental hazards in recycling 
process of computers 
 
Computer  
Component 
Potential health and 
occupational hazard 
Potential  
environmental hazard 
Cathode ray tubes 
(CRT)/ 
Monitors 
• Silicosis, cut injury, 
inhalation or direct contact 
with phosphor containing 
cadmium and other metals 
such as lead and mercury 
• Release of lead, mercury, 
barium, toxic phosphor and 
other heavy metals into 
water and soil 
Printed circuit  
boards 
• Inhalation of tin, lead, 
dioxin, beryllium, 
cadmium, mercury 
• Air emission of metals and 
dioxins 
Dismantled printed 
circuit boards 
• Inhalation of tin, lead, 
dioxin, beryllium, 
cadmium, mercury and 
respiratory irritation 
• Tin and lead contamination 
of soil and water. 
• Emission of brominated 
dioxin, beryllium, mercury 
and cadmium. 
Chips and other  
related  
components 
• Corrosive injury to eye and 
skin, inhalation of acid 
fumes and harmful gases 
such as chlorine and 
sulphur dioxide 
• Water and soil 
contamination and air 
emission of hydrocarbons, 
heavy metals, halogenated 
substances and acids. 
Plastics from  
computers and  
peripherals 
• Direct contact and 
inhalation of hydrocarbons, 
dioxin, and heavy metal 
• Emissions of dioxins and 
heavy metals and 
hydrocarbons 
Wires and cables • Inhalation of brominated • Emissions of brominated 
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Computer  
Component 
Potential health and 
occupational hazard 
Potential  
environmental hazard 
and chlorinated dioxin, and 
polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs) 
and chlorinated dioxin, 
PAHs 
Miscellaneous 
computer 
parts enveloped 
in rubber 
• Inhalation of dioxins and 
PAHs 
• Emission of dioxins, PAHs 
Toner cartridges • Respiratory irritation, 
unknown carcinogenic 
impact of carbon black, 
cyan, yellow and magenta 
toners 
• Soil and water pollution 
Secondary steel, 
copper 
and precious metal 
smelting 
• Heat injury, inhalation of 
dioxins and heavy metals 
• Emissions of dioxins and 
heavy metals 
Source: Adapted from Puckett et al. 2002  
 
2.4.2 Transboundary Movement of E-waste  
 
Transboundary movement of e-waste is regulated under the Basel Convention. 
The Basel Convention was negotiated in the late 1980s under the auspices of 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) due to the growing 
global environmental concern of the adverse effects of hazardous waste (Basel 
Convention website at www.basel.int). One of the aims of this convention is to 
curb illegal shipping and trading of hazardous waste from the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries to non-
OECD countries, as a way to prevent dumping of hazardous waste, and to 
avoid the negative impacts from treating and disposing of hazardous waste in 
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the less economically developed countries. It was adopted in 1989 and entered 
into force in 1992; and as of December 2010, 175 countries have signed to 
become members of this convention (Basel Convention website at 
www.basel.int).  
 
The Basel Convention is built on two basic principles; ‘Prior Informed 
Consent’ and ‘Environmentally Sound Manner’ (ESM). This is apparent in the 
provision on import and export of e-waste, where written consent from the 
transit and the receiving states, and proof that the waste is treated in an 
‘Environmentally Sound Management (ESM)’ manner must be provided to the 
related authorities before permission to import and export can be granted 
(Levinson et al. 2008). Despite these restrictions, e-waste is still being traded 
between countries in the Global North and the Global South (often illegally) 
(see for example Nnorom and Osibanjo 2008, Puckett 2005, Streicher-Porte et 
al. 2005, Widmer et al. 2005, and Puckett et al. 2002) mainly for two reasons; 
firstly, to be recycled in the less economically developed countries at a lower 
(financial) cost and secondly, to be donated to the relatively poorer population 
in the Global South as a way to ‘bridge the digital divide’ (Nnorom and 
Osibanjo 2008: 1474).  
 
There have been several attempts by numerous researchers to analyse the 
reasons for the wide spreading of transboundary e-waste movement despite the 
availability of an international treaty to overcome the problem. For example, 
Streicher-Porte et al. (2005) and Widmer et al. (2005) relate the problem of 
transboundary movement of e-waste to the lack of national regulation and 
weak enforcement of law in member countries; while Lepawsky and McNabb 
(2010) relate the issue to the loopholes in the treaty itself. Lepawsky and 
McNabb (2010) identify three gaps in Basel Convention: first, contradiction in 
the definition of hazardous waste in the national laws of member countries; 
second, unclear definition of the term ‘environmentally sound manner’; and 
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third, allowance for transboundary movement of e-waste for reuse or recovery 
through recycling.  
 
The economic attraction of e-waste recycling is the pulling factor behind the 
huge demand for e-waste in many less economically developed countries - 
despite its environmental and health hazard - which has led to the export of a 
significant but undetermined volume of e-waste into these countries, from the 
more economically developed countries (Robinson 2009). The loopholes in 
Basel Convention (which allows transboundary movement of e-waste for 
recycling) has led to the problems of some irresponsible exporters ‘re-
categorising’ all exported e-waste as intended for recycling (Lepawsky and 
McNabb 2010: 179). For example, Schmidt (2006) estimates that 80% of 
collected e-waste in the Global North is exported to Asia, and 70% to 90% of 
this goes to China (Liu et al. 2006, Puckett et al. 2002), while significant 
quantities are also exported to India, Pakistan, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and Ghana (Puckett 2005) and possibly to Brazil and 
Mexico (Robinson 2009). Figure 2.5 shows the main e-waste recycling 
countries, the main ports involved and the flow of e-waste movements.  
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Source: Rekacewicz (2002) http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/who-gets-the-trash  
 
Figure 2.5: The main e-waste recycling countries, main e-waste receiving ports 
and the movement of e-waste  
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The activities of handling, transporting, trading, possessing and disposal of 
hazardous waste and resources which contravene to the national law (of any 
country) or the international law are considered as pollution crime 
(INTERPOL website, available at http://www.interpol.int). As transboundary 
movement of e-waste involved international level crime, intervention of 
INTERPOL is seen as a way to overcome the problem. INTERPOL became 
actively involved in fighting pollution crime since 1992, when Pollution Crime 
Working Group was established (INTERPOL website, available at 
http://www.interpol.int). The scope and remit of INTERPOL Pollution Crime 
Working Group, as in other INTERPOL actions, is limited within the laws of 
individual countries and in ‘the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ and avoiding ‘any intervention or activities of a political, military, 
religious or racial character’ (INTERPOL website, available at 
http://www.interpol.int). 
 
Research conducted by Bureau Veritas in the UK and Michigan State 
University in the USA (on behalf of the INTERPOL Pollution Crime Working 
Group (PCWG)) has revealed that the largest volume of cathode ray tube 
(CRT) monitors which were exported from the USA in the year 2007 is 
destined for Malaysia (INTERPOL Pollution Crime Working Group (Phase II) 
Report 2009). According to the report, USA exported 50.7 metric tonnes or 
72% from the total exported CRTs to Malaysia (see Table 2.8 for the volume 
and percentage of exported CRTs from USA to other countries). Although this 
amount seems huge, it could be under-estimated as the data (which were 
obtained from the USA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2007) 
were based on self-reporting system. The actual amount could possibly be 
much higher.  
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Table 2.8: Estimated export volume of CRTs from the USA in 2007 
 
Countries Volume 
(metric tonnes) 
Percentage 
(approximate) 
Canada 11.6 16 
Malaysia 50.7 72 
Brazil 1.0 1 
Korea 7.1 10 
TOTAL 70.4 99 (not 100%, due to 
rounding) 
Source: adapted from the INTERPOL Pollution Crime Working Group (Phase 
II) Report 2009   
 
The movement of e-waste from more developed western countries to the less 
developed countries in Africa and Asia could bring two environment 
implications; first, leakage of hazardous substances during its transportation 
and second, unsustainable processes of material recovery and recycling. The 
processes of material recovery, especially those practised by the informal 
sector in less economically developed countries are often not undertaken in an 
environmentally sound manner and may lead to the leakage of hazardous 
substances. In China, Qiu et al. (2005, in Zhang 2009)  argues that the negative 
health effects of workers in the e-waste recycling and recovery industry are 
higher compared to workers in other industries by these percentages; headache 
(47.7%), itch (15%), nausea (11.1%), insomnia (9.7%), hypomnesia (5.3%) 
and conjunctiva congestion (4.8%).  
 
Besides being traded for recycling purpose, used electrical and electronic 
equipment are also exported to many developing countries as donations, 
especially computers (Robinson 2009), often in the name of ‘bridging the 
digital divide’ (Nnorom and Osibanjo 2008). A study by Basel Action Network 
(BAN) in Nigeria revealed that there are huge amounts of used electrical and 
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electronic equipment especially computers being imported into Nigeria for 
donation or second hand use every year (Puckett 2005).  Based on the tags on 
the imported appliances and the information on the computer hard drives, they 
found that 45% of the computers are from the EU, 45% from the USA and the 
remaining 10% are from other countries such as Japan, Belgium, Finland, 
Israel, Germany, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Norway and Singapore (Puckett 
2005). These equipment - which are considered obsolete in the more 
technology advanced donor countries - will quickly become obsolete and 
turned into e-waste in the recipient country, hence contributing to the increase 
in e-waste generation in those countries. Thus, the donation of electrical and 
electronic equipment from the more economically developed countries to the 
less economically developed countries is seen as an easy way for unscrupulous 
parties to dispose of their e-waste (Robinson 2009, Nnorom and Osibanjo 
2008). As there is no specific provision on movement of e-waste for donation 
in the Basel Convention, it is not considered as an illegal activity (Ladou and 
Lovegrove 2008). However, it is timely that Basel Convention legislate a 
provision to tackle the issue of ‘donating as a guise of dumping’ in managing 
transboundary e-waste movement. One way this could be done is by making it 
mandatory for the donor countries to be responsible for the disposal of the 
donated item; for example all donor countries or organisations are required to 
submit a plan for treatment and disposal of the donated items (once they reach 
their end-of-life) to the related authority in the donor and recipient countries, 
before approval for export can be granted. 
 
2.5 E-waste Management in Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is facing significant challenges related to the rapid increase in the 
volume of e-waste in the country which is coming from two main sources; 
domestically generated and imported e-waste. As mentioned in Section 1.2, 
Malaysia generated 688,000 metric tonnes of e-waste in 2008 (E-waste 
Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009). This data was obtained from 
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surveys involving 1200 respondents from diversified segments of the society 
including households, business entities, institutions, e-waste recyclers, 
electrical and electronic equipment manufacturers, importers and exporters in 
eleven main cities in the country, based on seven types of most common e-
wastes – i.e. television sets, personal computers, mobile phones, refrigerators, 
air conditioner units, washing machines and rechargeable batteries (E-waste 
Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009). This volume of e-waste is 
expected to rise up to 1.1 million metric tonnes in 2020, at a rate of 14% 
annually, according to the same report. The electrical and electronic items 
which have contributed significantly to the volume of e-waste in Malaysia are 
television sets and mobile phones. The huge volume of discarded television 
sets might be due to Malaysian government’s announcement to move into 
digital era and will switch off the analogue era by 2015 (Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission, as reported in The Star, 1 April 
2009).  
 
Besides the increasing amount of locally generated e-waste, Malaysia is also 
exposed to the e-waste trading or smuggling activities due to its location in the 
middle of the e-waste movement route (see Figure 2.5). The increasing amount 
of e-waste generated in Malaysia, coupled with the high possibilities of e-
waste being imported from other countries demand for a proper e-waste 
management framework is put in place especially as there are evidence of 
indiscriminate dumping and improper disposal of e-waste (see Section 5.1), 
thus resulting in the introduction of the first e-waste law – the Environmental 
Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005 – in August 2005. Similar to 
many other countries, e-waste management strategy adopted in Malaysia is 
focused on recycling and material recovery processes. As such, the 
enforcement of Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005 
includes the control of recycling facilities/premises through a licensing system. 
As of July 2010, there are 138 licensed recycling premises throughout the 
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country, with the breakdown between types of premises and its distribution 
among states as in Table 2.9 below.  
 
Table 2.9: The number and distribution of e-waste recovery premises in 
Malaysia 
  
State Partial 
Recovery 
Premises 
Full 
Recovery 
Premises 
Johor 17 3 
Kedah 12 1 
Melaka 12 3 
Negeri Sembilan 5 1 
Perak 4 0 
Pulau Pinang (Penang) 37 6 
Sarawak 5 0 
Selangor 25 2 
Wilayah Persekutuan 5 0 
Total 122 16 
 
All these premises are operated by private companies. These recycling 
companies collect e-waste from non-householders (such as industries and large 
institutions) based on yearly contract; as such these companies are also known 
as ‘e-waste contractors’. Out of 138 e-waste recycling companies (as at July 
2010), 122 companies are involved in partial recovery which refers to the 
process of collecting, segregating, dismantling and crushing of the equipment, 
(where the recovered materials will need further treatment before final 
products are produced); while the remaining 16 companies are involved in full 
recovery process  which refers to the complete chain of processes starting from 
dismantling of e-waste and recovery of precious metals, up to final disposal of 
treated hazardous. Plate 2.10 shows the computer dismantling process in one of 
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the full recovery premises. The technology employed by material recovery 
premises in Malaysia to recover precious metals from e-waste is limited to wet 
chemical processes and electrolysis (Awang 2010). Several different pieces of 
machinery used in the process are shown in Plate 2.12 and Plate 2.13.  
 
 
Plate 2.10: Dismantling of used 
computer at a recycling company in 
Malaysia. (Source: Reclaimtek (M) 
Sdn. Bhd.) 
 
Plate 2.11: A worker is engaged in 
manual dismantling of a used 
computer. (Source: Scrap Computer 
Trading) 
 
Plate 2.12: A crusher plant. (Source: 
Reclaimtek (M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
Plate 2.13: An e-waste recovery plant. 
(Source: Reclaimtek (M) Sdn. Bhd.) 
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While the e-waste generated, imported and processed by the non-householders 
in Malaysia (which include all industries, institutions and business entities) is 
regulated and controlled by law provision, there is no formal or 
institutionalized system of managing household generated e-waste. More over, 
the government does not provide facilities for proper disposal of e-waste. The 
issue of lack of formal system of management and disposal facilities, coupled 
with the low level of awareness among the society have resulted in improper 
disposal of e-waste, where small-sized e-waste (such as mobile phones and 
batteries) are disposed of together with normal household waste and ended up 
in landfill, and bulky items (such as refrigerators, computers, television sets) 
are being dumped indiscriminately, while some items are sold to door-to-door 
scrap buyers/dealers who are not licensed to collect and treat e-waste. 
Although the amount of e-waste disposed of by each member of the society 
may be small, it has tremendous cumulative and collective effects. The flow of 
e-waste in this manner exposes the society to environmental and health hazard. 
The failure of the government of Malaysia to provide a proper mechanism of e-
waste management, has triggered some concerned non-government 
stakeholders to step in and work together with the government to provide a 
better system of e-waste collection from the society, such as initiating 
voluntary take-back schemes (refer Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). However, these 
initiatives of societal steering for proper disposal of e-waste are not widespread 
nationwide, and only concentrated in several major towns. As such, the 
Malaysian government and related non-government stakeholders are working 
together towards introducing a relevant take-back law to control the negative 
environmental and health effect of improper household e-waste disposal (refer 
Section 5.2.4). 
 
In relation to e-waste recycling and material recovery activities, Malaysia faces 
the challenge of tracking down unlicensed/ illegal operators, as many of them 
operate from backyards of houses or shop houses, normally in secluded areas, 
and often in the pretext of other legal business such as buying and selling of 
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non-hazardous waste. These operators (mainly involved in partial recovery 
activities) conduct recycling and recovery activities of e-waste in an unsafe and 
unsound manner. For example in Plate 2.11, computer parts and components 
are left lying around on the floor, posing the danger of accident to the workers. 
In Plate 2.14 and Plate 2.15, obsolete computers which are waiting to be 
processed are left in the open air, exposing it to leakage of hazardous 
substances to the soil and groundwater. In addition to that, Plate 2.16 and Plate 
2.17 show a huge amount of dismantled e-waste components left under 
unprotected area, which is also posing significant health and environmental 
should the hazardous substances leak into the environment.  
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Plate 2.14: Piles of obsolete 
computers at a recycling company in 
Malaysia. (Source: Scrap Computer 
Trading) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.15: Dismantled computers 
awaiting further processing. (Source: 
Scrap Computer Trading) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.16: E-waste components. 
(Source: Scrap Computer Trading) 
 
 
 
 
Plate 2.17: Dismantled components of 
e-waste. (Source: Scrap Computer 
Trading) 
 
There is no record to date on accidents of environmental problems due to 
environmentally unsound process of recycling or material recovery of e-waste 
in Malaysia (E-waste Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009). Though 
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anecdotal accounts, including a report in the local newspaper (The Malay Mail, 
April 2005), suggest that such health hazards are experienced, including severe 
skin damage from exposure to acids in an e-waste recycling facility (E-waste 
Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009). 
 
As a conclusion, e-waste management in Malaysia is targeted towards the 
middle of the waste management hierarchy with a strong emphasis of recycling 
and material recovery processes to avoid disposal, and has so far shown no 
attempt to achieve the most desirable option in waste management triangle (i.e. 
prevention of e-waste generation). To ensure that the process of e-waste 
recycling and material recovery are conducted in an environmental sound 
manner with minimal impacts to the environment and society, Malaysian 
government imposed a law (Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) 
Regulations 2005) which controls the treatment of non-household e-waste 
which is sourced domestically (from industries, business entities and 
institutions) and abroad (from legal imports), while the management of locally 
generated household e-waste is shared with several non-governmental 
stakeholders. Several main problems related to e-waste recycling and material 
recovery management strategy adopted in Malaysia includes; the influx of 
illegal import or smuggling of e-waste due to ineffective enforcement of law;  
rapid growth of locally generated e-waste due to the lack of prevention and 
minimization strategies; indiscriminate dumping and improper disposal of e-
waste due to lack of facilities provided and low awareness among the society; 
and tracking down illegal e-waste recycling operators.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The issue of sustainable waste management is becoming more challenging 
with the emergence of a relatively new type of waste in the waste stream; the 
e-waste. E-waste is a contemporary environmental issue due to its rapid growth 
in volume and its hazardous content. Despite its hazardous potential, e-waste 
contains considerable amounts of precious materials which provide a profitable 
business opportunity. Thus, for both environmental and economic reasons, 
many countries worldwide adopt recycling and material recovery strategy to 
manage e-waste.  
 
The economic value of e-waste has induced the proliferation of illegal export 
or smuggling of e-waste especially from the countries in Global North to the 
countries in the Global South, where precious metals can be recovered from e-
waste at cheaper cost. One particular country in the Asian region which adopts 
recycling and material recovery strategy as an option to manage e-waste is 
Malaysia. As mentioned in Section 2.5, main issues relating to adoption of this 
waste management option in Malaysia includes illegal import or smuggling of 
e-waste, rapid growth of locally generated e-waste, indiscriminate dumping 
and improper disposal of e-waste, and tracking down illegal e-waste recycling 
operators. These call for a strong cooperation of government and non-
governmental stakeholders to govern this environmental issue together, as 
traditional governing by the government alone has proved (refer Chapter 5, 6 
and 7) to be too challenging for the government. 
 
Recycling practices in Asian and African countries are mainly based on 
economic potential. In these countries, e-waste is treated as just another type of 
recyclable item and the process is characteristically undertaken without proper 
environmental procedures, often by illegal recycling operators who operate 
informally outside of the main business circle. This has brought many 
consequences such as high occupational health risks to the workers due to the 
 52 
 
exposure to hazardous materials, and negative impact on the environment and 
the society at large as a result of the inappropriate disposal of hazardous 
materials from the recycling and material recovery processes. From the 
resource conservation perspective, such informal practices are ineffective as 
the percentage of recovery is low and many of the valuable materials are lost 
during the inefficient recovery processes. It is thus obvious that leaving the 
recycling of e-waste to the informal sector is not a sustainable option, both 
environmentally and economically. 
 
Although e-waste recycling practices in the more economically developed 
countries appear to be more technologically advanced and environmentally 
sound compared to those in the less economically developed countries, they 
still pose environmental and health threats as it is impossible to recycle e-waste 
without any environmental impacts (Hischier et al. 2005). Recycling process 
may remove some contaminants, but some amount of hazardous substances 
may still be concentrated at e-waste recycling centres (Robinson 2009). 
However, e-waste recycling and material recovery management strategy have a 
relatively lower environmental impact compared to disposal (through landfill 
or incinerator) management option (Hischier et al. 2005). However, all 
stakeholders of e-waste management, from the government and non-
governmental sectors worldwide should consider shifting the management 
options towards the top of the waste management hierarchy (prevention and 
waste minimization) by substituting the hazardous materials in e-waste with 
non-hazardous materials (as pioneered by the EU with the enforcement of 
RoHS directive in 2003) and encouraging redesign of equipment (which 
facilitates replacements of parts of equipment to cope with technology 
advancement instead of disposing items in whole) for a better control of the 
negative impacts of e-waste.   
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Chapter 3: The Conceptuality of E-waste Governance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The term ‘governance’ is defined in many ways and has been used in different 
contexts. Because of its extensive application, the term ‘governance’ receives 
diverse interpretations; making it a highly contested term. Nevertheless, in this 
research a broad definition is adopted within which it is understood as ‘a 
process of guiding, directing or steering of society’ (Jordan et al. 2005: 479). 
Based on this definition of governance, this chapter seeks to understand the 
governance concept and its application within the specific fields of 
environmental policy and waste management. While much of the debate on 
governance has originated outside the environmental sphere, there is a growing 
interest in the concept within the field of environmental policy and waste 
management. The challenge for governance analysts in analyzing 
environmental issues is to facilitate deeper understanding of the governance 
approaches, whilst preserving the broad concept of governance (Jordan et al. 
2005, Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). 
 
At the centre of the debates on governance is the proposition of a shift from 
government to governance, which is related to the shift on perception on the 
relation between society and economy (Jessop 1997). Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of this debate and a detail account of the main characteristics of 
governance; which are the multiplicity of levels, actors and modes of 
governance. One question which is of interest to governance analysts is the 
ability of nation states and non-state actors to practice governance in an 
increasingly complex world (Kjær 2004, van Kersbergen and van Waarden 
2004). Thus, it is the aim of this chapter to seek the answer to this question 
based on analysis on environmental governance from the perspective of 
multiple levels, actors and modes of governance. Modes of governance in this 
thesis is understood as the mechanism to achieve governance, and is divided 
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into four types, namely; hierarchical, persuasion, self-governance and co-
governance mode. A stronger emphasis is given here to the analysis of modes 
of governance as it is intricately linked to other perspective of governance such 
as multiple levels and actors of governance. For example, a multiple modes 
perspective on environmental governance allows for a deeper understanding of 
the roles of different actors, as actors behave differently in different modes of 
governance. A detailed account of the applications of multiple levels, actors 
and modes of governance perspectives in the analysis of environmental 
governance are discussed in Section 3.3.  Discussions are based on literatures 
on case studies from the Global North and Global South, mostly related to 
current significant environmental issues such as pollution, climate change and 
waste management. Taken together, this chapter is wrapped up with a 
conclusion in Section 3.4 which states that the multiplicity perspective of 
governance offers an avenue to examine the intricate, complex and sometimes 
overlapping relations of multiple levels, actors and modes of governance for a 
holistic and comprehensive understanding of e-waste governance in Malaysia.  
 
3.2 Governance: Definition and Transition of Interpretation 
 
One way governance is understood is as a process of steering of societies by 
state and non-state actors. It is defined by Kooiman (1993) as ‘the patterns that 
emerge from the governing activities’ (Kooiman 1993: 2); while governing 
activities is defined as ‘purposeful effort to guide, steer, control or manage 
(sectors or facets of) societies’ (Kooiman 1993: 2). Governing activities have 
shifted from the ‘rowing’ actions of government through the ‘formal public 
sector agencies’ and ‘bureaucratic procedures’ (Davoudi and Evans 2005: 495) 
to ‘steering’ actions where directing is provided without force or sanction. The 
concept of governance describes a range of processes and practices that 
signifies ‘dispersion’ of decision making authority away from central 
government (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 233), and introduces ‘new’ modes of 
governing alongside traditional hierarchical mode.  
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The shift from government to governance has been a topic of debate in various 
fields in social science. There are scholars who relate the shift to the 
introduction of the of neoliberal policy after the 1980s which resulted in the 
rolling back of state activities in service delivery (see Thornley 1993), while 
others argue that the shift is due to the socio-economic change which is 
apparent in the move from Keynesian welfare state to post-Fordist flexible 
specialisation (see Jessop 1995). De Angelis (2003) relates the shift to the 
massive growth of civil society organizations (CSOs) which have influenced 
the decision making process. Although the line separating the shift from 
government to governance is blurry, Jessop’s (1997) argument that the central 
issue behind the shift from government to governance is the restructuring of 
state’s role in governing the interaction between societies and economy 
captures the essence of the debate. 
 
Based on the arguments above, governance can be regarded as a complex 
arrangement where the ability to govern does not rely exclusively on the 
authority, legitimacy and sanctions of governments (Hysing 2009, De Angelis 
2003), but is shared with non-state actors with the application of ‘new’ modes 
of governance. Two dimensions of governance debate which have received 
sustained attention are regarding power and democracy (and legitimacy). 
Power has always been in the forefront of governance analyses; particularly 
regarding the power and authority of nation state. Questions arose about 
whether the power of the nation state has been eroded in the shift from 
government to governance, and the consequences of this shift. There are 
several camps of thoughts about this. Several governance analysts (such as 
Macleod and Goodwin 1999, Rhodes 1997, and Jessop 1994) argue that there 
has been a hollowing out of the nation state, as functions of the nation state are 
dispersed beyond national boundaries and to non-state actors; while on the 
other extreme Bell et al (2010) argues that the role of states is strengthened in 
the governance process. The views of others, such as Pierre (2000), 
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Karkkainen (2004) and Rosenau and Durfee (1999) stand in the middle of 
these two extremes. For example, Pierre (2000)  argues that state’s authority is 
being ‘transformed’ rather than decline in governance process, while 
Karkkainen (2004), and Rosenau and Durfee (1999) suggest that governance 
resulted in lack of dominance of state actors, but not to the extent of hollowing 
it out. 
 
The second concern is regarding democracy and legitimacy in governance, 
which is a controversial issue and has caused disagreement among governance 
scholars. One of the underlying expectations of governance is to increase the 
level of democracy and legitimacy in decision-making process with the 
inclusion of non-state actors (Trubek and Trubek 2005, Kjær 2004, Stoker 
2000). However, this is criticized by a few scholars (see Bell et al. 2010, Bell 
and Hindmoor 2009, Steffek and Smismans 2008, Smismans 2006) who argue 
that democracy in decision making is only achievable if the governance actors 
are selected through a democratic process. Therefore, the participation of non-
state actors in governance process is not an indication of democracy. 
Futhermore, according to Newman (2001) governance is having lack of 
legitimacy and integrity from the legal dimension due to the involvement of 
non-state actors in policy formation and implementation, as the legitimacy of 
some non-state actors such as NGOs are under question. Despite the critiques 
and disagreements among scholars, there is a degree of agreement about the 
features which governance is said to exhibit which is the multiplicity of levels, 
actors and modes of governance. This is discussed in the following section.  
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3.2.1 The Multiple Levels and Actors of Governance 
 
The multiple levels perspective of governance revolves around the idea of 
power distribution among the various levels of authority (Jordan and Schout 
2005, Klooster 2005, Bulkeley and Betsill 2003, Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
The concept of sharing of governing power between tiers of authority was 
originally conceived as a basis for the analysis of transitions within processes 
of decision making within the European Union (Jordan 2001, Hooghe and 
Marks 1996),  but has since been applied elsewhere (Betsill and Bulkeley 
2006). The emergence of regional forms of government (like EU) has seen that 
trickle-down of power has expanded beyond a sovereign state (Hooghe and 
Marks 2003). Drawing on the works of Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) and 
Hooghe and Marks (2003), the dispersion of authority in new governance can 
be categorized into two directions: vertically, where governance takes place 
within the multiple tiers of government, known as ‘Type I’ governance by 
Hooghe and Marks (2003: 256), or multiple ‘tiers’ of authority by Betsill and 
Bulkeley (2006: 150); and horizontally, where governance happens between 
multiple governance actors, known as ‘Type II’ governance by Hooghe and 
Marks (2003: 256) or multiple ‘spheres’ of authority by Betsill and Bulkeley 
(2006: 150). 
 
Another characteristic of governance is the inclusion of non-state actors 
(Sørensen 2006, Davoudi and Evans 2005). The term ‘non-state actor’ is 
amorphous and has been defined in numerous ways (Schwartz 2004). In this 
thesis, however, the term is used to refer to actors in the governance process 
which are independent from the state and are legally registered. The literature 
on the role of multiple actors in governance is rapidly increasing, though three 
main strands can be discerned. The first strand takes the state-centric 
perspective and focuses on the importance of the state’s roles in new 
governance (see Schout et al. 2010, Bell et al. 2010, Bell and Hindmoor 2009, 
Scott 2009, Hysing 2009, Trubek and Trubek 2005, Jordan et al. 2003, 
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Fairbrass and Jordan 2002); the second strand is based on society-centric view 
and focuses on the roles of non-state actors (see Shi and Zhang 2006, Ahmed 
and Ali 2006, Davoudi and Evans 2005, Schwartz 2004, Rhodes 1997, 
Appadurai 1996);  while the third strand steers in the middle of the two 
extremes (see Davies 2008, Karkkainen 2004, Rosenau and Durfee 1999). 
 
3.2.2 The Multiple Modes of Governance 
 
Another distinctive characteristic of governance is its ‘new’ modes of 
governance. Many governance scholars (see Sørensen and Torfing 2009, 
Dinica and Bressers 2004, Kooiman 2003) stress the importance of 
understanding the different type, qualities and capacities of modes of 
governance, in designing the best governance mode option as it is very rare for 
today’s society which is more complex and diverse to be governed by one 
mode. The multiplicity of the modes of governance has been studied from 
many perspectives. Although the work concerning modes of governance is 
abundant, there is ‘little consensus on what a mode of governance entails’ 
(Bulkeley et al. 2007: 2736). In this thesis, ‘mode’ of governance is understood 
as a mechanism in which governance is achieved.  
 
Bell and Hindmoor (2009), study modes of governance from perspective of 
state-centric relational approach to governance, and identify five different 
modes; hierarchy, persuasion, markets, community engagement, associations. 
While Kooiman (2003) examines modes of governance from social-political 
approach (a society-centric approach) and identifies three modes: hierarchy, 
co-governance and self-governance. Further analysis of these two studies 
reveals that there are similar modes which are given different labels by 
different scholars. For example the associations mode discussed by Bell and 
Hindmoor (2009) is conceptually similar to what Kooiman (2003) addressed as 
co-governance; and community engagement mode (in Bell and Hindmoor 
2009) has many similarities with a governance mode which is labeled as self-
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governance by Kooiman (2003). Some elements of self-governance as 
discussed by Kooiman (2003) - such as deregulation and privatisation- is 
described in Bell and Hindmoor (2009) under the label of ‘governance through 
markets’. Based on the combination of the works of Bell and Hindmoor (2009) 
and Kooiman (2003) (which are based on contrasting perspectives), this thesis 
indentifies four types of governance modes; hierarchy, persuasion, self-
governance and co- governance. 
 
The Hierarchical Mode of Governance 
 
The first governance mode (identified by both Bell and Hindmoor (2009) and 
Kooiman (2003)) is hierarchical governance. Hierarchical governance is 
characterized by top-down control, where governing entities determine how 
policy should be conducted and implemented to achieve some preferred end 
point in a given situation (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, Jordan 2008, Kooiman 
2003). In this conventional mode of governance, the behaviour of other 
participating actors is influenced by governing authorities in a formal and 
vertical structure, often with sanctions (Kooiman 2003). Two important 
concepts identified by Kooiman in hierarchical governance are steering and 
control. Hierarchical mode of governance is closely related to the 
implementation of neoliberal agenda, such as the implementation of ‘good 
governance’ concept, which deals with issues of efficient, accountable and 
transparent delivery of public services (Jordan 2008, Hezri and Dovers 2006). 
 
The Persuasion Mode of Governance 
 
The second mode is the persuasion mode. This mode is identified in Bell and 
Hindmoor (2009), but not mentioned in Kooiman (2003). Bell et al. (2010), 
and Bell and Hindmoor (2009) define persuasion as a mode of governance 
where actors of governance seek to change two things in the society that is 
being governed - the behaviour of members of the society, and mindset of the 
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members regarding how they ought to behave – in order to achieve specific 
policy objectives. There are numerous examples of how governments have 
applied this mode of governance; from the French government’s campaign to 
increase birth rates after the World War I to current examples on wider health 
and environment-related issues in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada 
(Bell et al. 2010).  Although most of the examples in the literature are drawn 
from the Global North, persuasion as a governance mode is also applied in 
countries in the Global South.  
 
The Self-governance Mode 
 
The third mode is self-governance. According to Kooiman (2003), self 
governance refers to the capacity of social entities to govern themselves 
autonomously. Kooiman and Jentoft (2009) defined self-governance as ‘the 
situation in which actors take care of themselves, outside the purview of 
government’ (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009: 821). Interest in self governance as a 
mode of governance began with the trend towards withdrawing public 
interventions by means of deregulation or privatisation in the 1980s. Its 
emergence is due to two reasons; firstly in search of ways to strengthen self-
steering capacity of the society, and secondly in search for other actors of 
governance other than the state, in certain areas where the state cannot fulfill 
its governing promises (Kooiman 2003). Kooiman (2003) cites the governance 
of powerful professional bodies such as the legal and medical professionals as 
examples of application of the self governance mode. These bodies formulate 
and enact their own rules to the exclusion of outsiders. Self-governing is 
sometimes seen as operating under the shadow of the state actors, as sectors of 
society can only govern themselves if they are allowed to do so by the 
government (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009); however, as self-governance is not 
created by the government, it is considered as a type of governance mode.  
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The Co-governance Mode 
 
The fourth mode, co-governance, is one of the most prominent defining 
characteristic of the ‘new’ governance (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001).  
Kooiman identifies five major manifestations of co-governance: 
communicative governance, co-management, regimes, public-private 
partnerships (PPP), and networks, which are conceptualized differently 
depending on the disciplines dealing with them. One type of co-governance 
mode that warrants detailed discussion here is PPP for two reasons. Firstly, its 
extensive application as the preferred mode of governance in many states in 
recent years, including in environmental governance (Jordan 2008), and 
secondly, the ways in which it overlaps with another important aspect of 
governance - the multiple actors of governance. PPP can be defined as an 
arrangement existing between two or more organizations from two or more 
sectors working towards a commonly defined goal (Darlow and Newby 1997, 
Taket and White 2000). It involves the sharing of risks and benefits among 
partners, and depends on a great degree on interdependency, trust, co-
operation, common goals, and the division of responsibilities and authority 
among partners (Kooiman 2003, Klijn and Teisman 2003, Davies 2002, Taket 
and White 2000, Darlow and Newby 1997).  
 
Osborne (2000) defines partnerships as a long term strategic collaboration 
intended to realise the broader aims of partners. PPP may carry different labels 
such as joined-up governance, governance network, co-governance 
mechanism, strategic alliances, or deliberative forums (Sørensen and Torfing 
2009). Kooiman (2003), however notes the difference between PPP and 
network: partnership involves interactions of two or more organizations from 
two or more sectors of society, while network interaction can occur between 
organizations, both inter-sector and intra-sector (Kooiman 2003). Based on the 
works of Sørensen and Torfing (2009) and Kooiman (2003), this thesis adopts 
a ‘litmus test’ to identify a PPP.  Any governance arrangement that have the 
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following characteristics is labeled as a PPP; firstly, the actors are from two or 
more different sectors in the society, one which represents  the government; 
secondly, the actors engaged in the governance mode are interdependent yet 
autonomous; and finally, the governance process is based on negotiated 
interactions and joint decision making.  
 
Taket and White (2000) distinguish three different types of partnerships; 
strategic, tactical and operational. The strategic type of partnership is 
concerned with things like developing policy, development of political will and 
target setting which are more common at international and regional levels. The 
tactical type of partnerships on the other hand involves the establishment of 
bodies to carry out necessary work, development of instruments such as 
expertise, budgets and legislation, setting of operational targets and resource 
allocation. Finally, the operational type of partnerships encompasses the use of 
instruments, service delivery, and implementation which can be summarized as 
being primarily concerned with taking action and is more prominent at local 
levels. However, it is important to note that more than one type of partnership 
may be present in any particular situation.  
 
There are three approaches which are commonly taken to the analysis of 
partnership; power, inter-dependency and performance (Morse and McNamara 
2008). The third approach – studying the performance of partnerships is 
commonly adopted by scholars, for example Sørensen and Torfing (2009), 
Slater et al. (2007), and Hudson and Hardy (2002). In increasing the 
performance of PPPs, Slater et al. (2007) recommend that state actors should 
play a less controlling role and instead increase on co-ordinating and enabling 
roles, while Hudson and Hardy (2002) insist on the importance of existence of 
support and commitment from the most senior levels of all the participating 
organisations. Sørensen and Torfing (2009) in researching the effectiveness of 
partnerships have demonstrated how various metagovernance tools can be 
employed by actors of governance not only to assess the performance of PPP, 
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but also to enhance democracy. The following discussions are examples of 
how new governance is applied in the governance of environment, particularly 
waste governance. 
 
3.3 Governance: The Application in Environmental, Waste and E-
waste Management 
 
The concept of governance which is characterized with its multiplicity in terms 
of levels, actors and modes has been widely applied in the analysis of 
environmental governance including issues of waste governance (or any 
special type of waste such as e-waste). As put by Davies (2009), 
‘environmental governance analyses are useful because they permit attention to 
the multitude of actors operating at a range of scales’ (Davies 2009: 157). The 
remaining part of this section focuses on the application of multiple levels, 
multiple actors and multiple modes perspective in environmental governance 
analysis based on extensive literature review. 
 
3.3.1 The Multiple Levels of Environmental Governance 
 
The increasingly complex environmental issues warrant a holistic and 
comprehensive perspective of governance analysis which acknowledges the 
vertical and horizontal interrelations of the multiple actors, scales and modes 
governance, and could not longer depend on simple analysis which is based on 
discrete division of actors and scales. Examples from climate change and waste 
management issues have shown that the focus of the environmental 
governance has transcended beyond the commonly accepted geographical and 
political boundaries. For example, the issue of climate change governance 
shifts down from transnational focus to national and sub-national scales 
(Bulkeley and Betsill 2003), while the issue of waste management shifts 
upwards from local scale to supra-national scale (Bulkeley et al. 2005, Davies 
2008, Levinson et. al 2008).  
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Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) have demonstrated that the application of 
multilevel perspective in the analysis of climate change governance recognizes 
the multiplicity of actors and modes of governance, beyond state actors and 
hierarchical mode, as normally accepted in traditional environmental 
governance analysis. The multilevel perspective highlights the reducing control 
of state actors at national level in decision making; which is not an indication 
of the weakening of the state but rather a ‘redefinition of scope and scale of 
state activity’ and a ‘reorganization of social relations between actors’, which 
in certain instances may possibly strengthen the state’s power (Betsill and 
Bulkeley 2006: 153).    
 
The multilevel perspective of environmental governance also allows for 
acknowledgement of sub-national actors in supra-national environmental 
concerns. This is demonstrated by Gustavsson et al. (2009) in a study on 
climate change mitigation action in Sweden. Gustavsson et al. (2009) finding 
resonates with the finding of Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) on this matter where 
local level interventions should be seen as part of global politics, alongside 
supra-national negotiations, agreements and policy development. The 
interlinking of ‘power’ and ‘influence’ of diverse actors at various levels is 
paramount in the construction of local governance of global environmental 
issue (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006: 154).  
 
On the other hand, the issue of waste management received a wider and 
interrelated analysis with the application of multilevel governance perspective. 
Two examples are the work of Bulkeley et al. (2007 and 2005) and Davies 
(2008). The research by Bulkeley et al. (2007 and 2005) examine the nature 
and development of municipal waste policy in the north-east region of 
England, based on extensive data collection method such as policy documents 
analysis, semi structured interview, in-depth interview, participant observation 
and workshops; while Davies (2008) compares the processes, practices and 
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negotiations between different actors (operating at and across different scales), 
which led to policy interventions, in Ireland and New Zealand from data 
collected by comprehensive policy analysis and interviews. Studies by 
Bulkeley et al. (2005) and Davies (2008) have proved that the supra-national 
actors are exerting power that influenced and determined the policy at local 
level. For example, EU legislation such as statutory targets for diverting waste 
from landfill and waste management performance indicators are communicated 
to the local level, and thus has been very influential in shaping the policy at 
sub-national level in EU member countries (Bulkeley et al. 2005, Davies 
2008). In the UK particularly, the European Landfill Directive has had a 
profound impact on the policy priorities and goals at all levels, and is changing 
the national, regional, and local policy framework for sustainable municipal 
waste policy (Bulkeley et al. 2005). The multilevel perspective of 
environmental governance adopted in two studies mentioned above has 
highlighted the transition of municipal waste governing system from ‘a linear 
and state-dominated’ system, to a perplexed and intricate interlinking 
relationship among ‘various levels of state activity and non-state actors’ 
(Davies 2008: 171, quoting Jessop 1994 and Rosenau 1992). 
 
Far from being confined to the governance of municipal waste, the transition of 
governing system as mentioned above is also evident in governance of e-waste. 
The dispersion of governing authority from UN to nation states (at global 
level) and from EU to the European member states (at regional level) are 
reported in various literatures (see Levinson et al. 2008, Kocasoy and Durmus 
2008, Khetriwal et al. 2008). Kocasoy and Durmus (2008) and Khetriwal et al. 
(2008), applied the multilevel perspective of environmental governance in 
analysing the dispersion of law on e-waste control from authority at regional 
level (EU) downwards to national level (EU member states), due to the 
enforcement of the WEEE directive and RoHS directive in 2003 (refer Section 
2.4). The WEEE and RoHS directives require EU member states to formulate 
and implement national level laws on e-waste control by 13 August 2004, to 
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avoid legal action from the European Court of Justice (Mohan et al. 2008). The 
work of Kocasoy and Durmus (2008) and Khetriwal et al. (2008) have revealed 
that while the basic elements of e-waste problem in EU member states are 
similar, there are several ways of adopting EU directives in tackling it as 
different EU member states are interpreting the directives differently and the 
multiplicity in terms of actors and modes of governance varies between 
countries. Multilevel perspective of environmental governance analysis allows 
for appreciation of diversities among national level governing entities which 
results in differences in interpreting and shaping policies. Governance analysis 
from multilevel lens recognizes that no single solution is best for all member 
states due to this multiplicity.  
 
Adoption of multilevel perspective of e-waste (for example by Goosey 2004) 
creates a space to look at other governance actors outside of the boundaries of 
traditional state entities.  Multilevel perspective highlights PSAs as the targets 
of EU’s WEEE and RoHS directives are other than state members. WEEE and 
RoHS require PSAs (manufacturers and retailers) to participate in managing e-
waste by providing free take-back schemes for obsolete products; and redesign 
of products and substituting hazardous content in manufactured products to 
reduce the hazardous impacts of e-waste. As the manufacturing industries 
related to the production of electrical and electronic equipment are located 
across the globe, these directives thus have an indirect impact to other 
countries outside the EU, indicating an intricate linking of vertical chains of 
multiple levels of governance and horizontal lines of multiple actors of 
governance. For example, Dell (a computer manufacturer with the head office 
in USA) launched a world-wide scale of voluntary take-back scheme of all 
Dell branded computer and other brand computers in exchange of a new Dell 
brand computer; and a Japanese electrical and electronic equipment 
manufacturing company in Malaysia produced only RoHS’s acceptable 
products (in terms of hazardous substances content allowable permit) as the 
products are exported to European countries. 
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Another example of the trickle down of supra-national power and authority to 
the national level governing entity is evident in the enforcement of Basel 
Convention (refer Section 2.4.2) in controlling transboundary movements of e-
waste (see for example the works of Nnorom and Osibanjo 2008, Puckett 
2005, Streicher-Porte et al. 2005, Widmer et al. 2005, and Puckett et al. 2002). 
The Basel Convention requires all member countries to formulate appropriate 
national legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic of hazardous waste. 
The effect of Basel Convention on individual member countries is profound, 
and is evident through the growing amount of national level e-waste law (refer 
Table 3.1). It is apparent that many countries worldwide are starting to transfer 
the burden of e-waste management to manufactures and other parties. This 
development has significant consequences in e-waste governance. It introduces 
and creates an avenue for non-state actors, particularly the private sector actors 
from across the world to play a role in e-waste governance at national and 
supra national levels. Besides the PSAs, NGOs have also been actively 
involved in e-waste governance. For example, Basel Action Network (BAN) is 
an NGO based in the USA, which was purposely established to manage issues 
related to Basel Convention and movements of hazardous waste, even though 
USA is not a party to Basel Convention. The application of multilevel 
governance perspective in this case has highlighted the complex web of 
interactions between state and non-state actors of governance, which are 
operating at various layers of governance; indicating the significant of 
multidimensionality in environmental governance analysis. This is not 
achievable with the traditional analysis of governance.     
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Table 3.1: The e-waste legislations in different countries. 
  
Country/ 
State 
Law/regulation/legislation Date of 
enforcement 
Responsibility 
Switzerland • Ordinance on the Return, Taking back 
and Disposal of Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (ORDEE) 
• July 1998 • Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Taiwan • Waste Disposal Act • 1998 
(amended) 
• Producer 
(financial 
responsibility 
only, not 
physical 
responsibility) 
Denmark • Statutory Order from the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy No. 1067 
• December 
1999 
• Local 
government 
Netherlands • Disposal of White and Brown Goods 
Decree 
• January 
1999 
• Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Norway • Regulations regarding Scrapped 
Electrical and Electronic Products 
• July 1999 • Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Belgium • Environmental Policy Agreements on 
the take-back obligation for waste 
from electrical and electronic 
equipment 
• March 2001 • Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Japan • Specified Home Appliances Recycling 
Law 
 
• Law for Promotion of Effective 
Utilization of Resources 
• Enacted 
1998, 
enforced 
April 2001 
• 2001 for 
business 
PCs, 2003 
• Manufacturer 
• Retailer 
 
• Manufacturer 
 69 
 
Country/ 
State 
Law/regulation/legislation Date of 
enforcement 
Responsibility 
for 
household 
PCs 
Sweden • The Producer Responsibility for 
Electrical and Electronic Products 
Ordinance (SFS 2000:208) 
• July 2001 • Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Germany • Act Governing the Sale, Return and 
Environmentally Sound Disposal of 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
(ElektroG Act) 
• March 2005 • Manufacturer 
• Importer 
Malaysia • Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005 
• 15 August 
2005 
• Manufacturer 
• e-waste 
contractor 
Korea • EPR in Recycling Law 
 
• 2003 • Manufacturer 
China • Administrative Measures on the 
Control of Pollution Caused by 
Electronic Information Products (often 
referred to as the Chinese RoHS) 
• Adopted 
2006 and 
took effect 1 
March 2007 
• Manufacturer 
China • Measures on Environmental 
Management of Electrical and 
Electronic Waste 
• Adopted 
2007 and 
took effect 
February 
2008 
• Manufacturer 
• Importer 
• Retailer 
China • Management Rule on Recycling and 
Disposal of Waste Electrical 
Household Appliances 
• Pending 
adoption 
• Government 
agency 
• Producer 
• Importer 
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Country/ 
State 
Law/regulation/legislation Date of 
enforcement 
Responsibility 
• Retailer 
• Collector  
• Enterprise 
• Consumer. 
Sources: (Khetriwal et al. 2009, Yang 2008, Terazono et al. 2006) 
 
As a conclusion, the application of multilevel perspective in environmental 
governance analysis highlights the significance of governance across the 
political boundaries of a sovereign state and the involvement of non-state 
actors in managing the global environmental issues which are becoming more 
complex. This perspective is more commonly applied in the Global North, 
compared to the Global South. However, as mentioned above, countries in the 
Global South are also involved in the intricate web of multiple levels and 
actors of governance and hence multilevel perspective may offer an avenue for 
a more comprehensive analysis of environmental governance.   
 
3.3.2 The Multiple Actors in Environmental Governance 
 
The involvement of non-state actors, which include the private sector actors 
(PSAs) and Civil Society Organisation (CSOs), in environmental governance 
multiplied rapidly after Rio Earth Summit 1992. There is evidence that private 
and civil society actors have become involved in processes of environmental 
governance in different countries in both the Global North (see Strømsnes et al. 
2009 for case studies in Norway) and Global South (for example the work of 
Martens 2006 and Schwartz 2004 for involvement of non-state actors in China) 
in attempts to address environmental problems. The complex nature of 
ecosystem which is both dynamic and interconnected requires a move beyond 
the ‘command and control’ approach by the state actors. The multi-actor 
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perspective of environmental governance analysis provides an avenue for 
consideration of the roles of non-state actors in governance practice. 
 
One of the main reasons of the involvement of non-state actors in 
environmental governance - either alone in practising self-governance, or 
together with state actors in co-governance, persuasion and hierarchical modes 
of governance - is the incapability of the state to manage and control 
environmental problems such as air pollution problem in China (Shi and Zhang 
2006, Ma and Ortolano 2000), environmental conservation programmes in 
USA (Karkkainen 2004), and social problems including the issues of workers’ 
and human rights (Auld et al. 2008). Non-state actors, especially the NGOs, 
step in to pressure the state actors and the private sector actors (PSAs). NGOs 
used wide range of tactics such as boycott campaigns, ecolabeling and 
environmental certification to pressure the PSAs to be more responsible of the 
impacts of their activities to the environment and the communities in which 
they operate, leading to the birth of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
(Auld et al. 2008). The roles of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in 
environmental governance, hence include raising environmental issues and 
maintaining civic and governmental interest in those issues, while ‘pressing for 
governmental and PSA environmental reforms’  (Sonnenfeld and Mol 2006: 
125).  
 
There are also instances where non-state actors are ‘invited’ by the state actors 
into environmental governance due to the lack of resources of the state such as 
expertise and financial, which is evident both in the Global North and Global 
South. One example is the involvement of non-state actors in controlling the 
water pollution issues and environmental conservation programmes in 
Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes USA Karkkainen (2004). A multi-actor 
governance framework was adopted as a solution due to crisis of state 
competence – where state capacity to solve the problem is being questioned – 
hence, the cooperation from non-state actors was sought. In this case, the 
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complex and dynamics nature of environmental problems proved to be too 
complicated to be governed through hierarchical method and by the state 
alone. As such the role of the state has transformed, from regulating to 
enabling.  
 
Another example is regarding managing air pollution in China. In China, the 
government decided to offer for the involvement of non-state actors to control 
air pollution problems (Shi and Zhang 2006) which proliferates due to rapid 
increase of industrial activities in China since 1970s (Ma and Ortolano 2000). 
A proactive approach taken by the government of China by fostering bigger 
roles for non-state actors in environmental governance is probably a common 
sense for other countries (Shi and Zhang 2006) and particularly popular and 
effective in the West (Schwartz 2004), but is a radical move for China, where 
environmental protection is strongly monopolized by the state (Shi and Zhang 
2006). However, as noted by Martens (2006), the inclusion of non-state actors 
in environmental governance in China, might just be a way to achieve other 
objective (rather than environmental considerations) such as to welcome 
international funding and assistance, as appeared in many ‘show-case’ nature 
protection projects (Martens 2006: 227). Besides that, another different aspect 
between these two examples (USA and China) is that the decision of China’s 
government to adopt multiple-actor governance framework is also due to 
external pressure (apart from the incapability of the state to control air 
pollution problem), such as the pressure from donors (which in many cases are 
from the Global North) and the pressure to follow the trend which is happening 
worldwide (Shi and Zhang 2006).   
 
The pressure from donors in shaping the decision and action of NGOs in less 
economically developed countries is also evident in Madagascar as found by 
Duffy (2006). Duffy (2006) explores the politics of environmental governance 
by examining the multiple-actor governance in Madagascar and found that the 
NGOs (which are often assumed and expected to operate in contestation with 
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the World Bank or the donor), have instead worked to achieve the neoliberal 
goals of the donor. This has transformed global environmental politics and 
formed new frontiers of environmental protection.  
 
Analyses of multi actors governance in both the Global North and Global 
South, such as the work by Murdoch and Abram (1998) and Murdoch (1997) 
on governance in the UK, and Martens (2006) and Qing and Vermeer (1999) 
on governance in China have shown that although there are inclusion of non-
actors participation in governance, their incorporation is usually on ‘acutely 
constrained terms’ (Murdoch and Abram 1998: 49). Involvement of non-state 
actors may include consultations and sharing of ideas with the state actors, and 
taking parts in government’s regulation implementation programmes; where 
their involvement may lead to the effectiveness of government’s programme 
(Martens 2006, Qing and Vermeer 1999, Murdoch and Abram 1998, and 
Murdoch 1997), but non-state actors are ‘rarely invited into the central arenas 
of policy formulation’ (Murdoch and Abram 1998: 49). The formulation of 
environmental conservation goals and policies remains the exclusive rights of 
state actors (Qing and Vermeer 1999). 
 
Several analyses of environmental governance from the multi actors’ 
perspective focus on the effectiveness of non-state actors’ intervention. Among 
others are the case studies in China (Martens 2006, Schwartz 2004, Ho 2001) 
and Norway (Strømsnes 2009); in both cases, political background of one 
country is the most important factor in determining the successful intervention 
of non-state actors. According to Martens (2006) and Schwartz (2004), the 
inclusion of non-state actors in environmental governance in China has had 
limited impact due to the grip of the less democratic government. The 
Communist Party which is ruling China appears to be not supporting the 
growth of non-state actors (Martens 2006) by setting strict rules for the 
establishment of social organization (Ho 2001, Saich 2000). The dominance of 
state power in China is apparent in the conception and interpretation of NGO, 
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which is rather unconventional. There are three types of NGOs in China; the 
traditional environmental NGOs, environmental GONGOs (Government 
organized NGO) and semi-NGOs. Among the three types of NGOs, only the 
first mentioned is independent from the state; while GONGOs is separated 
from the government only in name and semi-NGOs are university-affiliated 
organizations (which cannot be deemed entirely independent as most 
universities in China are government owned except for private institutions). 
However, the ability of China’s (traditional) NGOs to influence China’s 
environmental policy development and enforcement is limited as many are 
suffering from limited skills, funding and autonomy and operating in a highly 
controlled political space (Schwartz 2004). GONGOs, due to their close 
relation to the government, have limited autonomy and are constrained in their 
ability to take positions which is critical of government environmental 
protection initiatives. There are two contradictory views on the establishment 
of GONGOs in China; one group viewed this as ‘an intermediate step towards 
a more mature civil society’ while the other group, seen it as an ‘illegitimate 
frauds undermining the development of true social forces’ (Martens 2006: 
214). The most significant and influential NGOs are the semi-NGOs, as their 
work is normally of higher calibre than that produced by NGOs and is 
potentially more independent than that produced by GONGOs (Schwartz 
2004).  
 
Due to restrictions as mentioned above, the involvement of NGOs in 
environmental governance in China is not significant. This can only be 
changed if free political space is available, and NGOs are allowed to be more 
independent and empowered (Martens 2006, Schwartz 2004). In a similar vein, 
Shi and Zhang (2006) suggest that only if the government of China can do 
these three things can multi-actor governance happen in China; first, 
formulating a better legal framework to safeguard public participation in 
NGO’s activities; second, allow freedom to access to information to the public; 
and third, the state must take the lead in practising the rule of law. 
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 ‘Western societies’ in the Global North are generally regarded as more open to 
the intervention of non-state actors (such as in effort to raise environmental 
awareness), or by being the mediator between the government and the society 
(such as in managing environmental issues) (Martens 2006: 226). However 
finding from the work of Strømsnes et al. (2009), has proven that it is not 
always the case. According to Strømsnes et al. (2009), an international 
environmental NGO – Greenpeace – has not been successful to establish itself 
in Norway due to the country’s political culture. There are two ‘culturally 
embedded anomalies’ which have been identified by Strømsnes et al. (2009) in 
Norway; which are ‘state-friendly society’ and ‘local community perspective’ 
(Strømsnes et al. 2009: 391). In Norway, the culture of ‘state-friendly society’, 
allows the political system to invite non-state actors to participate in national 
politics, and to critique the policies of the government; but still be given 
funding from the government (Strømsnes et al. 2009). The government of 
Norway considers non-state actors as legitimate and support the activities of 
non-state actors (Strømsnes et al. 2009). In comparison to the case in China, 
where ‘thin’ democracy has hindered the development of non-state actors’ 
involvement in environmental governance, the case in Norway is the opposite; 
the ‘thick’ democracy in Norway’s political system has made it difficult for 
non-state actors to get a footing in the country (Strømsnes et al. 2009: 396).  
 
From the examples in the literature discussed above, it is evident that the 
multi-actors perspective on environmental governance analysis has created a 
space for considerations of the roles of non-state actors in environmental 
governance. Besides that, as will be made clear later, multi actor governance 
analysis also enables for deliberation on the expanding and transforming roles 
of state actors. For example, Hysing (2009) assesses the roles of state actors in 
forest certification programme in Sweden (which is primarily a voluntary self-
governance programme and autonomous from state), based on the ‘governing 
without government’ thesis, and found that the roles of state actors has shifted 
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from being the regulator to being an enabler; and such the modes of state 
actors governance has also transformed from focusing on hierarchy mode to 
persuasion mode. This finding implies two things; first, that state’s role is not 
hollowed out in ‘new’ governance, instead it undergone transformation, and 
second, that non-state actors are being actively involved in governance through 
voluntary self-governance mode. 
 
Multi-actors governance analysis has also been applied to the study on waste 
management such as in the work of Davies (2009) on solid waste management 
practice in New Zealand and Davoudi and Evans (2005) on regional waste 
planning in the UK. Both Davies (2009) and Davoudi and Evans (2005) find 
that the involvement of non-state actors is apparent in their case studies. 
Davies (2009) claims that state and internal non-state actors have been 
influential in shaping the landscape of waste management in New Zealand, and 
resulting in the shift of focus of waste management and policy from waste 
collection and disposal to waste minimization. According to Davies (2009), the 
lack of control from central government on waste management practices has 
led to the dominant role of the private sector actors particularly in matters 
regarding collection and disposal of waste.  
 
On the other hand, the multiple actor governance framework, which was used 
by Davoudi and Evans (2005) to investigate the implication of collective action 
involving state and non-state actors (in a multi actor steering committee called 
Regional Technical Advisory Bodies or RTAB) in regional waste management 
planning in England has shown that the involvement of non-state actors is not 
contributing to the effective of the planning process, compared to the 
traditional systems of government. This is due to ‘cultural assumptions’ which 
doubts its legitimacy and accountability (Davoudi and Evans 2005: 514).  
 
The multiple actors’ analysis in waste governance in the Global South is more 
complicated. This is because of the presence of an additional of waste 
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governance actors; which is the informal waste recyclers (which includes 
scavengers and middlemen). Scavengers and middleman play an important role 
in waste management in most Asian countries because of the significant 
impacts of their activities to the economy and waste management (Ray 2008). 
The practice of recycling has become so ‘market driven’ and ‘selective’ in the 
Global South due to the attachment of economic value to waste (Visvanathan 
and Norbu 2006: 11). Regarding this matter, the fact that there can be as much 
as four grams of gold from one personal computer (Streicher-Porte et al. 2005), 
has resulted in burgeoning of e-waste recycling activities in many Asian 
countries (Ray 2008), where many were conducted without the consideration 
of its impacts on health and environment. This led to the involvement of 
international NGOs in e-waste governance such as the Basel Action Network 
(BAN) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) which are based in the 
USA, to lobby the state actors for formulation of law to ensure the safe 
recycling of e-waste and to pressure the PSA to restrict the use of hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment, and to be responsible in the 
end-of-life of their products. 
 
An analysis of e-waste governance based on multiple actors’ perspective was 
carried out by Deathe et al. (2008). Deathe et al. (2008) analysed and evaluated 
policy goals and financing mechanism incorporated in partnership programmes 
in the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and 
Ontario in Canada; and found that partnerships and the sharing of 
responsibility between states and non-state actors had been successful in 
diverting e-waste from landfill through the recycling process. However, Deathe 
et al. (2008) argue that the effort was insufficient and they suggest that tougher 
‘up-stream’ control (or control at the manufacturing phase) is introduced by 
means of redesign or ‘Design for the Environment’ (DFE). This shifts the 
responsibility to tackle issues related to e-waste onto the shoulder of the non-
state actors, particularly the private sector actors.  
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Based on the selected cases from the literature which are discussed above, a 
conclusion can be made that multiple actors perspective of environmental 
governance allows for consideration of non-state actors, whilst recognizes the 
transformation or expansion of state actors in governance process. In several 
instances, non-state actors are invited to be a part of the governance process, 
often with a limited independence especially in countries where issues of 
democracy and political liberty is at stake. Governance analysis through the 
multiple actors lens is appropriate in the case of e-waste management issues 
due to the nature of e-waste which is hazardous and valuable. Participation 
from the PSAs is significant in e-waste governance due to the pressure from 
the state actors and NGOs.  
 
 
3.3.3 The Multiple Modes in Environmental Governance 
 
Governance analysis from the perspective of multiple modes (modes is defined 
in this thesis as a way governance action is carried out) through hierarchical, 
persuasion, self-governance and co-governance modes (or any combinations of 
these) has been applied in many areas of environmental governance studies. 
There are several examples on the application of multiple modes governance 
analysis such as the work of Grossman (1999) on the effectiveness of 
hierarchical mode in clean air regulation in the USA; Sandler (2004) on 
hierarchical intervention in ensuring the reduction of Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) (a type of gas used as refrigerants which induced ozone depletion) in 
more economically developed countries to meet the obligations under Kyoto 
Treaty;  Smith (2007) on persuasion mode of governance by PSAs (mostly the 
airline companies and insurance companies) in persuading passengers to offset 
their carbon emissions by paying to have trees planted at selected locations 
around the world in programmes such as Climate Care 
(http://www.jpmorganclimatecare.com/) and The CarbonNeutral Company 
(http://www.carbonneutral.com/); Hall and Taplin (2006) on the effectiveness 
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of NGO campaigns in influencing climate policy in Australia; Dinica and 
Bressers (2004) on the application of co-governance mode analysis in 
implementing environmental policies; and Murdoch and Abram (1998) on the 
limits of non-state actors (particularly the CBOs) participation in related to 
town and housing planning.   
 
In many instances, several modes of governance co-exist at one particular time 
in managing many environmental issues. As such, there are also literatures 
which focus on the combination of governance modes such as the work by 
Delmas and Keller (2005) who focused on the combination of persuasion and 
self-governance modes in ‘Waste Wise’ programme in the USA which 
involves the USA Environmental Protection Agency and PSAs; and by Bell 
and Hindmoor (2009) focusing on the combination of hierarchical and self-
governance modes in increasing energy efficiency among private firms in the 
Netherlands. 
 
There are also studies, where perspective of multiple modes of governance, is 
viewed together with the perspective of multiple actors and levels of 
governance. Two examples of such case studies in waste governance are the 
work of Davies (2008) and Bulkeley et al. (2007). Davies (2008) recognizes 
the co-existence of several modes of municipal waste governance in waste 
management planning and practice in various governance scales in New 
Zealand and Ireland, which involves the intervention of state and non-state 
actors. On the other hand, Bulkeley et al. (2007) considers the perspectives of 
multiple modes, levels and actors of governance, and develop an analytical 
approach (called the modes of governing approach) to address the issues of 
structures and processes of governance. Bulkeley et al. (2007) interpreted 
mode of governing as ‘a set of governmental technologies deployed through 
particular institutional relations through which agents seek to act on the 
world/other people in order to attain distinctive objective in line with particular 
kinds of governmental rationality’ (Bulkeley et al. 2007: 2739). The use of this 
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analytical framework has revealed that the multiple modes of governance are 
sometimes ‘intermeshed’ and ‘in conflict’ with one another (Bulkeley et al. 
2007: 2749). One finding of the work of Bulkeley et al. (2007) is in agreement 
with the finding from Davies’ (2008) work; that the environmental governance 
analysis and the multiplicity perspective is not a signal of reducing power of 
the state actors in governing process, but rather is a way to strengthen the state 
actors, by sharing of power with and transferring the responsibility to other 
actors. In the following sections, the perspective of multiplicity in governance 
mode as applied in analysis of environmental, waste and e-waste in the 
literature are discussed.   
 
The Application of Hierarchical Mode in Environmental Governance 
Analysis 
 
One example of the application of hierarchical mode perspective on 
environmental governance analysis is in the work by Agamuthu et al. (2008) 
on national level solid waste management in Malaysia.  Agamuthu et al. (2008) 
analyse the process of the centralization of solid waste management authority 
by the federal government of Malaysia with the introduction of The Solid 
Waste and Public Cleansing Management Act 2007. The law, which was 
gazetted on 30 August 2007, transfers the power of waste management from 
local governments (third level government) to the federal government (first 
level government) in the attempt to increase efficiency and providing high 
quality services in solid waste management in the country. Under this law, 
solid waste management services are provided by a company -‘Malaysian 
Solid Waste Management Corporation’- which is owned by the federal 
government. The flow of hierarchical authority (from lower tier of government 
to upper tier of government) is in contradiction of the flow in Europe where 
EU directives shapes the waste policy of member countries (from upper tier to 
lower tier of government) (see Davies (2008) for case study in Ireland and 
Bulkeley et al. (2005) for case study in the UK). This action is seen as a way 
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for federal government to coerce its power on state government (second level 
government, which controls local government) especially in five states (out of 
fourteen) which are not ruled by the Barisan Nasional (the ruling party). From 
the persuasion mode of governance perspective, Agamuthu et al. (2008) found 
that the law lacks incentives for waste separation compared to other Asian 
countries such as Japan and Singapore, which may have an impact on its 
effectiveness. As shown in the work of Agamuthu et al. (2008) above, 
governance analysis from the perspective of hierarchical mode of governance 
overlaps with persuasion mode and intertwined with the multiple actor and 
multiple level of governance modes; indicating that the complex nature and 
structure of waste management require more than just one perspective of 
governance to be understood comprehensively and holistically. 
 
The perspective of hierarchical mode of governance is also applied in e-waste 
governance analysis, and is apparent in studies on enforcement of laws at 
various levels such as Basel Convention at global level (see Levinson et al. 
2008 and Mohan et al. 2008), WEEE and RoHS directives at regional level 
(see Khetriwal et al. 2008) and various national level laws across the world 
(see for example Yang (2008) on case study in China). As supra-national laws 
(such as Basel Convention, WEEE directive and RoHS directive) have 
significant influence on national laws on e-waste control in many countries, the 
hierarchical perspective analysis overlaps with the perspective of multiple 
levels governance. Zhang (2009) and Yang (2008) applied the hierarchical 
perspective in analyzing e-waste governance in China. The government of 
China began taking hierarchical action to control e-waste since 1990, upon the 
submission of the country as a party to Basel Convention (Zhang 2009). 
Among the law formulated is on the ban of import of twenty one types of e-
waste in 2000; the law was condemned by the Greenpeace as ‘not working’ as 
the e-waste is kept being smuggled into China. Due to the pressure from 
international NGOs such as Basel Action Network (BAN), China tried to 
improve its hierarchical control of e-waste by formulating another law that 
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prohibits illegal recycling process in 2002, which has also shown limited 
success thus far. The ineffectiveness of hierarchical control of e-waste in China 
is possibly due to lack of enforcement as suggest by Streicher-Porte (2005) and 
Widmer et al. (2005).    
 
However, the application of hierarchical mode in e-waste governance in 
Switzerland is relatively more successful compared to the experience in China. 
Switzerland introduced ‘The Ordinance on the Return, Taking back and 
Disposal of Electrical and Electronic Equipment’ (ORDEE) in 1998 which is 
based on the EPR (Extended Producer Responsibility) principle. ORDEE is 
employed by delegation of responsibility (in terms of function and financial 
matters) among e-waste stakeholders which includes state and non-state actors 
(see Table 3.2 on the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders involved). 
Some responsibilities are mandated by ORDEE, while some others are 
stipulated by PRO (‘Producer Responsibility Organizations’ – an organization 
which organised voluntary collection and management of e-waste before the 
introduction of ORDEE).  According to Khetriwal et al. (2009), this 
mechanism is very effective in Switzerland as the amount of e-waste that goes 
as municipal solid waste has been significantly reduced.  
 
Table 3.2: Actors and responsibilities in the Swiss e-waste management system  
 
Actors Roles and responsibilities 
mandated by ORDEE 
Roles and responsibilities 
mandated by PROs 
Government • Framing the basic guidelines 
and legislation. 
• Licensing authority for recyclers 
 
Manufacturers/Importers 
PROs 
• Economic and physical 
responsibilities 
• Managing day-to-day 
operations of the system, 
including setting the 
recycling fees, as well as 
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Actors Roles and responsibilities 
mandated by ORDEE 
Roles and responsibilities 
mandated by PROs 
licensing and auditing 
recyclers 
Distributors and retailers • Take-back of any product that 
they have on sale, irrespective 
of whether the product was sold 
by them or not. 
• Responsible for making clear 
of the amount of Advance 
Recycling Fee (ARF) in the 
customer invoice. 
Consumers • Obligated to return discarded 
appliances to retailers or 
collection points 
• Bear financial responsibility 
through the recycling fee on 
new product purchases. 
Collection points  • Collect all kinds of e-waste 
free of charge and ensure the 
safety of the disposal 
products to prevent pilferage 
or illegal exports. 
Recyclers • Adhere to minimum standards 
on emissions. 
• Take adequate safety measures 
concerning employee health. 
• Authorisation required to 
operate a recycling facility from 
cantonal government 
• License from the PROs 
required. 
Source: (Khetriwal et al. 2009) 
 
Analysis based on the perspective of hierarchical mode of governance as 
discussed in the case studies in China and Switzerland, has shown that 
hierarchical action can be an effective mode of e-waste governance if it is 
complemented with efficient enforcement action.  It indicates two important 
things; first, that a strong political will from the state actors is paramount in 
ensuring that strict enforcement action is in place; and second, it may require 
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the involvement of more than just the state actors, and should include an 
involvement from the private sectors and civil society actors. Taking the 
findings of Agamuthu et al. (2008) on solid waste management in Malaysia 
into consideration, there is a possibility that blending hierarchical mode with 
persuasion mode of governance could further increase the efficiency of 
hierarchical action in waste management. As evident from the case studies 
brought forth, governance analysis from hierarchical mode perspective is 
intricately linked with the persuasion mode and the multiple actors 
perspectives. 
 
The Application of Persuasion Mode in Waste Governance 
 
In a comparative analysis of waste governance in New Zealand and Ireland, 
Davies (2008) has adopted the multiple levels and multiple actors perspectives, 
and has described one example of persuasion mode of governance in her 
discussion on the expanded roles of state actors. Davies (2008) brought forth 
an example of national level campaign organized by the national government 
of New Zealand (with coordinated effort from the state actors at local and 
regional levels) on waste awareness called ‘Reduce Your Rubbish’ campaign. 
The campaign which was launched in 2003 was aimed to improve attitudes and 
behaviour of households towards waste and encourage them to take simple 
actions to reduce waste. An almost similar public education campaign was 
organized by the Irish government in late 1990s, which targets to persuade 
people to reduce the use of plastic bags (Bell et al. 2010). These two cases are 
chosen to be compared here due to its similarities; firstly, both campaigns are 
initiated by the government, and secondly, both campaigns target public at 
large to change behaviour to reduce production of waste (or specifically plastic 
bags in Ireland). However, they produce different results. While the campaign 
in New Zealand was successful, the campaign in Ireland failed. However, a 
dramatic result on the reduction of plastic bag usage was shown after the 
government of Ireland decided to impose a tax, (levied at the point of sale) 
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upon the purchase of plastic bag. This policy resulted in 90% reduction in the 
production of plastic bags in Ireland. This indicates that in this case, a 
hierarchical mode can sometimes be more effective than a persuasion mode in 
waste governance. On the other hand, the success of the campaign in New 
Zealand may be due to the effective and efficient publicity involving various 
techniques such as broadcast on national television using well known 
celebrities and comedy competitions; developing a website; and a hotline for 
households seeking advice from local councils. Half of the funds (around NZ$ 
400, 000 or ₤200, 000) was spent on media events and publicity. Based on this 
example, Davies (2008) suggests that a campaign must be on-going (not a one-
off event) to ensure a long term impact. However, a long term, wide coverage 
of public education campaign would require a huge financial cost from the 
government. An intervention from PSAs might be able to reduce the financial 
burden from the government especially if this kind of public education 
campaign is to be replicated in a less economically developed countries where 
state’s economic resources is restricted. 
 
Other than the state actor, CSOs - especially NGOs – do play prominent roles 
in the persuasion mode of governance, such as the governance of e-waste. In 
late 1990s, many NGOs voiced their concern with the unsustainable nature of 
the management of e-waste by the electronic and electrical industry and started 
to fight for environmental justice, environmental health and exploitation of 
vulnerable population, due to the nature of e-waste which contains a 
substantial amount of hazardous substances and precious metals. As e-waste is 
a global issue, the voice of international NGOs is louder compared to small, 
local-based NGOs. Among the international NGOs which are actively involved 
in e-waste issue are Basel Action Network (BAN), Silicon Valley Toxics 
Coalition (SVTC), Centre for Environmental Health (CEH), Clean Production 
Action (CPA), European Environment Bureau (EEB) and Greenpeace. In 
2001, BAN, SVTC, CEH and CPA founded the ‘Electronic Take Back 
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Campaign’ (ETBC) (formerly known as Computer Take-Back Campaign – 
CTBC). 
 
Wood and Schneider (2006) and Spar and La Mure (2003) analyse 
environmental governance from the perspective of persuasion mode of 
governance, focusing on the roles of NGOs in USA. They found that NGOs 
aimed to reach three target groups in their campaigns; state actors, PSAs and 
society. In the beginning of their involvement in e-waste governance, NGOs 
targeted state actors and pressure for formulation of law, especially on safe 
recycling of e-waste and restrictions on the use of hazardous substances in 
electrical and electronic equipment. However, since the late 1990s, NGOs 
changed their tactics and started to focus on PSAs (Trumpy 2008, Seidman 
2007), and found that getting PSAs to change their policies can often be easier 
than urging the state actors to formulate policies (Vogel 2005). According to 
Wood and Schneider (2006), this tactic acts like a double-edged sword as the 
changes in PSAs’ policies serves as a stepping stone to change state legislative 
as states compete to attract investors through the creation of business friendly 
environment (Levy and Prakash 2003).  
 
A ‘naming and shaming’ strategy has also been used by the NGOs in the USA 
in the 1990s to pressure the PSA to becoming a ‘greener producer’, and has 
often been effective (Vogel 2005). For example, CTBC’s ‘Computer Report 
Card’, and Greenpeace’s ‘Guide to Greener Electronics’ campaign that ranks 
manufacturers based on selected criteria into leaders and laggards has put 
pressure on PSAs to compete to become more environmentally friendly. NGOs 
also published reports of research; two reports which have significant impact 
by BAN and SVTC are ‘Exporting Harm: The High Tech Trashing of Asia’ 
(2002) and ‘The Digital Dump: Exporting Re-use and Abuse to Africa’ (2005). 
These reports have help educating the public about e-waste, pressured the 
PSAs to improve environmental policies and attracted the media attention to 
the issue.  
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Other than state actors and CBOs, PSA is also keen in adopting persuasion in 
governance. For example, on 9th November 2008, a television station in the 
USA (CBS) has aired the intricately complex issues (interwoven of 
environmental, economic, social and politics) of e-waste recycling in a 
programme called ’60 Minutes’ (available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4586903n) in a place called Guiyu 
in China, resulting in the government of China reviewing the country’s e-waste 
policies. 
 
The application of persuasion modes of governance in waste and e-waste 
governance as shown in case studies above reflects four things; first, the roles 
of state actors in governance is no longer restricted to hierarchical mode, but is 
extended to include the persuasion mode; second, it allows some space for the 
consideration of non-state actors in governing process; third, while the target 
group of the persuasion mode by state actors is the general public, NGOs 
expand their target to include the state actors and PSAs; and fourth, the 
efficiency and success rate of persuasion mode of governance employed by the 
state actors might increase if it is combined with other modes such as 
hierarchical, be on-going with loud publicity.  
 
The application of persuasion mode of governance is more challenging in the 
less economically developed countries, relative to more economically 
developed countries due to two main reasons; persuasion mode by state actors 
may be hampered due to lack of financial resources to carry out wide spread, 
and long term campaign, while persuasion mode by non-state actors might be 
hampered by lack of ‘political liberalisation’ (Martens 2006: 226) by the state 
actors to support the independent actions of non-state actors.  
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The Application of Self-Governance Mode in Waste Governance 
 
Self-governance mode of waste governance is commonly adopted by civil 
society in many less economically developed countries, with examples from 
India, Bangladesh, Ghana, Burkina Faso (World Bank 2005), Indonesia 
(Pasang et al. 2007) and  Pakistan (Ali and Snel 1999). In these countries, self-
governance mode arises in response to local conditions where municipal 
authorities are unable to cope with the rapidly expanding demands for a 
modern and formal waste management system due to lack of financial 
capacities, insufficient equipment, staffs and expertise (Ali and Snel 1999). 
Two examples of how the self-governance mode is adopted in waste 
management in the Global South are from the work of Ali and Snel (1999) in 
Karachi, Pakistan and Pasang et al. (2007) in Jakarta, Indonesia. The self-
governance mode adopted in both case studies, involves three groups of non-
state actors which are; waste generators (which are the householders), waste 
collectors, and civil society organizations.  
 
The self-governance process in cases in Indonesia and Pakistan involve 
collection of fees from the residents to pay for the appointed contractors and 
workers, and to buy related equipment, while community organizations 
members work on voluntary basis. In Karachi, Pakistan, a group of housewives 
set up a society called ‘The Karachi Administration Women’s Welfare Society 
(KAWWS) in 1990 to manage household waste in the area. Each member of 
KAWWS pays a monthly fee of ₤0.90 to purchase waste collection bins, and to 
pay for the service of street sweeping workers and refuse vehicle drivers (Ali 
and Snel 1999). In Jakarta, Indonesia, neighbourhood associations collect a fee 
of ₤2.00 per month from every resident to pay the workers who collect wastes 
from households.  
 
On the other hand, governance analysis based on self-governance mode in 
waste management in more economically developed countries is not triggered 
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by the incapability of state-actors to provide services. For example, in the case 
of e-waste management, self-governance by private sector actors was initiated 
by the pressure to be more responsible in the disposal of their products after it 
reached its end-of-life. The pressure is either exerts by state actors (to comply 
with certain regulations and law) or NGOs (to collect e-waste via take-back 
schemes); signalling a direct impact and interrelations of the two previously 
mentioned modes. For example, the enforcement of WEEE and RoHS in the 
EU in 2003 has resulted in increasing amount of self-governance action by 
non-state actors’ who work in a network. A group of non-state actors based in 
Brussels, Belgium set up ‘Global e-Sustainability Initiative’ (GeSI). Among its 
members British Telecom (BT), Telecom Italia, China Telecom, Motorola, 
Nokia and WWF. Its main aim is to achieve sustainable development 
objectives through innovative technology (www.gesi.org). Similarly in Europe, 
several PSAs such as Hewlett Packard, Sony, Braun and Electrolux, set up the 
European Recycling Platform to enable the producers to comply with the 
WEEE directive. The main target of the organization is to evaluate, plan and 
operate a pan-European platform for recycling and waste management services 
(Widmer et al 2005). 
 
Self-governance of e-waste in the USA, on the other hand, is due to the strong 
persuasion actions (especially the ‘naming and shaming’) by the NGOs (Wood 
and Schneider 2006) which has forced PSAs to take actions. This is due to the 
lack of federal level law on e-waste control in the USA. As a result Dell (USA) 
launched its voluntary take-back scheme of all Dell branded computer and 
other brand computers in exchange of a new Dell brand computer (worldwide); 
and followed shortly after by Apple (which is limited to USA only). Dell’s 
action is an example of how multiple modes (and actors) of governance co-
exist in an issue; persuasion mode (by the NGOs) has led to self-governance 
action (by a PSA) which is applicable at various level of authority beyond the 
boundary of a sovereign state.  
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The Application of Co-governance Mode in Waste Governance 
  
One of the most commonly adopted types of co-governance mode in waste 
management is Public-private Partnership (PPP). PPP has been adapted as one 
of the modes in waste governance both in the Global South (see for example 
Ahmed and Ali 2006 and 2004, and Forsyth 2006 and 2005) and in the Global 
North (Slater et al. 2007, Binica and Bressers 2004). In both contexts, PPP is 
introduced to achieve two main objectives; firstly to provide services (or to 
improve available services) or solve issues related to waste management (seen 
as a way to strengthen local government), and secondly, to include (or 
increase) public participation in the implementation phase which is seen as a 
way to increase democracy. However, in the Global South, the inclination 
towards the first objective is stronger than the second. This is apparent from 
the works of Ahmed and Ali (2006 and 2004) on PPP in solid waste 
management in Bangladesh, where they compared data collected by a mix of 
methods (in-depth interviews, semi-structured questionnaires and observation) 
in four major towns (Khulna, Patuakhali, Sylhet and Dhaka) and Forsyth (2006 
and 2005) who works on the evaluation of democracy, legitimacy and 
accountability aspects of PPP in India and the Philippines, which will be 
discussed in detail in the following paragraph. 
 
According to Ahmed and Ali (2006), there are three factors which determined 
the effectiveness of a PPP; the design of PPP, the availability of political will 
and the establishment of facilitating agencies. It is crucial to understand the 
design of a PPP (which includes the structure, mechanism and actors involved) 
due to the nature of PPPs which are both dynamic and unique. The correctly 
designed PPP should have well balanced incentives to all partners to avoid 
resistance to cooperation among partners. This finding is not only true for the 
PPPs in the Global South; it is also in agreement with findings of Slater et al. 
(2007) based on their work on PPPs in England. Slater et al. (2007) suggest 
consistent assessment of lifecycle of PPP to understand the motivations, 
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characteristics and activities of PPP to maintain its efficiency. The second 
factor which can have an effect to the effectiveness of a PPP (other than the 
design of PPP mentioned above), is the available support it receives from all 
actors (the public sector, private sector and the citizens) and a strong political 
will from influential politicians. The third factor, as noted by Ahmed and Ali is 
the establishment of facilitating agencies (independent agencies set up to 
bridge the gap between partners), to improve effectiveness of PPP. Their 
studies have shown that facilitating agencies have been successful in 
increasing accountability and service. 
 
Although PPP is more commonly applied and has shown relative success in the 
Global North than the Global South, exact duplication may not be the best 
option. In Bangladesh, Ali and Ahmed (2006) noted that partnerships between 
public sector and large conglomerate (as commonly happen in the Global 
North) do not produce success; instead PPPs between public sector actors and 
a string of small solid waste management companies, informal waste sectors 
and society (in a vertical integration - where all actors may benefit) have 
shown a better level of success. Similarly, Forsyth (2006, 2005) in his study on 
waste-to-energy projects in India (Lucknow, Chennai) and Philippines (Ayala 
Alabang, Baguio) revealed the same outcome. Among the reasons cited by 
these scholars for the difference in the results of PPP in different areas are 
political background (including decision making autonomy), relative wealth 
and economic complexity (Ahmed and Ali 2004, Forsyth 2006).   
 
Forsyth (2006, 2005) studied waste-to-energy projects in India and Philippines 
from the perspective of deliberative environmental governance. Based on 
detailed documentary newspaper research for background information and in-
depth interviews (with key actors from local government, CSO and PSA), 
Forsyth concluded that PPP is not a cure in democratic deficit in decision 
making. Instead, he found many evidence of lack of democracy, legitimacy 
and accountability in PPP in both countries which is due to; the political 
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environment in the two countries where open access to political debates by 
actors are not always possible. This is a clear indication of lack of democracy 
where people’s right to voice their opinion is restricted. Secondly, Forsyth 
found that the PPP’s participants are chosen (not elected) by the most powerful 
partner; sometimes not based on ability but based on who can provide a 
stronger support to the most powerful partner. This, besides an indication of 
lack of democracy, also implies lack of legitimacy and accountability in 
decision making. In cases of PPPs, both in India and the Philippines, Forsyth 
found that the local poor are always left out. 
 
A co-governance perspective is applied in the analysis of e-waste governance 
in more economically developed countries particularly the application of PPP 
in take-back recycling schemes in the USA (Wagner 2009, Renckens 2008), 
Canada (Deathe et al. 2008), and Switzerland (Khetriwal et al. 2009). One 
similar finding from these analyses is that PPP is an effectiveness mode of 
managing e-waste. Wagner (2009) reported that PPP has increased the amount 
of e-waste collected and recycled in the state of Maine, USA and thus diverted 
from disposal and halting export, while Deathe et al. (2008), discovered the 
same finding in the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia and Ontario in Canada. Reckens (2008), on the other hand, 
extends the geographical scope of his research to focus on the PPP mode at 
federal level, and explores the potential of PPP in the form of multi-stake 
holders’ dialogue in governing e-waste. He discovered that PPP as applied in 
four multi-stakeholders dialogues - Common Sense Initiative (CSI), the 
National Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), Responsible 
Recyclers Practicers (R2 practices) and Electronic Product Environmental 
Assessment Tool (EPEAT) - is a practical approach to governing e-waste due 
to its ability to move a conflict stance to a constructive dialogue, and to 
increase the legitimacy of the initiative by the participation of multiple 
stakeholders. Comparisons made from these two findings signify that the 
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effectiveness of PPP is not limited to the operating phase but also at the 
planning phase of e-waste management process.  
 
Apart from being applied to manage e-waste in different countries, PPP is also 
applied at global level. The UN recognizes the importance of co-governance as 
a tool to uphold UN principles and to achieve the aims of sustainable 
development. PPP was chosen as the most appropriate tool to manage global e-
waste issue as specified in the Nairobi Declaration of 2006 (following 
Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002). There are three 
partnership programmes in place regarding e-waste management at a global 
level, undertaken by Basel Convention Secretariat; they are the Mobile Phones 
Partnership Initiative (MPPI) started in 2002; Partnership for Action on 
Computing Equipment (PACE) in 2008; and StEP (Solving the E-waste 
Problem) in 2004. The role of UN as the initiator and coordinator of global 
level PPP is very significant due to the nature of e-waste problem. Firstly, e-
waste governance involves international PSAs as manufacturers of electrical 
and electronic equipment which are produced and traded worldwide; and 
secondly, e-waste is still rampantly traded across the globe despite the 
provision on restrictions on transboundary movement of e-waste in the Basel 
Convention. From the case studies on waste governance analysis from the 
perspective of PPP as a mode of co-governance as mentioned above, it is 
evident that PPP is a suitable mode of governance in managing waste either to 
achieving targets of improving service or increasing public participation, or 
perhaps both in certain instance.  
 
From the discussion above, a conclusion can be made that governance analysis 
from the perspective of multiple modes provides insights on the different 
mechanisms of which governance actions are carried. Apart from that multiple 
modes analysis also provides deeper understanding on the roles of different 
actors (as actors behaves differently in different modes) hence allowing for a 
more complete understanding of governance process. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
The shift from government to governance has strong influence in shaping the 
studies on environmental issues; ranging from climate change issues to waste 
management in various countries. The characteristic of new governance, in 
terms of the multiple levels, actors and modes involved, are used to understand 
environmental problems from different perspective. Evidence from available 
literatures demonstrated that the concept of new governance has the potential 
to provide a wide and comprehensive perspective of the issue, for example in 
the study of e-waste governance.  
 
As shown in the literature reviewed in this chapter, it is evident that the 
perspective of multiple levels, actors and modes of governance in governance 
analysis has provided a comprehensive and holistic understanding of 
environmental governance. A multilevel perspective on governance analysis 
highlights the ‘blurry’ political boundaries involved in managing 
environmental issues, especially many environmental problems are trans-
political boundary. The processes involved in the governance of e-waste, for 
example are made more explicit by adopting the multi-level perspective as 
many issues regarding it transcend political boundaries such as the trading of 
e-waste. The issue surrounding e-waste which is global in nature benefits from 
the application of this perspective. Therefore, the study of local level e-waste 
law, for example, is not complete without considering the regional and global 
legal context within which they are established. On the other hand, the 
application of a multi-actor perspective in analyzing environmental governance 
provides an avenue for consideration of non-state actors as an important 
governance actor other than the traditional state actors, and a way of 
reconsidering the role of the state in governance. Finally, the application of 
multiple modes of governance facilitates an understanding of the multiple 
mechanisms taken to achieve governance and the roles of governance actors in 
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these processes. Therefore, a conclusion can be made that application of 
multiple levels, actors and modes of governance is most suitable to understand 
the issue of e-waste governance based on the analysis of the literature.  
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Chapter 4: Methods of Researching the Roles of Actors in E-waste 
Governance 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explains and examines the methodological routes which were 
undertaken in this research. It is divided into three sections; the first part 
highlights the research design, the second part delineates the research methods, 
and finally, the third part reflects my experiences in conducting this research. 
The research began with a wide-ranging desk study to identify the critical 
elements of the research process such as the research problem, objectives, and 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which then led to the formulation of 
the research questions that have guided the work. According to George and 
Bennett (2005), these initial tasks are of utmost importance in the research 
process as they guide the decisions that follow.  
 
The research design forms the backbone of the research (George and Bennett 
2005). It encompasses the tasks of identifying an appropriate research 
methodology, approach, methods and analytical technique. Besides the 
fundamental concept, the decisions taken in arriving at the research design 
were also driven by the research aims and research questions. As is explained 
and justified later in this chapter, a qualitative methodology using a case study 
approach was chosen as the most appropriate mode of inquiry. Data for the 
research were obtained by adopting multiple methods of data collection 
namely interviews, observations and review of documents, and were later 
analysed by applying the thematic analysis technique. Kitchin and Tate (2000) 
in stressing the critical importance of research design have used the process of 
constructing a building as an analogy; they equate research design to a 
construction plan. Failure to provide an adequate construction plan before 
commencing the construction process might end up in deeper problems at a 
later stage; likewise failure to prepare a detailed research design prior to 
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commencing research might cause problems in later stages of the research 
process. Section 4.2 presents a more detailed explanation of the research 
design process and justifications of why such decisions were deemed fit and 
thus chosen for this research. 
  
The next step in the research process is the execution of the research plan as 
specified in the research design. This is a complex and challenging process. 
Section 4.3, discusses in detail the research methods, including sampling of 
respondents, the collection of data and its analysis. Also discussed in this 
section are the limitations and hurdles that were encountered during the 
research and how they were mitigated. This is then followed by a narration of 
my research experiences in Section 4.4, before concluding in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
Research design is a process of making decisions on critical elements of the 
research, such as the formulation of research objectives and structure (George 
and Bennett 2005) and the determination of appropriate data collection 
methods and data analysis techniques (Philliber et al. 1980). Yin (2003: 20) 
defines research design as a ‘logical sequence that connects the empirical data 
to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions’. 
Several authors, for example Philliber et al. (1980), view research design, 
especially in qualitative research, as the research ‘blueprint’. However, this 
idea is opposed by Mason (2002), who claims that the characteristics of 
qualitative research which are exploratory, fluid, flexible, data-driven and 
context-sensitive make it impossible for a researcher to write an entire advance 
blueprint prior to conducting research. However, in my view, and based on my 
experience, a detailed research design is paramount, and is the most crucial 
step in the research process. It helps a researcher to focus on the study, and 
holds all the parts and phases of a research project together. Yin (2003: 21) 
finds that a carefully thought through research design is an excellent way to 
  
avoid a situation where 
questions’.  
 
The five elements that were considered in arriving at my research design were: 
the research methodology, research approach, data collection methods 
(including ethical consideration and valid
analysis techniques (see Figure 4.1). Each of these elements is discussed in 
detail in the following sub
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The elements of a research design
 
4.2.1 Research Methodology: The Qualitative Methodology
 
My main aim in conducting this research was to explore and explain the roles 
and involvement of multiple actors in e
respondents needed to be allowed to express their perspectives freely. A 
qualitative approach provides
exploration of themes without prior assumptions, something that is hard to 
achieve taking a quantitative approach. Qualitative methods also have the 
the ‘evidence does not address the initial research 
ity of data), research scope and data 
-sections.  
 
 
 
-waste governance. To achieve this, 
 an open environment conducive to the 
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ability to produce a wealth of detailed information, necessary if e-waste 
governance is to be investigated in an exploratory manner. Unlike quantitative 
research methodology which does not recognize individuality of research 
subjects or respondents (and therefore may oversimplify the complexities of 
interaction of actors of governance in the case of this research); qualitative 
methodology recognizes subjective ideas, experience and perspective of 
individual respondents thus inducing the production of richer insights and 
more precise generalisations. Producing or generating rich data is made 
possible by adopting a qualitative approach because it accepts a wide variety of 
data sources such as people, objects and documents, and it offers diversity in 
data generating methods. The in-depth nature of qualitative study promotes the 
generation of richer data even though the number of respondents is normally 
smaller compared to a quantitative study. Therefore, due to the reasons stated 
above, qualitative methodology was chosen over quantitative methodology in 
conducting this research. 
  
4.2.2 Research Approach: The Case Study Approach 
 
Once the decision on research methodology has been made, the next important 
decision is to arrive at an appropriate research approach. Creswell (2007) 
suggests five types of qualitative research approach: narrative research, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case study. One way to 
decide on the right approach is to assess the type of research questions posed. 
Yin (2003) suggests that the case study approach is the most appropriate 
approach when undertaking research which asks mostly ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions. As my research aims to explore the complexities of governance 
actors’ interactions, and does ask mostly ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in order to 
understand the significance and implication of the diverse roles of multiple 
governance actors, case study approach is the most suitable approach. 
Furthermore, case study approach which is defined by Creswell (2007: 73) as 
an approach where ‘the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or 
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multiple bounded system (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data 
collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, 
interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a 
case description and case-based themes’, has the potential to generate data with 
high level of explanatory richness (Denscombe 2005, Yin 2003, George and 
McKeown 1985). Data richness offers by the case study approach is crucially 
significant in the study on e-waste governance in dealing with nuances and 
intricacies of governing process; thus inducing the production of a precise and 
comprehensive result.  
 
4.2.3 Research Scope 
 
One increasingly important environmental issue across the world today is 
waste management. Waste management is becoming more challenging than 
before with the emergence of new type of waste, such as e-waste, which 
possesses tremendous detrimental effects to the environment, human beings 
and other living beings; stressing a pressing need for in-depth studies on waste 
management to avoid ecological destruction. The study of waste management 
from the governance lens offers a comprehensive understanding of the issue, as 
governance analyses do not only focus on the ‘multitude of governance actors 
operating at range of scales’ (Davies 2009: 157), but also allows for deeper 
apprehension of intricate interactions of these actors which are shaped by the 
complex combination of social, cultural, political and economic factors. Thus, 
it is timely that a research on waste governance is conducted. 
 
Given the need to build a detailed understanding of waste governance, and 
bearing in mind time and resource constraints, it was decided to limit the study 
to one country – Malaysia (Figure 4.2) – and to focus on a particular set of 
governance actors in a particular field, namely e-waste. While the choice of 
Malaysia was in no small way determined by the fact that I am Malaysian, the 
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country does provide a highly appropriate context in which to address the aims 
of the research and explore the research questions.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: The map of Malaysia 
(Source: http://www.ckten.com.my/images/map_malaysia.jpg)  
 
According to Puckett (2005), Malaysia is one of the hot spots for traders and 
smugglers of e-waste. This is happening despite the fact that e-waste in 
Malaysia is theoretically controlled by both national and international laws. In 
addition, a number of non-state actors are becoming increasingly important and 
vibrant in the governance of environmental issues in Malaysia, a fact that may 
be partially associated with the country’s burgeoning educated, middle class 
population and their rapidly transforming desires and priorities. Another 
important aspect that made Malaysia an appropriate choice for a case study is 
the existence of close links between the state and non-state actors. For 
example, many businesses in Malaysia are linked to politicians, political 
parties or the government, which sometimes is problematic in governance 
process.  
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A particular entry point for the research was the role of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) in environmental governance. PPP is chosen to be the 
focus of this study as it allows for a clearer understanding of the roles of 
different actors of governance, as various actors work in collaboration instead 
of individually. Furthermore, PPP has been the focus e-waste governance study 
in other countries (such as the work of Renckens (2008) in the USA); thus 
providing an opportunity to compare how e-waste governance in Malaysia 
ranks relatively to the practice in other country. To ensure that information was 
captured in sufficient detail, I focused my study on two PPPs in two states on 
the Malaysian peninsula; Penang and Selangor. The state of Penang was 
chosen because it is one of the most developed states in Malaysia and has been 
dubbed the ‘Silicon Valley’ of Malaysia due to the concentration of electronic 
and electrical manufacturing companies in the state, with consequent high 
levels of e-waste generation. Selangor is the richest, most developed and most 
populous state in Malaysia, and was chosen because it is an industrial hub for 
the electrical and electronic equipment manufacturing, and also because of the 
presence of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) which occupies a 
designated zone of approximately 15 x 50 kilometres square stretching from 
the Petronas Twin Towers to Kuala Lumpur International Airport (including 
the towns of Putrajaya and Cyberjaya). 
  
4.2.4 Data Collection Methods: Interview, Observation and Review of 
Documents  
 
The next important step in research design is to decide on the most appropriate 
data sources and data collection methods. Having analysed the three main 
qualitative methods namely interviews, observations and review of documents, 
I decided to adopt all the three methods to address the research questions, with 
interviewing being used as the main research tool.  
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The combination of these three methods was deemed the best approach to 
gathering the required data for the study due to their complementary strengths. 
For example, review of documents provides the background of the issue and 
helps in selecting potential respondents in the initial part of the research 
process, which is then followed by collection of detail data via interview 
method; the generated data are then cross reference for accuracy by adopting 
the combination of observation and documents review methods. By applying 
the mixed data collection method, the weakness of one method is overcome by 
other methods, thus increasing the quality of data produced; notwithstanding 
that each method possesses its own strength as describe below. 
 
Interviews were chosen as the main method because of their ability to produce 
detailed, in-depth data (Arksey and Knight 1999). Interviews were conducted 
with key informants, those best informed on issues related to e-waste 
governance such as government officers (at federal, state and local levels), 
electrical and electronic equipment manufacturers, e-waste contractors (or e-
waste recycling operators), scrap dealers, and representatives from relevant 
NGOs and CBOs (refer Figure 4.3 for categorizations of respondents and 
Table 4.2 for the number of respondents from each category). Their knowledge 
provided the depth of information necessary to explore and understand the 
topics under investigation. Interviews allow for a direct interaction between 
researcher and respondent; this means that data can be checked for accuracy 
and relevance as they are collected (Denscombe 2005), and this contributes to 
the validity of the data. Another reason why interviews were chosen as the 
main research method for this study was because of their convenience, in terms 
of response rate and flexibility. As all interviews are prearranged based on the 
respondent’s convenience, response rates are generally high – as was also true 
in this case. Interviews are also quite flexible. Adjustments to the lines of 
enquiry can be made during the interview itself, allowing the researcher to 
make follow the most rewarding lines of questioning. The type of interview 
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used in this research was the in-depth, semi-structured interview, also known 
as open-ended interview. 
 
The second main method used in this research was observation. Observation 
was chosen to complement the interviews. Observations allowed me to record 
what people did, and not just what they said they did, and thus served to cross-
check the accuracy of the data obtained from the interviews. The third method 
adopted was review of documents; especially policies and legislation. This was 
because policies and legislation are major governance tools for state actors. As 
one of the objectives of this research is to examine the roles of state actors, the 
review of policies and legislation is clearly important. The sources of the data 
gathered through this method are permanently available and open to public 
scrutiny, hence contributing to their high validity. Besides that, it is also a less 
expensive method which complements and supplements the other two 
methods.  
 
There are important ethical consideration connected with the collection and 
validity of data. In fact ethical issues are not only important during the data 
collecting phase, but throughout the whole research process including during 
the phases of data analysis and dissemination of findings to ensure that the 
thesis final report provides an honest, fair and unbiased account and does not 
negatively affect those who might have participated in the research. Advance 
consideration of the likely consequences of the participants taking part in the 
interviews was given high priority. To ensure that no key informants should 
suffer as a consequence of their involvement with the research, strict 
confidentiality and anonymity of respondents was guaranteed. To ensure that 
the interests of all parties are protected, respondents were informed of the 
objective of the interviews prior to each interview and informed consent was 
obtained from the respondents.  
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Validity of data is another concern. This is achieved by checking one interview 
transcript against other interviews to assess the level of consistency, and 
contacting respondents if necessary to check the accuracy or meaning of 
statements. Data derived from other methods such as document analysis and 
observation provided a back-up for the content derived from the interviews. 
Adopting different methods of data collection is a way to increase the validity 
and reliability of the data.  
 
4.2.5 Analytical Technique: Thematic Analysis  
 
Data in this research were analysed using the thematic analytical technique. 
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns 
within data which are not theoretically bounded (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
Braun and Clarke (2006) consider it as a poorly ‘branded’ (Braun and Clarke 
2006:79) analytical method which is commonly used in qualitative 
methodology but is either claimed as something else or is not identified as any 
particular method at all. This procedure involves thorough searching across a 
data set to find repeated patterns of meaning and responses that fit the themes 
which have been prepared earlier.  
 
Thematic analysis was chosen as the analytical technique in this research for 
several reasons. Firstly, due to its independence from any particular theoretical 
approach, thematic analysis is a flexible analytical tool and is able to interpret 
the research topic from various aspects (Boyatzis 1998), and hence has 
significant potential to generate unanticipated insights which might open up 
new perspectives on the topic under study. Furthermore, this technique has the 
potential to generate a rich and highly detailed explanation out of a complex 
data set (Braun and Clarke 2006). Secondly, thematic analysis has the ability to 
highlight similarities and differences across a data set, thus making it a highly 
appropriate tool to make comparisons between the two case studies in this 
research. Thirdly, Braun and Clarke (2006) claim that it is a useful tool for 
 106 
 
producing qualitative analyses suited to inform policy development such as the 
study of governance. 
 
4.3 Research Method  
 
Once the research design was completed, this research moved on to execution. 
This stage of the research (which encompasses a series of processes) is labelled 
as research method. It is the process in which data were collected and analysed, 
to produce meaningful information that would add to knowledge. According to 
Mason (2002), research method is more than just a procedure for gaining data; 
it involves a combination of several intellectual, analytical and interpretive 
activities. I divide the discussion on research method into three parts; selection 
of respondents, data collection (or data generating methods), and data analysis, 
which are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
4.3.1 The Selection of Respondents  
 
Based on the research design (where data collection methods have been 
determined) and the research questions, appropriate respondents were selected. 
Respondents for this research were chosen based on their roles in identified 
organizations (which are stakeholders of e-waste issue) and they were 
specifically approached as ‘key informants’. The process of identification and 
selection of key informants involved layers of categorizing. Firstly, the 
organizations (which the key informants are representing) in this study were 
divided into two main categories: state and non-state actors (termed 
governance actors), which were then sub-divided into more specific categories 
(refer Figure 4.3). Figure 4.3 illustrates the typology of these organizations 
which served as the base for the process of respondent selection.  
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Figure 4.3: Typology of governance actors as used in this thesis. 
 
Following the classifications as in Figure 4.3, and based on the background 
information which was gathered via an extensive desk study, a list of names 
and contact information of suitable respondents from each category was 
prepared. Samples were chosen based on their ability to help in understanding 
and illuminating the research questions. The list, however, was not considered 
as fixed. As the data collection process started, the list was expanded using the 
snowballing technique. Based on the list of selected respondents, the next stage 
(data collection) was started. 
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4.3.2 Data Collection  
 
As noted above, three main data collection techniques were adopted in this 
research, namely: interviews, observation and review of documents, of which 
the interview was the most important. The data collection period of the 
research extended from the end of October 2008 to early April 2009. Selection 
of data gathering methods and data sources were guided by the research 
questions. A table connecting research questions to appropriate data sources 
and data collection methods was constructed (see Table 4.1) to make sure that 
the appropriate methods were used for each research question. (see Appendices 
1 to 4 for samples of interview templates). 
 
Table 4.1: Appropriate data gathering methods and sources are based on the 
research questions 
   
Research questions Data gathering 
techniques 
Data sources 
Who are the actors of 
environmental governance in 
Malaysia? 
 
• Review of 
documents 
• Documents 
How, why and with what 
implications are actors involved 
in environmental governance? 
 
• Interview 
• Review of 
documents 
• Observation 
• Key informants 
• Documents  
What and how significant are 
the roles of actors in different 
types of governing modes?  
 
• Interview 
• Observation 
• Key informants 
 
How, why and with what 
implications are state and non-
• Interview • Key informants 
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Research questions Data gathering 
techniques 
Data sources 
state actors working in 
partnership? 
• Observation 
What is the most dominant and 
significant mode of governance? 
 
• Interview 
• Observation 
• Key informants 
 
Data Gathering Technique 1: Interview 
 
The in-depth interview was the main method used to gather data for this thesis. 
Through this method, the subjective views, experiences and knowledge of key 
players in e-waste governance was elicited. Altogether, a total of 56 interviews 
were conducted (of which two were follow-up interviews, and two were 
telephone interviews). Table 4.2 shows the number of respondents, arranged by 
category.   
 
Table 4.2: The number of respondents and interviews conducted based on 
category of actors 
Category of actors Level/type of 
organisations 
Number of 
respondents 
Number 
of 
interviews 
State Federal 
State 
Local 
4 
1 
3 
4 
1 
4 
Non-state: 
Private sector actor 
 
Manufacturer 
Retail, sales and service 
Telecommunication service 
provider (Telco)  
E-waste contractor 
Solid waste concessionaire 
8 
3 
 
1 
5 
2 
8 
3 
 
1 
5 
2 
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Category of actors Level/type of 
organisations 
Number of 
respondents 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Scrap dealer, scavenger 
Used items and repair shop 
3 
3 
3 
3 
 
Non-state: 
Community-based 
organization 
(CBOs) 
Neighbourhood Watch 
(Rukun Tetangga) 
 
Residents’ Association 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
 
Non-state: 
Non-governmental 
organizations 
(NGOs) 
Quango/Gongo 
Association 
Charity 
Environmental 
 
1 
4 
2 
2 
 
2 
4 
2 
2 
 
TOTAL  54 56 
 
Overall, the number of respondents from the private sector actors constituted 
46% of the total, followed by CBO at 22 %, NGOs 17% and government 
actors 15%. The larger number of respondents from the private sector was due 
to two reasons. Firstly, the involvement of private sector actors in e-waste 
related activities is very wide, ranging from the manufacturing process to 
repair and recycling activities. Secondly, I was struggling to get accurate and 
in-depth answers to my research questions from many of the respondents in the 
private sectors. This consequently forced me to seek out more respondents 
until sufficient data were collected, resulting in the high number of respondents 
from this group of actors, compared to others.  
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One important focus of my study is the public-private partnerships (PPP); and 
16 out of 54 respondents were directly involved in two PPPs which formed the 
mini case studies in my thesis. The breakdown of these respondents in term of 
category of actor is given in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Breakdown of number of respondents who are involved in PPP, 
based on category of actors 
 
Category of actors Number of actors 
interviewed 
Government 2 
Private sector 2 
CSOs (CBOs and NGOs) 12 
TOTAL 16 
 
 
The path to gathering data through the interview method began with contacting 
potential respondents based on the prepared list, as mentioned in the previous 
section. This was done in the first instance by telephone, followed by an 
official letter outlining the background and nature of the research. Follow-up 
telephone calls were made to enquire whether the potential respondents agreed 
to be interviewed and an appointment time, date and venue were confirmed. In 
instances where respondents asked for the interview questions, these were 
immediately emailed, and followed by a phone call to confirm that the email 
was received. The process was started about a month prior to commencement 
of my fieldwork, and was carried out until all respondents were interviewed. A 
great deal of time was spent on the phone and writing emails. 
 
Prior to each interview, I made certain that ethical considerations were in 
place, such as being explicit about what I was doing. As much as possible, I 
tried to inform all respondents of my intentions; however in circumstances 
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where this was not feasible, respondents were informed after the interview 
(informed consent from them was obtained before the data were further 
analysed). For example, attempts to interview certain groups of potential 
respondents such as scrap dealers, scavengers, second-hand computer dealers 
and electrical and electronic equipment repairers were rejected at the first 
instance as I was mistakenly perceived as a newspaper reporter. For these 
groups, data were collected through informal conversational interviews where 
questions were generated spontaneously and without their even realizing that 
they were being interviewed. At the end of each conversation, I then explained 
that I was actually collecting data for my research and asked for permission to 
use their opinions for my work. This condition, which Descombe (2005) refers 
to as a ‘debriefing session’ is ethically acceptable. It is recognized in the vast 
majority of the codes of conduct published by professional association 
(Descombe 2005). This strategy worked as all respondents agreed with the 
condition that they must remain anonymous. Compared to the standardized and 
semi-standardized interview methods, this technique is less systematic; 
therefore data organization and data analysis are more difficult. Data capture is 
also trickier as conversations were not recorded. To ensure that data are fully 
captured, I recorded my reflections on the important points of the conversation 
in an audio recorder as soon as the conversation/interview ended and 
transcribed these as soon as possible. 
   
In other interviews, open-ended questions were posed to interviewees, which 
were intended to evoke as much information as possible. A sample of 
interview questions can be found in Appendices 1 to 4. All interviews were 
conducted in a one-to-one manner, except for one interview with an 
international electrical equipment manufacturer which was attended by the 
director, who was the main respondent, accompanied by six assistants.  
 
Due to differences in the nature of their involvement in e-waste related 
activities, and the diversity of educational background of the interviewees, the 
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approach to interviewing varied accordingly. Interview sessions with the head 
of government departments and bosses of private companies were mostly 
conducted using a standardized, open-ended interview schedule, where the 
exact wording and sequence of questions were determined in advance, and 
were read out during the interviews. However, in addition to the interview 
questions, I also kept a list of topics to be covered in each interview on a 
separate sheet which was used as a guide in questioning to increase naturalness 
and flexibility of questions and answers. 
 
An interview relies extensively on the ability of an interviewer to balance the 
art of asking and listening and depends much on the observational and 
analytical skills of an individual (Creswell 2007, Descombe 2005, Arksey and 
Knight 1999). Recording the interviews has given me the advantage on being 
able to focus on quick analysis of the replies and framing questions for 
elaboration and clarification. Whenever consent from the respondents was 
granted, I recorded the interviews in an audio recorder, which has not only 
enabled me to capture the meaning from each interview effectively, but kept 
me focused on the interview without being too preoccupied with jotting down 
the responses. Seven out of eight respondents from the government 
departments, however, did not give their consent for the interviews to be 
recorded; no doubt because they were acutely aware that anything they said 
(which might be deemed to be critical) would probably result in them losing 
their jobs, and repeatedly reminded me that they should appear anonymous in 
my thesis.  However, even where recording was permitted by the respondents, 
I still took notes, which I later found helped me tremendously in the analysis 
process.  
 
Where recording was allowed, the quality of the recordings was ensured by 
making sure that recording device was tested beforehand, by speaking clearly 
and by ensuring that interview sessions were conducted with minimum noise in 
the background. Several precautionary steps were also taken such as taking 
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along extra batteries, and immediately uploading the audio recording into the 
computer system as backup files. Where time permitted, transcripts were 
prepared as soon as the interviews ended. This step assisted the process of 
making reflections and initial analysis which are not only crucial in identifying 
any points missed during the interviews but also proved to be useful in 
improving later interviews. Confusions which surfaced were clarified 
immediately with respective respondents via telephone. Subject to prior 
agreement with the respondents, several transcripts were emailed to 
respondents for confirmation and verification. 
 
Although the interview sessions were successfully conducted, they were not 
without obstacles.  The greatest limitation was to gain entry to the potential 
respondents and to persuade them to agree to an interview. It was very rare, 
especially with the government officers and private companies’ heads, to agree 
to an interview after the first phone call. What normally happened was the 
gatekeepers – usually the secretary or personal assistance to the heads – did not 
allow me to speak to their bosses at the first instance. Instead I was commonly 
asked to email a formal letter indicating the reasons for the interview, which I 
duly did, or in some cases, was asked to contact another person, usually a 
lower ranking officer. This was then followed by another telephone call should 
no positive development occur after two weeks. The routine of making 
telephone calls, sending emails and waiting for the outcome were pursued four 
times, which took between about one month and a half to two months. In cases 
where the potential respondents agreed to be interviewed, an appointment was 
immediately made setting out the date, time and venue of the meeting. One of 
my attempts to secure an interview appointment with a director of a Japanese-
based electrical device manufacturer took three months, as my interview 
questions were sent to the regional office in Singapore, and later to the head 
office in Japan to be vetted before permission was finally granted. The 
difficulties that I have encountered in getting the consent for interview from 
respondents in the government and private sectors may be an indication that 
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the issue of e-waste governance is so sensitive and these actors are not pleased 
to disclose related information to the public.  
 
In circumstances where no positive reply was received after the fourth attempt, 
I considered the informant as not interested and did not proceed further. The 
lost opportunity to gather information from such people was compensated with 
materials available in the public domain such as from websites, and an 
alternative interviewee was sought as a replacement from the list prepared 
beforehand. Besides that, I also adopted another strategy which in most cases 
worked very well; which is mentioning the name of an important figure in the 
introductory phone call. This was possible as during the course of the research 
I managed to meet and exchange telephone numbers with several important 
people in government departments and industry during conferences that I 
attended. Many of them were very helpful in giving me the contact numbers of 
the appropriate person with the most information. Telephone calls which 
started with mentioning that ‘I’ve got your number from Mr XY’ always ended 
with a positive outcome. Once during a conference, I braced myself to relate to 
the head of a ministry about my difficulty in getting an interview with one of 
the directors, to which he reacted immediately by making a telephone call to 
the person and as a result an instant interview date was secured. Here I was 
trapped in an ethical dilemma where I have used the power of someone else to 
influence a potential interviewee into agreeing to be interviewed.  
 
Having been given the opportunity for an interview did not, however, 
guarantee a smooth journey to the next step of the process. I was often 
spending (or rather wasting) a great deal of time waiting for people to appear, 
as many of the respondents were busy and important people in their 
organisations. In one instance, I arrived for a pre-arranged appointment with an 
important government officer at 2.00 p.m. and was asked to wait as he was 
summoned to see a minister, which I did until office-hours ended for the day at 
5.30 p.m. A replacement interview was not possible as his diary was already 
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full, and the only option was to conduct a telephone interview via his mobile 
phone while he was being chauffeured to the airport for a work trip. Another 
thing which I found to be rather disappointing and which caused much delay in 
my working schedule was when agreed interview appointments were 
postponed or even cancelled at the eleventh hour, and on a few occasions I was 
only informed upon my arrival for the interview. To make sure that time was 
not wasted in such situation, I utilized it by working on the transcripts from 
previous interviews.  
 
As my thesis is written in English, I prepared interview questions in English 
and planned to conduct interviews in English. However, things did not always 
go as planned in the field. As the Malaysian community is multi racial and 
multi lingual in composition, it is common for people to be well versed in 
several languages, or at least two languages; the national language which is the 
Malay language or Bahasa Melayu and English, with English being considered 
as a racially neutral language. Most Malaysian are comfortable speaking in a 
mixed of English and Malay Language, bahasa campur or bahasa rojak (a 
mixed of Bahasa Melayu and English language) in their everyday 
conversation. Therefore, even though I began asking questions in English, 
most respondents answered in bahasa rojak as a matter of habit, except the 
high ranking officers in the public and private sectors who were more 
proficient in English language. To this I reciprocated by phrasing the following 
questions in the same manner, which led to a fairly conversational and 
situational interview sessions. As a result, I noticed that the respondents 
became more relaxed, and subsequently willing to share more elaborated 
responses. I realised that this might have caused a loss or differences in 
meaning of the questions, and might have resulted in substantially different 
responses from the respondents. However, as this research is by no means 
trying to compare responses among different respondents, but rather is aimed 
at gaining as much information in breadth and depth, the differences were 
considered negligible.   
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Data Gathering Technique 2 (Observation) and Data Gathering Technique 3 
(Review of Documents) 
 
Another technique which was applied to obtain data for my research was 
observation. Unlike the interview method where the data gathered is mainly 
based on the perception of interviewees, observation produces data based on 
the observer’s insights and perceptual sense, thus making me, the observer, the 
main ‘tool’ in this technique. There were two significantly different 
observation methods which I adopted in this research: firstly participant 
observation and secondly, non-participant observation.  
 
I played my role as a participant observer by attending three related 
conferences and a partners meeting of a public-private partnership programme. 
To ensure maximum information could be gained from attending the 
conferences, elements worth noting such as any significant break through, 
policy changes, and related figures were determined beforehand. I kept a 
research diary to note down all my observations on the nature and intensity of 
the involvement of the various actors in the conferences, which was indeed a 
great help in forming a bigger and more general picture of my study as a whole 
in relation to my research. As there were also exhibition booths at the 
conferences, I took the opportunity to collect brochures, pamphlets, annual 
reports and many other relevant documents, and was fortunate enough to make 
new contacts from who I gathered a lot of information by engaging in 
informal, yet enlightening conversations. I also took the opportunity to talk to 
important people in the industry, government and NGOs during coffee breaks. 
This not only assisted me in getting their views on the research that I was 
conducting, but also proved to be a great ‘lubricant’ in gaining entry for the 
interviews later on, as noted above.  
 
The non-participatory observation involved observing the process of collecting 
used computers at nine collection centres in Penang and Petaling Jaya in the 
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public-private partnership programmes, and three e-waste recycling plants. 
Each observation session lasted for about two to three hours. Details on date, 
duration and location of these observation sessions are provided in Table 4.4. 
The research diary is an invaluable tool in this process as it is not only used as 
a mean to keep record of the date, venue, time and duration of the observation 
sessions, but also to keep record of field notes which is very helpful in the data 
analysis phase. 
 
Table 4.4: List of the dates, locations and duration of observation sessions 
 
Date Activity observed Location of 
observation 
(state) 
Duration of 
observation 
27 February 
2009 
e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Selangor 8.00 a.m. -10.30 a.m. 
28 February 
2009 
e-waste collection in 
PPP collection centre 
Selangor  9.00 a.m. -12.00 p.m. 
1 March 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Penang 3.00 p.m. - 5.00 p.m. 
3 March 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Penang  9.00 a.m. -11.00 a.m. 
3 March 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Penang  7.00 p.m. -10.00 p.m. 
5 March 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Penang  7.00 p.m. -10.00 p.m. 
6 March 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Penang  3.00 p.m. -5.00 p.m. 
1 April 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Selangor  9.00 a.m. -11.00 a.m. 
3 April 2009 e-waste collection in  
PPP collection centre 
Selangor  9.00 a.m. -11.00 a.m. 
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Date Activity observed Location of 
observation 
(state) 
Duration of 
observation 
20 November 
2008 
e-waste recycling 
process 
Selangor  10.00 a.m. -12.00 p.m. 
1 March 2009 e-waste recycling 
process 
Penang  9.00 a.m. -11.00 a.m. 
4 March 2009 e-waste recycling 
process 
Penang  10.00 a.m. -12.00 p.m. 
 
The main reason why observation was adopted was to check the validity of 
data from interviews against the ‘reality’ of the process of e-waste 
management, hence increasing the quality, validity and reliability of the data 
obtained. It was also meant to get first hand information and to fully 
understand the complexities of e-waste recycling, as there are limitations on 
how much can be learned from what people say in an interview. The 
observations have helped me tremendously in informing, contextualizing and 
verifying the information/materials gained from the interviews. They were also 
a very helpful way to gain sensitive information which might have be hidden 
by the respondents.  
 
Besides the positive notes on observations, the very nature of this technique, in 
several instances, possessed some limitations as detailed below. Observations 
are both time and labour intensive, and at times can be expensive, for example 
paying the participating fee for conferences. Another issue regarding 
observations is writing field notes which can be a rigorous and demanding 
work. To ensure that all data are captured, as and when needed, I made full use 
of audio recording devices and recorded my spoken descriptions, which were 
later transcribed.     
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Materials for my thesis were also extracted from many documents which were 
collected before, during and after the field study period. Among the documents 
which have been analysed and have produced valuable information to the 
thesis are research journals, minutes of meetings, letters of communications 
between actors, policy statements and legislation, company profiles and annual 
reports, brochures, pamphlets, and leaflets. The greatest strength of this 
method is its non-reactive or unobtrusive nature of yielding excerpts or 
quotations from materials. As transcribing is not needed, this method is time 
saving. Furthermore, it gave me the freedom to access it and do the analysis at 
any time convenient to me. 
 
4.3.3 Data Analysis  
 
Data analysis is a procedure of making sense of the available raw data. It is a 
process which demands a high degree of intellectual ability such as creativity 
and analytical thinking. This process is interrelated and often goes on 
simultaneously with the data collection and report writing (Creswell 2007, 
Braun and Clarke 2006) (see Figure 4.4). The data analysis process for each 
individual research endeavour is unique, which Creswell (2007) claims is an 
art, and therefore cannot be rigidly defined (Kitchin and Tate 2000). Despite 
that, Creswell (2007) believes that data analysis process conforms to a general 
contour, which he describes as ‘analytic circles’ rather than a fixed step-by-
step process which simply moves from one phase to the next. Creswell’s ‘data 
analysis spiral’ (Creswell 2007: 151) consists of four general procedures as the 
followings;  
 
• data managing 
• reading  
• describing, classifying and interpreting 
• representing and visualizing 
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Kitchin and Tate (2000), while recognize that qualitative data analysis is an 
inductive process which is not easily captured by a linear process, offer a 
guideline which is intended for novice researchers which are spread into three 
iterative routes. They are represented in Table 4.5 below. 
 
Table 4.5: Kitchin and Tate’s (2000) guidelines on qualitative data analysis 
routes  
 
Route Procedure 
Description Transcription  
Annotation 
Classification Categorizing 
Splitting and splicing 
Connection Linking and connecting 
Corroborating evidence 
   
Based on Creswell’s (2007) ‘data analysis spiral’, and Kitchin and Tate’s 
(2000) guidelines on qualitative data analysis routes mentioned above, plus the 
work of Braun and Clarke (2006) and Marshall and Rossman (1999), I drew 
my own research analysis procedure. The data analysis process in my study 
spread out into four stages, where each stage consisted of several procedures 
with specific aims. The details of the analysis stages, phases, procedures and 
aims are condensed in Table 4.6 below, and followed by a narration on how 
each task was undertaken. These tasks, though presented in turn are not 
completely linear, with a good deal of back-tracking and iteration occurring 
between stages 2, 3 and 4.  
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Table 4.6: Details on data analysis adopted in this research  
 
Stage Phase Procedure Aim 
1 Data 
management  
• Transcribing 
• Organising data into 
folders and files 
 
• Preparing data for 
analysis 
• Familiarize self with 
data 
2 Classification • Repeated active reading 
and reflecting 
• Annotating/memoing 
(noting down initial 
ideas) 
• Generating 
categories/codes 
• Coding 
 
• Condensing and 
winnowing data in a 
systematic manner to 
produce meanings to 
the texts 
 
3 Interpretation • Identify patterns and 
themes 
• Making links and 
connections 
• Corroborate evidence 
• Reducing data into 
themes  
• Presenting data in a 
discussion 
 
4 Representation • Writing report • Relating back the 
analysis to the 
research questions 
and literature  
• Presentation of in-
depth analysis output 
in qualitative 
narrative. 
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The data analysis process can be represented in a flow chart as in Figure 4.4 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: A flow chart of the data analysis process 
 
Stage 1: Data Management 
 
The route to obtaining meaningful information for my research began with the 
preparation for the transcription process. To start with, digital back up copies 
of original audio recordings were made, tagging them with a serial numbering 
system for easy reference. This was followed by the transcription process. 
Transcription is a process where raw data, whether in the form of pure 
description from observations and direct quotation from interviews in the audio 
format, are transformed into readable and printable texts. This involved careful 
listening to the audio recordings. Transcriptions of interview recordings were 
limited to spoken words only, as the thematic analysis technique which is 
adopted in this research does not require more detail than the spoken words in 
the transcript (Braun and Clarke 2006) and are verbatim for interviews which 
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were conducted in English. While undertaking this process, I found myself 
engaging in continuous repetition of the audio recordings to ensure data were 
captured precisely. As such, this process demands not only a great deal of hard 
work, but also consumed a great amount of time. Transcription work for 
interviews which were conducted in vernacular (Malay Language or Bahasa 
Melayu) or a mix of English and vernacular consumed twice the amount of 
time as they were transcribed as recorded before they were translated into 
English. It is possible that in this process some meaning might have been lost 
or, indeed, some twisted or invented. Out of 56 interviews, only 18 interviews 
were conducted fully in English language, while the rest were a mix of English 
and Bahasa Melayu. To increase the validity and reliability of the data, 
transcripts were sent to several respondents through email for their comments 
and to seek their approval.  
 
This was then followed with the physical organising and sorting of all the print 
outs of interview transcripts, which at this particular stage had been 
transformed into material data, for further analysis. The transcripts were 
indexed with similar serial numbers as the audio recording tagging (see 
Appendix 5 for a complete list of the interview transcripts reference system). 
The entire sets of transcripts were read through before the coding process 
began. Ideas, comments, memos and identification of possible patterns, which 
were shaped as reading through was done, were written on the right-hand side 
margin of every page of the transcripts print outs which were purposely left 
blank. Writing notes and memos in the margins of the raw data served as a 
reminder about new thinking on facets of the investigation which were inspired 
during the reading process (Denscombe 2005). Besides that, the process of 
reading and rereading of transcripts also acted as a log of thinking lines which 
helped enormously with the process of generating categories. 
 
The process of preparing transcriptions, reading and re-reading of transcripts is 
time-consuming, and at times, can be boring. However, as agreed by many 
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qualitative research authors (see Braun and Clarke 2006, Bird 2005, Riessman 
1993), this process is an excellent way to start familiarizing oneself with the 
data. This phase provides the bedrock for the rest of the analysis (Braun and 
Clarke 2006) and is a key phase of data analysis (Bird 2005). As claimed by 
Braun and Clarke (2006), the time spent is not wasted, as it informs the early 
stages of analysis, and develop a far more thorough understanding of the data. 
 
Stage 2: Classification of Data 
 
The process of repeated reading of transcripts sits on the boundary of the first 
and second stages of the research analysis route.  Thorough reading is 
necessary to note recurring patterns in the transcripts, to identify the important 
or more salient factors and to produce a general sense out of the data. It marks 
the beginning of the classification process. The classification of data, in simple 
terms, is a process where the raw data or the transcripts are broken up into 
parts and then placed into similar categories. This step begins with the task of 
generating categories, followed by the splitting of data and the coding process.  
 
The categories used in my research analysis were a combination of prefigured 
or a priori codes (which were generated based on literature) and codes which 
were produced through data interrogating. Data interrogating is a process 
which involves asking a lot of why questions to the data. Apart from that, 
during the first reading of the transcripts, I was engaged in a deep, yet active 
intellectual process of questioning the data and reflecting on the conceptual 
framework which resulted in several sub-categories being added or expanded, 
while several others were collapsed. This is the most difficult phase in the 
analysis process. Marshall and Rossman (1999) describe categorizing as tough 
intellectual work which is complex and ambiguous, and demands a high level 
of creativity, but can be fun at the same time. Through the combination of 
these two processes, seven categories emerged, where specific codes were 
given to each category (see Appendix 6). These categories were used as a 
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guide structuring the writing up process. Not all the answers given by an 
interviewee are useful (Wolcott 1994). Only answers which respond to 
interview question count as useful or relevant data, while other data have to be 
discarded.  After this process, a second level of categorization was carried out. 
The second level categorization process involved only the transcripts of 
respondents who are taking part in the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
programme, and is meant to produce deeper and more detailed understanding 
and explanation for the PPP process. By adopting the same method of data 
interrogating as explained above, thirteen categories were produced, and were 
given specific codes (see Appendix 7).   
 
Once the categories and category codes were ready, the transcripts were 
printed out again as the previous set were all marked with memos and 
comments. The transcripts were reread diligently, and chunks of text which 
were linked and connected to any of the prepared categories were highlighted 
with different coloured pens. The related codes were indexed on the right 
hand-side margin of the transcripts (see Appendix 8 and 9 for samples of coded 
transcripts). The process of organizing data into specific categories is known as 
the coding process (Tuckett 2005, Kitchin and Tate 2000). For parts of 
transcripts which were coded for more than one category, different types of 
identification were used, such as underlines.  
 
After the coding process was completed, I proceeded with the next task which 
was to sort the data into categories. The process of organizing data into 
meaningful groups was done with the help of the cut-and-paste function of the 
word processor. At the start of this research process, I planned to use NVIVO 
(a qualitative analysis software) in the data analysis process. However, 
concerning that my lack of experience with the newly acquired technique may 
require more time and could possibly have an affect the accuracy of the data, 
and thus the results generated, I decided to opt for the ‘old’ technique which I 
am more familiar and comfortable with. To get on with the sorting process, a 
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specific file for each category was created, and relevant parts of the coded 
transcript or ‘databits’ (Kitchin and Tate 2000: 245) are cut and paste in the 
new file (see table 4.7). Kitchin and Tate (2000: 243) refer to the end product 
as ‘sorted categories’. 
 
Table 4.7: Example of a sorted category based on two transcripts  
 
Category: Communication among partners in PPP (PPP Comm) 
 
Databits Transcript 
reference 
number 
Respondents 
reference 
Most of the time, I call YY. Because 
normally I use my handphone to make calls. 
My mobile service provider cannot reach 
XX toll free number.  
 
42 Respondent # 42, 
CBO, interviewed on 
27 February 2009 
I will only call them to come down if I feel 
we have got a sensible amount.  
 
42 Respondent # 42, 
CBO, interviewed on 
27 February 2009 
We never meet in formal meetings. My tight 
schedule and heavy responsibility as a 
teacher in a school just wouldn’t allow me 
to. However we frequently used other type 
of communication, via telefon and sms (text 
messaging system) for example. Anyway, 
our major partners such as XX and YY are 
based in Penang. Meeting up physically 
wouldn’t be that easy. And whenever there 
are functions such as exhibitions we will 
meet.  
42 Respondent # 42, 
CBO, interviewed on 
27 February 2009 
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Category: Communication among partners in PPP (PPP Comm) 
 
Databits Transcript 
reference 
number 
Respondents 
reference 
Normally Mr LLS of ZZ will sms or call us 
to inform of any progress or invite us for 
any function. For example, there are lucky 
draw competition carried out every year, and 
XX will normally follow-up by calling us up 
to ensure that we are kept informed and are 
invited. 
42 Respondent # 42, 
CBO, interviewed on 
27 February 2009 
 
We had a few meeting when we first start on 
the mechanism of the programme. Some 
were conducted here, others in Penang. We 
were also invited to visit XX and YY. After 
the programme was launched and is running 
smoothly now, then we just let it go on. 
There is no more meeting between us now. 
Now that the programme has sail off 
smoothly, we rarely meet. Once a month I 
met people from YY when they came over 
for collection. 
 
8 Respondent # 8, 
Government, 
interviewed on 26 
November 2008 
Communicating with XX can be quiet 
difficult. As a big organization with a 
regional office based in Singapore, deciding 
on simple things than take a long time. XX 
they have the corporate comm 
(communication) section. Everything must 
go through several levels. For example all 
8 Respondent # 8, 
Government, 
interviewed on 26 
November 2008 
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Category: Communication among partners in PPP (PPP Comm) 
 
Databits Transcript 
reference 
number 
Respondents 
reference 
the speeches for our launching day have to 
be vetted by the legal department. Even, the 
publicity brochure has to go through their 
corporate comm. They check if logo correct 
or not. The colour correct or not.  
 
 
The remaining databits were sorted in the same manner, and the tables 
produced became the main source for the data interpretation stage that follows.  
 
Stage 3: Interpretation of Data 
 
Data interpretation is a stage consisting of several steps, and is aimed to make 
sense out of the data which have been collected. It begins as soon as data starts 
being gathered. The steps involved in the previous stage such as construction 
of categories, coding and sorting of data are interpretive actions and are the 
beginning of interpretation process. Other actions of data interpretation include 
establishing links between categories, and identifying similarities and 
differences among categories.  
 
For example, one of the objectives of my research is to understand why 
different actors took part in partnership programmes. The chunk of information 
or databits related to this issue was put together in a table under the category 
‘reasons’ and coded as ‘PPP Re’. To make more sense out of the available 
data, I adopted the word matrix method based on suggestions by Creswell 
(2007), Yin (2002), Kitchin and Tate (2000) and Miles and Huberman (1994). 
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The word matrix displayed the five different sub-category of reasons 
(economy, environment, social, responsibility and others) as cited by the 
respondents against three groups of actors (Table 4.8). 
  
Table 4.8: An example of a word matrix to interpret the reasons for 
involvement in partnership by different actors 
 
Actors Reasons for involvement in partnerships 
Economy Environment Social  Responsibility Others 
Government  X X X X 
Private Sector 
Actor 
X X X  X 
CBO/NGO X X X  X 
 
The overall pattern in the word table led to the conclusion that all actors of 
governance took part in partnership programme for environmental and social 
reasons. State actors participation was also due to the needs oblige to their core 
responsibility, a reason which is not shared with other actors. On the other 
hand, both groups of non-state actors participated in the partnership 
programme due to the economic incentives derived from it; a reason which is 
not in the minds of state actors. The whole of the data were interpreted in this 
manner, which I found to be a real challenge as it relies heavily on my ability 
to think laterally and to connect data together in meaningful ways. The 
interpretation of data is then ready to be shared thorough written 
representation. 
 
Stage 4: Representation 
 
The essences of the study which were revealed from the analysis of the data 
were then communicated in qualitative narrative. In fact, the writing process 
began much earlier than the data analysis phase. Writing up began with jotting 
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down of ideas and potential coding schemes during the classification and 
coding of data. Like the research itself, writing is iterative (Kitchin and Tate 
2000), and progressed in a nonlinear order (Braun and Clarke 2006). The 
process continues through the entire analysis process. My writing journey 
began with rough sketches which were gradually built up into drafts of 
chapters. I started drafting the three analysis chapters, followed by two 
chapters on literature review, and one chapter each on research methodology, 
conclusion and introduction.  
 
4.4 Research Experience 
 
In conducting this research, I realised that my biography – particularly my 
attachment with the University of Malaya and Durham University, and my 
ability to converse in Malay and English languages - have played an important 
role in establishing rapport with the various persons I met, in gaining entry 
permits and permission for interview sessions and in acquiring invaluable 
information which proved to be crucial for my research. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, getting permission for an interview was one of the biggest 
hurdles that I faced throughout the journey of completing the data collection 
process. This was however, made a little more manageable with my status as a 
staff member of University of Malaya – the oldest and most prestigious 
university in Malaysia. Notwithstanding that, once entry was granted, the fact 
that I am currently a student of a university in the United Kingdom helped 
break the ice in several interview sessions as many of the respondents have had 
their education in the United Kingdom. This particular similarity which I 
shared with the respondents often warmed up the atmosphere during the 
meeting. The respondents became more relaxed as a result, which was visibly 
shown in their altered body language and therefore become more forthcoming. 
I, therefore, juggled my biography as either a university student or university 
staff when the situation called for it. 
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A researcher’s ethnicity is another important aspect in a multi racial and multi 
lingual country like Malaysia. As an ethnically Malay researcher, my 
proficiency in Bahasa Melayu, the national language, has enabled me to 
communicate well and interact easily with respondents, especially those from 
the working class such as the scavengers, electrical items repairers and 
electrical equipment retailer, who are able to converse in that language 
regardless of their race. I am also very fortunate for being able to communicate 
in English, which has helped me tremendously in communicating with the 
respondents at the managerial level upwards who mostly use English as a 
default language in their everyday job. Therefore, I conducted the interview 
sessions in the language (or a blend of languages) that I felt my respondents 
were more comfortable with. 
 
As most people would naturally feel more comfortable and have a thicker 
sense of belonging while dealing with those from the same race, I experience a 
slight disadvantage in gaining access for interviews as a Malay, for many of 
the players in e-waste governance are ethnic Chinese. However, as my name 
Adeline is more commonly used among the ethnic Chinese rather than the 
Malays in Malaysia, on several occasions I was mistakenly assumed to be 
Chinese during introductory telephone conversations.  This was indeed a 
blessing as it helped me to secure several interview appointments with Chinese 
respondents. I was also fortunate that despite my earlier worries, gender bias 
was not an issue at all in the process of getting data for my research. Instead, I 
felt that I gained respect from various people that I met throughout this 
research process as a married, middle-aged female student, which somehow 
made this research journey a smoother one.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to elucidate the methodological routes which were adopted 
in this research. It began with a description of the research design, followed 
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with research method and ended with the narration of my experiences in 
conducting this study. The next step that followed was the data collection step, 
which was both physically and mentally challenging. Multiple methods of data 
enquiry - interviews, observations and review of documents - were adopted to 
allow the weakness of one method being covered by another, thus minimising 
the possibilities of bias in the final output. However, as data is filtered through 
a personal lens in qualitative research, it cannot escape personal interpretation. 
To summarise, this qualitative research on e-waste governance in Malaysia 
was carried out by adopting the case study approach with multiple methods of 
data collection, which were analysed using thematic approach. The decisions 
on research methodology, methods and analytical technique were made due to 
their abilities to investigate and interrogate the complex issue of e-waste 
governance and to fulfil the research objectives. 
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Chapter 5: The Roles of State Actors in E-waste Governance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The potential harmful effects arising from indiscriminate dumping and illegal 
dismantling have induced concerned stakeholders to become involved in e-
waste governance – each actor acting with unique and specific roles. This 
chapter seeks to explore this matter; focusing on the roles of state actors. State 
actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia comprise of three levels of 
governments; the federal, state and local level governments. The questions that 
this chapter seeks to answer are: how do state actors play their roles in the 
governance process and what are the implications of state actors’ involvement 
in overall e-waste management? This will be achieved by investigating the 
different modes of governance in which state actors are involved. The state 
actors of e-waste governing in Malaysia are involved in three modes of 
governance; the hierarchical mode, the persuasion mode and the co-
governance mode. While the roles of state actors in the hierarchical mode is 
common, it is rather surprising that state actors are also involved in non-
hierarchical modes of e-waste governance. The analysis of state actors role in 
hierarchical mode of governance is presented in Section 5.2, followed by their 
roles in the persuasion mode in Section 5.3.  
 
Two major roles of state actors in the hierarchical mode of governance are to 
formulate law and to enforce the formulated law. The analysis of the 
hierarchical roles of state actors (Section 5.2) begins with a description of the 
Department of Environment (DOE) as the responsible federal government 
agency in governing e-waste. This is followed by a discussion of the evolution 
of law on e-waste, a critical discussion of its limitations, the implications of the 
implementation of the law, and finally possible avenues for improvement. The 
discussion in Section 5.3 is focused on the role of state actors in the persuasion 
mode of governance. State actors (federal level government) are involved in 
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persuasion mode of governance in a campaign on mobile phone recycling. A 
detailed discussion of this programme and the state actors’ roles are reported in 
Section 5.3. 
 
5.2 The Hierarchical Mode of Governing E-waste 
 
The hierarchical mode of governance displays a ‘top-down’ character where 
the governing bodies are (or see themselves as) in some way ‘superimposed’ 
above those governed (Kooiman 2003 : 115). In hierarchical mode, command-
and-control is applied, often with sanction, to achieve a specified objective. As 
such, and as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are two main 
roles for state actors in hierarchical mode of e-waste governance; firstly to 
formulate relevant law and secondly to implement the law. These roles are 
played by the federal government, particularly the Department of Environment 
(DOE). A brief background of DOE in terms of its history, organisation of 
staff, overall function and specific roles in governing e-waste is briefly 
provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
The DOE was established in 1974 as a small division under the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing, and was known then as the Division of 
Environment (Hezri and Hassan 2006). It was moved from the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing to the Ministry of Science and Technology in 
1976 (the Ministry of Science and Technology was renamed the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment in a major cabinet reorganisation in 
March 2004). Following a restructuring exercise in 1983, the Division was 
upgraded to Department status and is now officially known as the Department 
of Environment (DOE). The head office of the DOE is in Putrajaya, and it has 
twenty-six branches nationwide (www.doe.gov.my). From an administrative 
perspective, the DOE is headed by a Director General (see Figure 5.1 on the 
organisation structure of the DOE). The Director General of the DOE is 
appointed by the minister, and has extensive administrative powers, which 
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among others include the power to approve licences, charge fees and fines, 
prohibit activities, prosecute transgressors and make subsidiary legislation. All 
subsidiary legislation made under the EQA (known as regulations, rules or 
orders) have to be approved by the minister of Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment, after consultation with the Environmental Quality Council 
members. 
 
The main function of the DOE is to prevent, control and abate pollution in 
Malaysia through administering and enforcement of Environmental Quality 
Act 1974 (EQA 1974) (www.doe.gov.my). EQA 1974 is Malaysia’s only piece 
of environmental law. It is mainly a regulatory instrument for pollution control, 
and does not cover other, broader environmental issues. EQA 1974 received 
Royal assent from the King on 8th March 1974. It was gazetted on 14th March 
1974 and came into operation on 15th April 1975. The provision on e-waste 
management in the EQA 1974 is found in Section 34B (Prohibition against 
Placing, Deposit, etc. of Scheduled Wastes), and in a subsidiary law (which 
was made under EQA 1974 called ‘The Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulation 2005’). The administration and enforcement of laws on e-
waste is placed under the responsibility of a unit called the Hazardous 
Substances Division. This unit receives support from three other units under 
the DOE; the Strategic Communication Division pertaining to issues relating to 
the raising of public awareness and education, the Environmental Institute of 
Malaysia (EiMAS) for training purposes, and a Legal Unit to deal with legal 
matters and any prosecutions that might be brought under the law (see Figure 
5.1).  
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(Source: Department of Environment – www.doe.gov.my)  
  
Figure 5.1: Organisational structure of the DOE Malaysia (as at November 
2010)  
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5.2.1 E-waste Legislation: Emergence and Evolution  
 
E-waste was first legally recognized as a type of hazardous waste in Malaysia 
on 15th August 2005, when a provision on the control of pollution caused by e-
waste generation, storage, treatment and disposal came into effect. The 
introduction of e-waste law in Malaysia came relatively late considering the 
significant amount of e-waste generated in the country. Malaysia is one of the 
leading sites for the global electronics industry, involving the assembly, testing 
and packaging of semiconductors (MIDA 2004 – www. mida.gov.my), and is a 
hot spot for e-waste recycling activities (Lee 2007). Although e-waste law in 
Malaysia was introduced in 2005, the root of e-waste legislation can be traced 
back to the introduction of the law on hazardous waste in 1979.  
 
The progress or evolution of Malaysian e-waste policy can be divided into four 
phases with prominent milestones in each phase. The progress has been 
influenced by various factors, such as global trends in environmental 
governance where intervention of third sector actors proliferate, changes in 
national level economic activities, responsibility as a party to international 
treaties, and international relations. The four phases and their significant 
milestones in e-waste policy development in Malaysia are presented in Table 
5.1. This analysis provides the background information towards understanding 
the involvement of state actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia.   
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Table 5.1: The four phases of evolution and key milestones in Malaysian 
legislation on hazardous waste management 
 
Phase  Period Milestones/ significant events Influencing factors 
1 1979- 
1988 
Environmental Quality (Sewage 
and Industrial Effluents) 
Regulations 1979. Enacted on 1st 
January 1979. 
 
The institutionalization of 
environmental policies at the 
global level. 
2 1989- 
1995 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 1989 was 
introduced.  
To ensure safe disposal and 
management of hazardous 
waste. 
 
3 1996- 
2004 
Environmental Quality Act 1974 
amended. Provision on the control 
of hazardous waste included in 
Section 34B.  
 
To address the international 
commitment to the Basel 
Convention. 
4 2005- now Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 1989 was 
revoked and replaced by 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005.  
E-waste is prescribed as a type of 
hazardous waste. 
 
The proliferation of the third 
sector in environmental 
governance; international 
relations, the influence of 
international treaty and 
foreign countries’ laws 
 
 
Phase 1 (1979-1988) 
The first phase in e-waste policy development began with the introduction of 
the first legislation on hazardous wastes known as the Environmental Quality 
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(Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations 1979 (made under EQA 1974), 
which was promulgated on 1st January 1979. The introduction of this piece of 
legislation was a response to a new wave of environmental management where 
institutionalization of environmental policies at the global level proliferated. 
Janicke and Weidner (1997) identify two broad waves of institutionalization of 
environmental policies at the global level. The first wave occurred in the late 
1960s to early 1970s, pioneered by frontrunners in the developed world, such 
as the USA, Sweden and Japan, and the second wave came in the aftermath of 
the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the Rio Conference of 1992. Malaysia 
responded to the first wave by making various administrative and legal 
changes including the establishment of a ministry for the environment and a 
national environmental law (Hezri and Hasan 2006), which brought forth the 
Environmental Quality Act (EQA) in 1974, discussed above. The 
Environmental Quality (Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations 1979 
called for restrictions on the discharge of effluents and disposal of sludge on 
any soil or surface of any land without the written permission of the Director 
General of Environment (www.doe.gov.my). The aim of this provision was to 
avoid indiscriminate disposal of hazardous industrial waste on land and to 
avoid pollution of land and water. Indiscriminate disposal of hazardous waste 
is not only detrimental to the environment and human health, but also requires 
costly clean up measures (Lee 2006).  
 
Phase 2 (1989-1995) 
The second phase began in the late 1980s and was triggered by changes in 
national economic activities. At that time, Malaysian economic activities were 
restructured away from agricultural activities to industrial activities, resulting 
in the production of a more complex type of waste and making waste 
management more complicated. To ensure that proper measures for managing 
hazardous waste were in place and the environment and public health were 
protected and to align legislation with the transformations in economic activity, 
the government constantly and progressively reviewed the law – a process 
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which continues to this day. This culminated in the formulation of three sets of 
regulations related to hazardous waste management in 1989, namely: 
 
• Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 1989 
• Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes 
Treatment and Disposal Facilities) Order 1989 
• Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes 
Treatment and Disposal Facilities) Regulations 1989 
 
The introduction of these by-laws marked the second phase in the progress of 
e-waste law in Malaysia. It was in these by-laws that the term ‘scheduled 
wastes’ was first used in Malaysian law to refer to hazardous waste. These by-
laws aim to control indiscriminate and illegal dumping of hazardous waste by 
tracking the movements of waste from the point of generation to disposal 
facilities using consignment notes. The main target of this law is industry. 
 
Phase 3 (1996- 2004) 
The third phase of e-waste policy evolution saw a very significant 
advancement in Malaysia’s hazardous waste legislation. In this phase, the EQA 
1974 was amended in 1996 to include Section 34B (Prohibition against 
placing, deposit, etc. of scheduled wastes). The enforcement of this law 
resulted in the prohibition of these activities: 
 
• Placement, deposit or disposal of any scheduled wastes on land or into 
Malaysian waters except at prescribed premises; 
• Receive or send scheduled wastes in and out of Malaysia, and 
• Transit of scheduled wastes.  
(source: Environmental Quality Act (1974) (Act 127) from 
www.doe.gov.my). 
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The amendment was carried out as a commitment to fulfilling Malaysia’s 
obligations as a party of the Basel Convention. Malaysia’s first step to 
becoming a member of the Basel Convention took place on 8th October 1993, 
when Malaysia deposited the instrument of accession to the Basel Convention. 
It came into force in Malaysia on 6th January 1994. This proved to be a turning 
point in hazardous waste legislation and management in Malaysia. A more 
stringent provision and stiffer penalties were introduced in the newly amended 
law. The penalties for illegal trafficking of hazardous waste were increased to 
RM500,000 (£100,000) or five years imprisonment, or both. Despite stringent 
requirements, the law provides an avenue for importation and exportation of e-
waste by obtaining written approval from the Director General of the DOE. 
 
Phase 4 (2005-present) 
The most significant milestone in e-waste policy evolution was reached in 
2005, when e-waste was finally legally defined as a type of hazardous waste. 
This was achieved with the introduction of Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005 which came into force on 15th August 2005. This 
piece of legislation replaced the previous Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 1989 which was revoked. It emphasizes pollution 
abatement and control through the implementation of waste treatment and 
disposal schemes, and encouraging waste minimization. This is clearly 
manifested in the key provisions of this regulation which focus on the 
generation, storage, treatment, disposal and tracking of movements and 
transportation of hazardous wastes. Generation of wastes is controlled by a 
notification system which requires waste generators to notify the DOE of the 
types and amount of waste that they have generated or stored. Storage of waste 
is limited to less than 20 metric tonnes for not more than 180 days. Full 
responsibilities of e-waste generators and contractors are provided in Appendix 
10. 
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The law also specifies that storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste 
should only be undertaken at specific premises called ‘prescribed premises’ 
(noted in regulations 4, 5 and 6 of the law). Three premises are listed as 
prescribed premises: off-site storage facilities, off-site treatment facilities and 
off-site recovery facilities (Environmental Quality Act 1974 (Act 127) from 
www.doe.gov.my). The term used under this law to refer to e-waste recycling 
plants is ‘off-site recovery facilities’, which is divided into two categories; 
partial recovery and full recovery premises. As of July 2010, there were 138 
registered premises, of which 122 were partial e-waste recovery premises and 
16 were full recovery premises (see Table 2.9) (www.doe.gov.my). Partial 
recovery refers to the process of collecting, segregating, dismantling and 
crushing of the equipment, where the recovered materials will need further 
treatment and recovery before final products are produced (Respondent # 4, 
interviewed on 3 September 2009), while full recovery is a complete chain of 
processes starting with the dismantling of e-waste and recovery of precious 
metals, through to final disposal of treated hazardous waste.  
 
The law specifies that the owners of prescribed premises should obtain a 
licence. To obtain a licence, the owner of the prescribed premises must make 
an application to the DOE for a fee, based on the Polluter Pays Principle. The 
fee payable is determined following an assessment and evaluation of several 
factors including class of premises, location of premises, quantity of waste 
discharged, class of pollutants discharged and the existing level of pollution. 
The licencing measure is meant for easy monitoring of waste generation and 
movement. These licences were sceptically nicknamed ‘licences to pollute’ by 
a representative of an NGO (Respondent # 53, interviewed on 4 March 2009). 
Any person who is found guilty of occupying or using premises without 
obtaining a licence shall be liable to a fine not exceeding RM50,000 (£10,000) 
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both, and to a further 
fine of RM1,000 (£200) for every day that the offence is continued.  
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Another major amendment in the new law is the introduction of a new 
categorisation system of waste. The new system categorised hazardous waste 
into five categories (coded SW1 – SW5), based on type of waste, and not the 
source of waste as in the previous law. The new categories of scheduled wastes 
are: 
 
• SW 1 Metal and metal-bearing wastes, 
• SW2 Wastes containing principally inorganic constituents which may 
contain metals or organic materials, 
• SW3 Wastes containing principally organic constituents which may 
contain metals or organic materials, 
• SW4 Wastes which may contain either inorganic or organic 
constituents, and 
• SW5 Other wastes. 
 
E-waste falls under the SW1 category. This new system contributes to more 
effective waste management as the type of waste is the key factor in 
determining suitable management solutions, not the source of the waste. The 
new categorisation system is also in line with the system used in the Basel 
Convention (Lee, 2006).  
 
There were many factors responsible for the processes leading up to the 
formulation of this new law. The three main factors were international 
pressure, the influence of international and foreign countries’ law, and the role 
of non-state actors. The effect of international pressure is apparent in an 
incident narrated by Ir Lee Heng Keng, the Deputy Director of Department of 
Environment in a speech to a Waste Management Conference in Kuala 
Lumpur in November 2008. According to Ir Lee Heng Keng, a ship laden with 
used computer monitors en-route from Malaysia to China was stopped in Hong 
Kong waters in 2005. Malaysia’s DOE received a call from Hong Kong’s 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) questioning Malaysian action in the 
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matter as Malaysia is a party to the Basel Convention which restricts 
transboundary movements of waste. The incident - which tarnished the image 
of the country at international level and affected international relations – 
created the impulse for a quick formulation of an e-waste law. As a result, the 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005 was introduced, 
rather hastily, to replace the Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) 
Regulations 1989.  
 
The second factor that has had an impact on the formulation of Malaysian law 
on e-waste is the influence of international law and foreign countries’ law. In 
managing the issue of e-waste, Malaysia has attempted to be on a par with the 
international agenda and tried to work in tandem with international efforts 
(Ibarahim 2006). This was confirmed by one of the directors of the DOE in an 
interview: 
 
“International laws play an important role in the process of formulation 
and review of our law on e-waste. Basel Convention and EU laws are 
used as guidelines. We did this to make sure that we are always in line 
with the international law…..in line with the current progress at 
international level” (Respondent # 1, Government, interviewed on 27 
November 2008, verbatim). 
 
The influence of the Basel Convention in Malaysian e-waste law is evident. 
For example, the wordings used in the definition of e-waste in both laws have 
many similarities. E-waste in the Basel Convention (List A, Category A1, 
Code A1180) is defined as: 
 
“waste electrical and electronic assemblies or scrap containing 
components such as accumulators or other batteries included in list A, 
mercury switches, glass from cathode ray tubes, or other activated glass 
and PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) capasitors, or contaminated with 
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Annexe I constituents (for example, cadmium, mercury, lead, PCB) to 
an extent that they posses any of the characteristics contained in 
Annexe III’ (Basel Convention website, available at www.basel.int). 
 
Under Malaysian law, the definition of e-waste (in the First Schedule of 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulation 2005 under Category 
SW 1 (Metal and metal-bearing wastes), code SW110) is given as follows as: 
 
“waste from the electrical and electronic assemblies containing 
components such as accumulators, mercury-switches, glass from 
cathode-ray tubes and other activated glass or polychlorinated biphenyl 
capasitors, or contaminated with cadmium, mercury, lead, nickel, 
chromium, copper, lithium, silver, manganese or polychlorinated 
biphenyls” (Guidelines for the Classification of Used Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment in Malaysia, available at www.doe.gov.my). 
 
From this text it is clear that the definition of e-waste under Malaysian law is 
lacking with respect to the definition and clarification of the boundary between 
e-waste (for disposal) and used electrical and electronic equipment (for reuse 
and refurbishment). In order to clarify such grey areas, a guideline was 
published by the DOE entitled ‘Guidelines for Classification of Used Electrical 
and Electronic Equipment in Malaysia’ (to be read together with 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005), which took 
effect on 15 January 2008. Among other things, this guideline clarified that 
any electrical or electronic equipment which is less than three years from the 
date of manufacture and is intended for direct re-use is not considered as e-
waste and can be imported or exported.  
Another factor which has been significant in shaping e-waste policy in 
Malaysia is the role of NGOs. Two locally registered NGOs which are 
particularly concerned with issues related to e-waste are the Consumer 
Association of Penang (CAP) and Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM). SAM is a 
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national NGO affiliated with Friends of the Earth International. Both NGOs 
have worked very closely with international like-minded organizations such as 
the Basel Action Network (BAN), Global Anti Incinerator Alliance (GAIA) 
and International POPS (persistent organic pollutants) Elimination Network 
(IPEN), and have gained broad exposure and knowledge on e-waste from their 
involvement with these international groups. Inspired by the experience of 
such international organisations (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008), these 
NGOs started to lobby the government for an e-waste law by writing letters to 
the Director General of the DOE. CAP, for example, has a high level of 
concern over the issue of justice for the workers who are involved in 
dismantling of e-waste, as many workers have to take up such employment 
because of extreme poverty despite the health risks that they are facing. Many 
of the workers are international migrants from India, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar. The NGOs pressured the government to introduce and implement 
laws to ensure that e-waste recycling is carried out in an environmentally 
sound manner that is safe for both the environment and people (workers and 
general public). In this case, CAP’s actions are inspired by the BAN’s 
investigation in Guiyu, China (Respondents # 49, 13 November 2008). CAP is 
also lobbying for a law to halt the import of e-waste to Malaysia to avoid the 
country becoming an e-waste dumping ground as has happened in several other 
countries in the Global South, unless safe e-waste recycling technology is in 
place.  
 
The above discussion and analysis of the evolution of Malaysian law on 
hazardous waste control over the last thirty years demonstrates that the DOE 
has actively played its role as the policy maker in ensuring the relevancy of the 
law in controlling the negative impact of hazardous waste to the environment 
and society. That said, it is worth noting that the latest version of the law - the 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005 – materialised 
due to pressure from inside and outside of the country, including the need to 
fulfill Malaysia’s obligations as a party to the Basel Convention. The concept 
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of multilevel governance where authority and power are dispersed beyond a 
sovereign state (which is known as Type I governance in Hooghe and Marks 
(2003) and multiple tiers of authority by Betsill and Bulkeley (2006)) is 
evident in this case.   
 
An almost similar situation (where internal and external pressure, coupled with 
the responsibility to fulfil its obligations as a party of the Basel Convention 
have shaped the formulation of law) is also happening in China. A study by 
Zhang (2009) on e-waste governance in China reveals that pressure from 
foreign countries and international environmental NGOs, have resulted in the 
restructuring of e-waste recycling operations by the Chinese government via 
promulgation of laws since 2001. Notwithstanding the introduction of new 
legal provisions, in both Malaysia and China e-waste continues to be a source 
of hazardous waste pollution as cases of indiscriminate dumping and informal 
dismantling are still widespread (evidence from Malaysia are provided in 
Plates 5.1 to 5.6). This mismatch could be due to a combination of factors such 
as loopholes in the content of the law and/or weaknesses in the implementation 
of the law. The following section, therefore, turns to discuss the limitations of 
the hierarchical mode of governance in Malaysia. 
 
5.2.2 The Limitations of the Hierarchical Mode in E-waste Governance 
 
A successful hierarchical mode of governance depends significantly on the 
roles played by the state actors as the major players in ensuring the creation of 
an effective legal framework and its efficient implementation In controlling 
pollution emanating from improper management of e-waste, the hierarchical 
mode of governance which has been adopted by the federal government of 
Malaysia has shown limited success as cases of improper disposal are still 
widespread (as evident in Plates 5.1 to 5.6). This is substantiated by the 
findings of two pieces of research undertaken in the state of Selangor; by 
Othman et al. (2004) in Mukim Hulu Langat and Kalana (2010) in Shah Alam 
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(the capital city of the Selangor state). In the surveys conducted by Othman et 
al. (2004), they found that 40% of residents interviewed opted to dispose of 
their e-waste together with normal household waste while Kalana (2010) 
reports a slightly reduced percentage of such action (disposing of e-waste 
together with other household wastes) at 30%. In both studies, similar reasons 
was cited by the respondents for their decisions (to dispose of e-waste together 
with normal household wastes); namely, a lack of information (and facilities) 
about the correct way of disposing e-waste.  Interviews with the public to 
ascertain how they dispose of their e-waste were conducted by the New Straits 
Times newspaper (published on 13 July 2009), and comments such as ‘I 
discard my e-waste at the same place I throw my domestic waste’ and ‘ I give 
them away to scrap collectors’ are among those voiced by the respondents. 
This indicates that the available law formulated and variably enforced by the 
state has not provided a total solution to e-waste management. This might due 
to several limitations which lie in both the content of the law and in its 
implementation. It is to these limitations to which the chapter now turns. 
 
 
 
 
Plate 5.1: Backyard dismantling of personal 
computers (PC). (Source: author) 
 
 
Plate 5.2: Backyard dumping of television 
sets. (Source: author) 
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Plate 5.3: Dumping of e-waste at the 
backyard of an electrical repair shop. 
(Source: author) 
 
 
Plate 5.4: Illegal dumping of e-waste at 
the road side. (Source: author) 
 
 
Plate 5.5: E-waste is mixed with other scrap 
at a scrap dealer storage yard. (Source: 
author) 
 
 
Plate 5.6: Indiscriminate dumping of 
electrical bulbs. (Source: author) 
 
Limitations in the Content of the Law  
The Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005, as 
mentioned above, was introduced rather hastily due to mounting pressures 
from inside and outside of the country, and was much inspired by laws adopted 
in other countries, which might not be suitable for application in Malaysia. 
There are two areas regarding the content of the law which limit the potential 
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for an effective hierarchical mode; firstly, it overlooks some important players 
in the e-waste industry, and secondly it provides avenues for exemptions from 
complying with the law by obtaining written permission from the Director 
General. 
 
The first weakness of the law concerns the exclusion of relevant players in e-
waste management. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, generation of e-waste in 
Malaysia comes from two sources – the industries and the households; and 
while e-waste from industrial sources enters the formal stream of management, 
those generated by the households may enter the informal e-waste management 
stream. Although the players in e-waste management in Malaysia are so 
diversified, the law identifies only two major players; industrial e-waste 
generators and formal e-waste contractors (who are involved in the process of 
collecting, transporting, dismantling, recycling, treating and disposing of e-
waste in formal recycling industry), and neglects the generation of waste by 
households and small companies as well as informal recycling activities.  
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(Source: author) 
 
Figure 5.2: The e-waste stream from industrial and household sources 
 
Under Malaysian e-waste law, an e-waste generator is defined as ‘any person 
who generates scheduled wastes’. However, the Environmental Quality 
(Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005, including Regulation 15 (on the 
conduct of training), second schedule (on waste notification), fifth schedule 
(on inventory) and sixth schedule (on consignment notes), implies that this law 
is meant for large industrial concerns only. Any person who wishes to generate 
more than 20 metric tonnes of e-waste is required to apply for a licence from 
the DOE, and to notify the Department of the amount of e-waste generated 
within 90 days. As such, small companies and households are not subjected to 
this law as the amount that they generate is within permitted limits. This has 
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brought significant consequences as the amount of e-waste generated by 
households (although relatively little individually) has a tremendous 
cumulative effect.  
 
Besides that, the law may also not be as a useful a tool to control pollution 
from the generation of e-waste by industries as appears on first sight. This is 
because many of the industries already have more stringent in-house policies 
related to e-waste control. Manufacturers, especially Multi National 
Companies (MNCs), are governed by their own policies which are stricter than 
the EQA and were in place even before the national law was introduced. By 
adhering to their internal policies, they seemed to be complying to the EQA at 
the same time. A respondent working with a USA-based microchip 
manufacturer in Georgetown, Penang said that the company has been 
conforming to its internal policies on e-waste control which are stricter than 
the EQA, as they have to protect the specific code number of their products 
from falling into the hands of their competitors, long before the government’s 
law came about.  
 
“We have a general policy on environmental protection called the XXX 
Green commitment, which is an integrated environmental, health and 
safety stewardship commitment that encompasses products, operations 
and employees. This directive comes from our headquarters long before 
Malaysian government’s law and it is much stricter than the law” 
(Respondent # 16, private sector actor, interviewed on 17 December 
2008, verbatim). 
 
One group of important players in e-waste management which the existing e-
waste policy has overlooked is the informal e-waste recycling industry. They 
consist of, first, door-to-door scrap buyers, commonly known as ‘old 
newspaper men’ (orang surat khabar lama) (as they normally go around the 
neighbourhood making their presence felt by chanting ‘old newspapers’ over a 
 154 
 
loud-hailer); and, second, the scavengers who collect waste from public 
dustbins, dumpsites and landfills (see Plates 5.7 and 5.8). Both door-to-door 
scrap buyers and scavengers play a significant role in household e-waste 
management in Malaysia. Their activities could, in theory, prevent e-waste 
from ending up in the solid waste landfills (see Figure 5.1), provided that they 
act as agents (or middle men) and sell the e-waste to licensed contractors for 
final processing.  
 
However, through field observations and interviews with door-to-door scrap 
buyers and scavengers, it is clear that this – the channelling of e-waste from 
informal collectors to licensed contractors – is not happening. Instead, they are 
involved in backyard dismantling activity (Respondent # 31, 18 February 2009 
and Respondent # 30, 2 February 2009). Backyard dismantling is a process 
where e-waste is dismantled manually to salvage working parts (and sell them 
to electrical and electronic repair workshops), and precious materials are 
recovered by burning or deploying the acid bath technique. The remainder is 
disposed of together with normal household waste, which ends up in landfill. 
This activity is not only harmful to the environment but also exposes the 
scavengers to health hazards. There are three factors that are responsible for 
the existence of these groups in the waste management stream; firstly, the high 
demand and value of e-waste (despite it being treated as waste by others); 
secondly, the lack of proper disposal facilities for consumers; and finally, 
ineffectiveness of legal framework and enforcement which permits scavenging 
activities. 
 
The presence of these important actors in waste management who fall outside 
the normal ambit of management raises questions about whether the Malaysian 
government can achieve its goal of controlling pollution. Essentially, a 
significant proportion of e-waste, and especially that from household sources, 
is channelled through an informal network of unregistered and unregulated 
scavengers and recyclers. The presence of these actors is common in the 
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management of normal solid waste in many less economically developed 
countries, where these actors are considered a nuisance at disposal sites as they 
could hinder the effective operation of the disposal system. However, 
according to Hassan et al. (2000), these actors’ activities are, in fact, an 
advantage as they undertake waste separation at no cost. They suggest that a 
system where these actors are registered with the relevant authority be 
introduced so that their comparative advantage can be utilized. In relation to e-
waste management, this suggestion by Hassan et al. (2000) is a practical way 
to provide better control of e-waste and to avoid e-waste from ending in 
landfill. This is only possible if the authorities can provide a mechanism where 
the e-wastes ‘rescued’ by these actors (from the landfill or disposal sites) are 
bought by the licensed contractors at a reasonable price to be processed in an 
environmentally sound manner. The fact that Malaysian e-waste law was 
modelled after the laws from more economically developed countries (where 
problems related to informal networks of scavengers and scrap dealers do not 
exist to the same extent) may have been the reason why it was not considered 
by Malaysian law makers. 
 
 
 
Plate 5.7: A scavenger rummaging for 
recyclables, including e-waste in a public 
dustbin. (Source: author) 
 
 
Plate 5.8: E-waste is mixed with other 
scrap in a door-to-door scrap buyer’s 
adapted motorbike. (Source: author) 
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The second significant weakness of the law is that it provides provisions for 
actors to get around the law by obtaining written approval from the Director 
General of Environment. This is prominent in issues related to exclusion from 
disposing, treating or recovery of material at the prescribed premises, storage 
of e-waste above permitted limits, and import and export of e-waste, and will 
be discussed in turn in the following paragraphs. As mentioned earlier, the law 
specifies (in Regulations 4, 5 and 6) that storage, treatment and disposal of 
hazardous waste should be undertaken at prescribed premises only. However, a 
provision for special management of waste is found in Regulation 7 of the law, 
which enables waste generators to apply for an exemption. According to 
Regulation 7, waste generators may apply to be exempted from disposing, 
treating or recovery of material at the prescribed premises by writing to the 
Director General. An application should be made to the Director General of 
Environment with documentary evidence that the wastes do not exhibit any 
dangerous or hazardous characteristics such as corrositivity, ignitability, 
reactivity and toxicity to human and other life forms and accompanied by a 
prescribed fee of RM300 (Lee 2006). Another similar example concerns the 
storage of e-waste. Malaysian law limits the storage of e-waste within certain 
amounts and durations. Restrictions in terms of specified quantity and duration 
of storage are given in Regulation 9 of the Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005 which allows e-waste to be stored for not more than 
180 days after being generated, and the quantity should not be more than 20 
metric tonnes. An opportunity to get around the law is available by obtaining 
written approval from the Director General of Environment. An application for 
a waiver to store more than 20 metric tonnes of hazardous waste should be 
addressed to the Director General of Environment who will grant a written 
approval either with or without conditions if he/she is satisfied with the 
application. 
 
Another related example is regarding the export and import of e-waste. The 
provision on prohibition and restriction of import and export of e-waste is 
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spelled out in Section 34B of EQA 1974 (amended 1996) (which should be 
read with Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulation 2005). This 
piece of law prohibits the export of e-waste for final disposal, but allows it to 
be exported for recovery subject to the export guidelines on minimum 
percentage for recoverables and by obtaining prior written approval from the 
Director General of the DOE. According to the report of ‘E-waste Inventory 
Project in Malaysia’ (2009), 90 metric tonnes of e-waste was exported to 
Thailand in 2005 and 1,925 metric tonnes was exported to the USA, Germany, 
Belgium and Thailand in 2006. 
 
Similarly, according to the same section (Section 34B), the import of 
hazardous waste is discouraged, except import for final disposal from OECD 
countries which is totally prohibited. However, import of e-waste from non-
OECD countries for recovery may be permitted, again subject to obtaining 
special permission from the Director General of the Environment 
(http://www.basel.int). In 2006, 4,628 metric tonnes of e-waste was imported 
from the USA (E-waste Inventory Project in Malaysia Report 2009) and 
50,699 metric tonnes was imported from the USA in 2007 (The Interpol 
Pollution Crime Working Group (Phase II) Report 2009). This approach, 
where players are offered an opportunity to by-pass the law by obtaining 
written consent from the Director General, is not helping in strengthening the 
enforcement of the law, and subsequently is not contributing to effective 
control of pollution emanating from the process of e-waste disposal. Another 
limitation in the implementation of Malaysian e-waste law (other than the 
weaknesses in the content of the law discussed above) relates to the 
enforcement of the law, to which this chapter will now turn.  
 
Limitations in Enforcement of the Law 
Issues relating to pollution emanating from e-waste are still unresolved despite 
the introduction of relevant legislation. Discussions in the previous sub-
sections have shown that there are several weaknesses in the promulgated law. 
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Apart from these flaws in the statutes, the enforcement of the laws is not as 
efficient or effective as might be desired. The weaknesses of the design of the 
law have apparently been a cause of concern among enforcement officers. This 
was revealed by a respondent during an interview who said: 
 
“Most laws are formulated and decided by the policy makers within the 
four walls of their offices and they don’t bother to look into its 
practically in term of implementation. The burden after the law was 
approved is passed to the enforcement officers to deal with” 
(Respondent # 8, Government, interviewed on 26 November 2008, 
verbatim). 
 
The limitations faced by the Malaysian government in ensuring effective and 
efficient enforcement of the existing law and opportunities for improvement is 
primarily related to human resources: the limited number of personnel 
(enforcement officers), and the lack of communication (and cooperation) 
between staff (especially from other government agencies). 
 
Issues related to ineffective enforcement of laws due to the limited number of 
personnel was raised by all respondents from the DOE in their response to 
questions as to why problems related to e-waste are still recurring despite the 
legal provisions that exist. As of 2009, the DOE operated with 1,567 officers 
and with branches in every state (Department of Environment – 
www.doe.gov.my), compared to only nine officers in 1977 (Hezri and Hassan 
2006). However, the significant increase in the number of staff is not sufficient 
as the complexity of environmental issues is also on the rise. To a question on 
what action was taken by the DOE to ensure that Malaysia is not and will not 
become a dumping ground for e-waste from foreign countries, a respondent 
representing the DOE said: 
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“The ideal way is to place our enforcement officers at every entry point 
or at least at the main ports in Klang, Penang, Johor. But that is just 
impossible. Not with the current number of staff that we have. We are 
short of staff” (Respondent # 1, Government, interviewed on 27 
November 2008, verbatim). 
 
Lack of staff has also affected the processing time of applications. A 
respondent from a private company dealing with import and export of used 
computers revealed that they were kept waiting for more than three months to 
get an approval for their application to import used computers, only to be told 
after numerous follow up calls that the officers in-charge were too busy 
handling issues on open burning and transboundary haze and had not attended 
to the application (Respondent # 23, 20 November 2008). This respondent was 
particularly upset to be told that issues of transboundary haze were given 
priority over their application as the haze attracted more media coverage and 
had the potential to tarnish the image of the department and the country. 
During site visits to several treatment and recovery plants, I observed that two 
of the prescribed premises contravened the law by not having proper labels on 
drums containing hazardous waste. More rigorous and frequent visits by the 
enforcement officers to prescribed premises is needed to monitor compliance 
of law more efficiently which, of course, depends very much on the number of 
staff available.  
  
In enforcing the law, the DOE needs the support from other government 
agencies (from other ministries) such as the police (regarding the visits to 
prescribed premises) and customs (regarding import and export of e-waste) 
which is not always available. Effective communication is also lacking. For 
instance, when the DOE released the guidelines on classification of used 
electrical and electronic equipment on 15th January 2008, the Customs 
enforcement officers claimed they were not informed (Respondent # 23, 20 
November 2008). According to this guideline, electrical and electronic 
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equipment which fulfil certain requirements (such as, are manufactured less 
than three years from date of import, and are intended for direct re-use) are 
allowed to be imported. Due to miscommunication, a consignment of used 
computers (which according to the guideline could be legally imported) was 
required to be returned to the exporting country causing financial loss to the 
importer (Respondent # 23, 20 November 2008). The limitations of the 
existing law (both in content and enforcement) may have negative implications 
that can be a hindrance to effective governance. According to Lau (2004), 
weak enforcement of law due to inexperienced staff and financial constraints 
are common in many less economically developed countries. 
 
5.2.3 E-waste Law: Implications of Implementation and Improvement 
Actions  
 
As a result of e-waste import restrictions due to the implementation of the law, 
many e-waste recycling companies are suffering from insufficient raw 
materials and are running below capacity. This has happened because there is a 
lack of data on the amount of e-waste generated locally which has prevented 
the DOE from making a correct judgement about the number of plants needed 
in the country (Respondent # 1, 27 November 2008). One plant in particular 
operates at only 30% of its capacity (Respondent # 25, 19 December 2008). 
Due to this, a few companies have had to walk away from the business and 
permanently closed down their operations, while others are taking immediate 
steps to rectify the situation such as applying for a waiver to import e-waste, 
relocating to or setting up a branch in a neighbouring country (mainly 
Singapore), and initiating voluntary recycling campaigns to increase the 
amount of raw materials from local sources (see Section 6.2.2).  
 
Although there are too many licensed e-waste recovery plants (relative to the 
amount of locally generated e-waste) (Respondent # 25, 19 December 2008; 
Respondent # 26, 4 March 2009; Respondent # 22, 1 March 2009), many waste 
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generators are nonetheless applying for waivers to export their waste to be 
processed (treatment, recovery, disposal) overseas for the reason that the 
available technology in the country is not up to standard (Respondent # 16, 17 
December 2008). This is a matter of quantity over quality. A representative 
from an international company in Georgetown narrated during an interview 
that the company conducted audit trails to the appointed e-waste contractors’ 
premises. From their experience, these contractors were operating with lack of 
security features and were not conforming to the EQA even though they are 
licensed contractors. The company failed to find even one premises that could 
meet the high standards set by their headquarters, and they therefore had no 
choice but to apply for a waiver to ship their e-waste overseas. According to 
the representative, who sits on the board of management of the company, the 
waiver will end in 2012 and the company is considering two options; either to 
set up their own e-waste treatment and recovery of material facility in 
Malaysia so as to meet their standards, or to relocate the whole business to 
another country (Respondent # 16, 17 December 2008).  
 
The situation mentioned above (where many e-waste generators apply to 
export their e-waste to be processed overseas, despite claims of lack of raw 
materials by local plants) is a strong indication that Malaysian e-waste law has 
not been fully successful in controlling pollution from formal e-waste 
treatment and disposal activities. It is also an indicator that a significant 
amount of e-waste (especially generated from non-industry sources) is not 
entering the formal e-waste stream (see Figure 5.2), but instead is channelled 
through the informal recycling system (which is neglected in the existing law), 
resulting in the insufficient supply for the licensed e-waste industry. The same 
situation existed in China after the introduction of policy measures in 2001, 
where e-waste was sold to informal recyclers (peddlers and small workshops) 
as they pay a higher price than the registered plants resulting in insufficient e-
waste for the large-scale regulated e-waste treatment plants (Zhang 2009). The 
implementation of the law potentially has tremendous impacts on the economy 
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as several companies are considering moving their operations to other 
countries where advanced e-waste processing technology is available, and their 
business operation is not hampered by national law.  
 
5.2.4 State Actor’s Effort in Improving Control on E-waste 
 
One of the efforts taken by Malaysia’s DOE to improve pollution control due 
to e-waste disposal has been to draft a law on household generated e-waste. As 
mentioned in Section 5.2.2, there is no provision on the control of household 
generated e-waste in the existing law. The formulation of the new law is 
influenced and shaped by the principle of Extended Producer Responsibility 
(EPR). The EPR movement began in Europe and its application for e-waste 
management started in 1998 in Switzerland. It has since undergone evolution 
and refinement, and has been widely adopted as a means to control e-waste 
especially across Europe and Asia (Wagner 2009, Khetriwal et al. 2009). Four 
principal goals of EPR are; to reduce usage of raw materials, to prevent or 
reduce the amount of waste, to encourage design or redesign of more 
environmentally compatible products to foster recyclability and reusability, 
and to facilitate closure of material loops to promote sustainable development 
(OECD 2001). Among the policies which are based on this principle are the 
following EU directives: Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
(Directive 2002/95/EC), and Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous 
Substances (RoHS) (Directive 2002/96/EC), which were introduced in 2003.  
 
WEEE requires producers to be responsible on product labelling to inform 
consumers of proper disposal of unwanted electrical and electronic items, and 
to organise and finance take-back, treatment, recycling and recovery of e-waste 
(Directive 2002/95/EC). Unlike WEEE, which impacts on other countries’ 
policies, RoHS influences the policy measures of private electrical and 
electronics item manufacturers. This is because electrical and electronic 
manufacturing is a globalised business, with components sourced from 
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different countries worldwide, and are shipped to other countries for further 
processing and assembly. Many of these items would finally enter Europe’s 
market and fall under the jurisdiction of RoHS and WEEE upon disposal. Due 
to this fact, many international manufacturers apply RoHS to all suppliers 
globally, making RoHS a de facto global standard for electronics 
manufacturing (Goosey 2004). 
 
Besides the EU directives, Malaysia’s DOE is also learning from recycling and 
take-back policies of other countries such as Japan and South Korea 
(Respondents # 1, 27 November 2008). The progress of Malaysian e-waste 
legislation relative to the Basel Convention, the EU’s directives (WEEE and 
RoHS), and Japanese and South Korean law are summarised in Table 5.2 (also 
highlighted in Table 5.2 are the areas of concern of each piece of legislation). 
Japan enacted the Home Appliances Recycling Law in 2001 to control 
recycling of television sets, refrigerators, washing machines and air 
conditioners. Under this law, transportation fees are paid by consumers, and 
discarded appliances are sent to recycling facilities. While in South Korea, new 
e-waste legislation was enacted in 2003 determining that television sets, 
refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners and personal computers must 
be recycled under the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) principle, 
where manufacturers pay recycling fees to recycling management bodies, and 
the work of recycling facilities is subsidized by these bodies (Terazono et.al. 
2006). However, the experience from other countries as mentioned above, may 
not be fully applicable in Malaysia, as most household waste generators are 
expecting payment for their waste (as they are aware of the precious content of 
e-waste), and are more inclined to value e-waste from the economic 
perspective rather than environmental perspective.  
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Table 5.2: Progress of e-waste law in Malaysia in relation to the international 
development 
 
Date enacted Title of legislation Areas of concern 
5th May 1992 Basel Convention  Curbing illegal shipping and trading 
of e-waste from Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries to 
non-OECD countries. 
 
1996 Inclusion of Section 34(B) into  
Environmental Quality Act 1974  
 
Provision on the control of hazardous 
waste included to address the 
international commitment to the 
Basel Convention. 
 
2001 Japan introduced Home 
Appliances  
Recycling Law 
Recycling of television sets, 
refrigerators, washing machines and 
air conditioners. 
 
2003 Korea introduced a similar law Television sets, refrigerators, 
washing machines, air conditioners 
and personal computers must be 
recycled under the Extended 
Producers Responsibility (EPR) 
principle. 
2003 EU introduced WEEE Directive Overall reduction of e-waste and the 
adoption of sound disposal methods 
in member states. 
 
2003 EU introduced RoHS Directive Comprehensive management of e-
waste by product regulation and 
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Date enacted Title of legislation Areas of concern 
restriction on certain hazardous 
chemicals. 
 
2005 Environmental Quality 
(Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005 
E-waste is prescribed as a type of 
hazardous waste. 
2 January 2007 UK introduced The Waste 
Electrical  
and Electronic Equipment 
Regulations 
Producers are required to set up a 
take back system so that WEEE can 
be returned free of charge and 
collected separately based on 
Extended Producers Responsibility.  
  
Expected on 
2010  
(first meeting  
held on 15th  
October 2008) 
 
Environmental Quality 
(Recycling and Disposal of End-
of-Life Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment) Regulation 20__   
Prohibiting the use of hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic 
equipment and e-waste take-back 
system. 
 
 
Legend:   International/foreign law 
Legend:   Malaysian law 
 
Learning from and influenced by the experience of foreign countries in 
adapting the EPR principles in law making, Malaysia’s DOE has extended an 
invitation to stakeholders to be involved in the new law formulation process 
(Respondent # 1, 27 November 2008). As discussed in Section 6.2.1, 
representatives from the electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers 
and importers/distributors (which were divided into four working groups: 
office utilities, home appliances, mobile phones and computers), e-waste 
recovery plant operators and representatives from the government met to 
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discuss the matter on 15th October 2008. The final draft of the law, with a 
proposed title - Environmental Quality (Recycling and Disposal of End-of-Life 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment) Regulation 20_ _ - was expected to be 
completed in 2009 and ready for implementation in 2010. However, the target 
was not met due to lack of agreement on certain matters among the 
stakeholders. In China, disputes among stakeholders over key issues such as 
distribution of responsibilities, has delayed the law formulation process for 
seven years. The law, called ‘Regulation for the Administration of Recovery 
and Disposal of Wastes 2009’ was finally issued on 25 February 2009 (Qiu et 
al. 2005, in Zhang 2009).   
 
In Malaysia, among the issues raised by the electronic and electrical equipment 
manufacturers, importers and distributors (which will be directly affected by 
the implementation of the proposed law) were: 
 
• Logistic and transportation of  e-waste especially bulky home 
appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines 
• Protection of confidentially of Intellectual Properties of e-waste 
• Responsibility for the costs incurred 
• Setting up of e-waste collection centres at places convenient to 
consumers before being sent to recovery plants 
• Proposal to apply Individual Producer Responsibilities  
• Revision on the law on import and export of e-waste. 
 
(source: summarised from minutes of meeting between DOE and relevant 
private sector actors, dated 15th October 2008.) 
 
During the meeting, the Individual Producer Responsibilities principle was 
proposed by the representatives from the electronic and electrical equipment 
manufacturers and importers/distributors, as an alternative to EPR. This was 
because the Malaysian market is flooded by cheap products made by small 
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companies in China, which are known as ‘fly by night’ companies. Most of 
these companies cease operation after producing a batch of equipment and start 
again with a different brand, making it impossible to track them to make them 
responsible for their products. In a nutshell, e-waste law in Malaysia has 
evolved significantly through the years largely influenced by developments at 
international level. The DOE, as the authority to administer EQA, has been 
actively updating and improving the existing law. Table 5.2 charts the 
evolution of e-waste law in Malaysia, in relation to developments at 
international level and in other countries.  
 
5.3 Adopting Persuasion Mode in Governing E-waste  
 
One mode which is being adopted in e-waste governance is the persuasion 
mode; a mode to govern without sanction. The approach commonly adopted in 
persuasion mode is the public campaign, where society is guided to achieve 
certain objectives through sharing of information and providing related 
facilities. In this matter, the Strategic Communication Unit (a unit under the 
DOE head office in Putrajaya – see Figure 5.1) has initiated a campaign as an 
approach to promote end-of-life mobile phone recycling. The programme, 
called ‘Used Hand Phones Recycling Campaign’ aims to persuade consumers 
to dispose of used mobile phones (and related accessories and peripherals) 
responsibly. This campaign aims to achieve two objectives; the first objective 
is to increase awareness of the importance of proper disposal of e-waste to 
avoid hazardous impacts on humans and the environment, and the second 
objective is to provide disposal facilities to encourage and assist the public in 
participating in the programme (Respondent # 2, 27 November 2008).  
 
The drop-off disposal method was adopted, and collection bins were located at 
selected government offices, universities and shops throughout the Malaysian 
Peninsular (Plates 5.9 and 5.10). As of November 2010, a total of 114 bins had 
been distributed with 70% of them concentrated in the Klang Valley (the most 
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modern conurbation in Peninsular Malaysia covering Kuala Lumpur and the 
state of Selangor). This programme was first launched in October 2002, but 
faded away and became inactive only a few months after it was launched 
(Respondent # 2, 27 November 2008) due to several obstacles regarding 
human resources and financial support. It was reactivated and re-launched in 
2004 after receiving a capital injection of RM200,000 (£36,000) from the 
government. Nevertheless, it was still unable to achieve its collection targets, 
contributing to the below-expectation performance of this campaign. However, 
comparison of the performance of this programme (before and after the capital 
injection) is not possible as records on the amount of collection are not 
available (Respondent # 2, 27 November 2008), or perhaps were not kept at 
all. 
 
There are many factors which have contributed to the below-expectation 
performance of this campaign. Among the most critical factors cited by the 
DOE officers during interviews was the lack of environmental-consciousness 
among the public which, of course, was the reason why the campaign was 
initiated in the first place. However it is clear that the campaign itself suffered 
from a number of flaws, which contributed to its underperformance such as: 
lack of staff (to monitor and maintain the programme), frequent changes in the 
staff-in-charge, lack of financial means (to pay for advertising and campaign 
materials), poorly located bins and poor mechanisms for disposing of collected 
items. 
 
Lack of staff has hindered this programme from being expanded. There are 
only two officers in-charge of the programme. Among the scope of the job 
regarding the recycling programme is to monitor and empty the bins as and 
when needed, which is in addition to their office-bound responsibilities as 
enforcement officers. These officers are also in-charge of other programmes 
related to increasing awareness and knowledge of environmental preservation 
and conservation. Both officers are not only too busy with paperwork, but also 
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none too happy to do the job of monitoring and emptying the bins. During the 
interview session, one of them said: 
 
“Can you imagine…both of us have to go round and clear the bins of 
any rubbish such as sweet wrappers, bulbs, dry cells which are not 
supposed to be in the bin, when there are mountains of files on our 
desks waiting to be attended. Imagine the ‘disaster’ it would bring if 
any of our family members or friends happened to be there at that time 
and see what we were doing. They must have thought that I have been 
lying about having a degree…” (Respondent # 2, Government, 
interviewed on 27 November 2008, translated from Malay language). 
 
Lack of financial support has had huge implications for the programme 
especially related to publicity. For example, due to the limited budget 
allocation, the DOE is not able to pay for slots in television commercials 
(Respondent # 2, 27 November 2008), which is more effective but more 
expensive than the printed media in increasing the level of awareness among 
the public. Instead, several other methods to increase public awareness were 
adopted such as advertising in a local newspaper on the danger of improper 
disposal of e-waste, renting a booth at a popular fair called “Carnival Sure 
Heboh” to share information on proper e-waste disposal, disseminating 
information through the DOE’s website (www.doe.gov.my) and the 
distribution of pamphlets and car stickers (Respondent # 2, 27 November 
2008). Lau (2004) in research on solid waste management found that 
Malaysian waste reduction efforts through recycling campaign are ineffective 
due to three reasons; lack of information to the public or lack of publicity, 
financial constraints and lack of specific targets. As found by Davies (2008) in 
her research on waste management in New Zealand, publicity and concerted 
effort from state actors at various levels are crucial in the persuasion mode of 
governance (see Section 3.4.3). In the case of the Malaysian government’s 
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persuasion mode of governance on e-waste management it can be concluded 
that both these elements of a successful campaign have been missing.   
 
In 2006, the DOE started inviting non-state actors to work collaboratively in 
this campaign in order to extend its scope (in terms of publicity and the 
distribution of bins). Five private companies responded to this call. After 
negotiations, the DOE decided to work with a shopping centre which agreed to 
allocate space for the collection bins (Plate 5.9). Besides collection, this 
company was also involved in sending messages on environmental awareness 
(including proper e-waste handling and disposal) to its customers through an 
annual programme called “Eco Show Case” (Respondent # 20, 21 January 
2009). 
 
Another significant obstacle faced by the DOE in this programme was related 
to the disposal of the collected e-waste. Under Malaysian e-waste law 
(Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005), the rights to 
transport, store and dispose of e-waste are only given to contractors which are 
licensed by the DOE. The Strategic Communication Unit of the DOE has 
neither the license to transport and store the collected e-waste nor the expertise 
and facilities to dispose of it. To resolve the matter, a collaborative 
arrangement with a private e-waste contractor was established. Under the 
arrangement (which was started in December 2009), the licensed e-waste 
contractor took over the process of emptying the collection bins, and 
transporting, storing and disposing of the used mobile phones collected under 
this programme. All the costs incurred by the company in carrying out the 
processes are met by the sale of precious materials recovered from the e-waste. 
Although elements of collaboration are apparent in this case, all the parties 
involved (the DOE, the shopping centre and the e-waste contractor) refused to 
label it as a partnership. According to the state actor, non-state actors in this 
programme are not considered as partners (where resources and power are 
shared) but merely as allies to help them solve shortcomings regarding 
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placement of bins and collection and disposal of waste (Respondent # 2, 27 
November 2008). 
 
 
According to Hassan et al. (2000) based on their research in Malaysia, 
persuasion actions in waste management require continuous effort from state 
and non-sate actors; and should stress not only the importance of waste 
recycling, but also the protection and conservation of environment as a whole. 
This is in agreement with Davies (2008), who claims that persuasion 
(especially through campaigns) should be done continuously (and not as a one-
off event) to increase its long term effectiveness (see Section 3.4.3).   
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the various roles of state actors were analysed through the lens 
of the multiple modes of governance in which they are involved. State actors’ 
roles in the hierarchical mode of governance – mainly to formulate relevant 
 
Plate 5.9: The handphone recycling bin in 
a shopping centre. Note the amount of dry 
cells which were disposed in the bin due to 
low level of awareness about recyclable 
items among the public. (Source: author). 
 
Plate 5.10: The handphone recycling bin in 
the DOE headquarters Putrajaya. 
(Source: www.doe.gov.my) 
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law and its implementation - were not very effective due to several flaws, both 
in the statutes themselves and in their implementation. The existing legal 
framework, which adopts a licensing system to control pollution from e-waste 
during the treatment and disposal process (including the processes of 
dismantling, material recovery, treatment and final disposal), and consignment 
notes to track e-waste generators (which is limited to industrial e-waste 
generators) and the movement of e-waste may have a positive short term effect 
but did not address the root of the problem. This is because the law overlooks 
another source of e-waste production which is the householders (and other 
non-industrial source. Besides that the law neglects an important player in e-
waste recycling chain which is the informal recyclers. Apart from the 
loopholes in the content of law, weak enforcement has also contributed to its 
lack of effectiveness. For example, as in the example recounted in Section 
5.2.3, pollution can still occur at licensed premises due to lack of effective 
monitoring.  
 
To overcome the weaknesses in e-waste control which are related to the 
implementation of the existing law (Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulation 2005], the government of Malaysia is now in the process 
of drafting a new law, which will focus on solving the issue regarding 
collection of e-waste from non-industry sources. One big step ahead, in terms 
of increasing the participation of non-state actors in governance has been taken 
by the Malaysian DOE, by inviting stakeholders from the private sectors to be 
a part of the law drafting process. The involvement of PSAs in the drafting of 
this law is seen by many critics as a way to transfer the responsibility of 
managing the collection and disposal of e-waste to the manufacturers rather 
than a democratic process to increase public participation in decision making 
(Respondent # 48, 21 November 2008; Respondent 49, 13 November 2008). 
Many non-state actors are also sceptical about the ability of the DOE to 
implement the new law, judged on the basis of their weak performance in 
administering the existing law.  
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The role of state actors is not restricted in the traditional hierarchical mode of 
governing, but is expanding to include persuasion mode as well. This is 
evident in the ‘Hand Phone Recycling Campaign’ which is initiated by and 
organized under the purview of the DOE. Although the state actors’ efforts to 
adopt persuasion mode in governing e-waste is commendable, the results have 
not been very encouraging. The government’s campaign is limited in term of 
geographic coverage and publicity due to three reasons: first, lack of staff to 
manage the programme; second, lack of financial resources for wider, louder 
and more visible publicity; and third, lack of ability to treat and dispose the 
collected e-waste.  
Based on the case studies brought forth in this chapter, several reasons have 
been identified as the factor for the state’s incapability to undertake their roles 
in e-waste governance more effectively. Amid the many reasons, one similar 
reason can be discerned, that is human resource. The problems related of 
human resource have repeatedly surfaced during interview sessions with the 
state actors’ representatives, both during the discussions on their roles in the 
hierarchical mode and persuasion mode of governance. The problems of lack 
of staffs and weak communication among staffs are said to be affecting the 
roles of state actors in implementing the law and maintaining public campaign. 
This indicates that the ineffectiveness of state actors’ intervention in e-waste 
governance in Malaysia is caused by the handicap of the actors and is not the 
fault of the mode. State actor’s incapability in governing e-waste has been a 
trigger factor for the intervention of non-state actors in environmental 
governance in Malaysia, particularly in managing the collection and disposal 
of e-waste from household source. However, do non-state actors possess the 
necessary ability and capability to govern e-waste without the state actors? 
This is the issue where this thesis now turns.  
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Chapter 6: The Roles of Non-State Actors in E-waste Governance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The efforts of state actors in managing e-waste in Malaysia have so far shown 
limited success as indiscriminate dumping and improper-disposal of e-waste is 
still prevalent in Malaysia. The ‘failure’ of governance led by state actors has 
opened up opportunities for non-state actors to be involved in governance. 
Moreover, the emergence and proliferation of third sector actors in decision 
making processes in the Global North, especially regarding environmental 
issues since the 1990s, has inspired like-minded organizations in Malaysia to 
become involved in the governance process. Not only has this been seen as a 
way to resolve environmental issues but also a way in which to introduce a 
more democratic procedures, such as including public participation in the 
decision making process.  
 
In addition, the emerging dominance of neoliberalism in the 1980s has resulted 
in an increasing number of joint decisions between PSAs and state actors 
(Kooiman 2003). Several scholars (see Trumpy 2008, and Seidman 2007) 
suggest that the expansion of neoliberalism has resulted in states becoming less 
able to control and regulate corporate activities, hence increasing the power of 
PSAs in decision making process. The combination of these factors has 
resulted in significant involvement of non-state actors in the e-waste 
governance process globally and the introduction of more innovative and 
flexible governing tools besides the traditional command and control method. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of such purportedly global 
trends are also visible in the less economically developed countries in the 
Global South, where the state has traditionally retained a strong ‘command and 
control’ position.  
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Within the literature on governance, intervention by non-state actors is 
normally associated with non-hierarchical modes involving persuasion, self-
governance and co-governance. However, as the long standing literatures on 
policy making suggest, it has been observed that non-state actors can also play 
significant roles in hierarchical modes of governance. Although non-state 
actors are not involved directly in enacting policy, they may significantly 
influence state actors in decision making, the formulation of law, and on 
occasion, its implementation. Such processes are commonly observed in the 
Global North, however it is relatively rare in a less economically developed 
nation such as Malaysia (where public participation is still limited), and moves 
in such direction would constitute something of a revolution in governance 
practice. Taken together, the increasing role of non-state actors in shaping the 
hierarchical mode of governance together with their involvement in non-
hierarchical modes, have raised an important question: are non-state actors able 
to compensate for the weaknesses of the state and effectively fill the 
governance gap surrounding e-waste?  
This chapter begins with looking at the problems relating to the division of 
actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia in Section 6.2. The division between 
state and non-state actors may appear simple in theory, but is complicated in 
practical as the shadows of government on the non-state actors are very 
prominent. This is followed by discussions on the diverse roles of non-state 
actors in Malaysia, based on their involvement in the hierarchical, persuasion 
of self-governance modes of governance. The roles of non-state actors in co-
governance modes (particularly in PPP) are discussed in Chapter 7. Although 
there is evidence from the research undertaken regarding the involvement of 
non-state actors in other types of co-governance (such as networking among 
non-state actors), some are overlapping with other modes (such as persuasion) 
and therefore are discussed in this chapter under the headings of other modes. 
The chapter proceeds  by discussing the roles of PSAs in hierarchical, 
persuasion and self-governance modes in Section 6.3, and the roles of CSOs in 
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the mentioned modes in Section 6.4, before drawing some comparisons 
between these actors in the conclusions (Section 6.5). 
 
6.2 The Shadows of Government on Non-state Actors in E-waste 
Governance in Malaysia 
 
The term ‘non-state actor’ has no standard definition (Schwartz 2004), and in 
this thesis the term ‘non-state actors’ is used to refer to any actor in the 
governance process who is independent from the state and is legally registered. 
In Malaysia, all non-governmental profit-making organizations are registered 
with the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), and non-profit 
organizations are registered with the Registrar of Societies (ROS). The term 
private sector actor (PSA) is used to refer to non-governmental profit-making 
organizations in this thesis, and civil society organization (CSO) is used to 
refer to the non-governmental non-profit organisations, as illustrated in Figure 
4.3. In this research, private sector actors were divided according to their main 
activities related to e-waste, namely manufacturing, sales, services, recycling, 
telecommunication service provider, collection and disposal of waste.  
 
CSOs, which are defined by the World Bank as ‘the wide array of non-
governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public 
life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on 
ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations’ 
(World Bank website, available at www.worldbank.org), consist of many 
categories of organizations. Therefore, based on this definition, any 
organization coming under the following categories is considered as a civil 
society organization: community groups or community-based organizations 
(CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous 
groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional 
associations, and foundations (World Bank website, available at 
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www.worldbank.org). In this research, only two types of CSO - CBOs and 
NGOs - are taken into consideration (see Figure 4.3).  
 
The significant difference between CBOs and NGOs lies in their scope of 
interests, staffing, funding and limits of operating area. CBOs are set up by a 
group of people in a neighbourhood to protect common interests such as to 
achieve greater unity among residents or to provide security to a 
neighbourhood. CBOs are operated by volunteers who are residents of the area. 
The two most common CBOs in Malaysia are the neighbourhood group 
(Rukun Tetangga (RT)) and residents’ associations (RA) (see Figure 4.3). A 
significant difference between RAs and RTs relates to their memberships. 
While all residents of an area are automatically considered as members of their 
RT, residents are required to pay registration and yearly fees to become a 
member of an RA. Despite these differences, RTs and RAs share similar 
objective of establishment.  
 
Determining the boundary of an NGO and non-NGO can be confusing 
especially in cases where NGOs such as research organizations are sponsored 
entirely by profit-oriented organisations or financed totally by the government. 
Another tricky issue concerns GONGOs (government organized NGOs) 
(sometimes also known as QUANGOs – Quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organizations). In China, GONGOs are established for three main reasons; 
first, to reallocate government’s financial budget in departments which are 
involved in cutting down of budgets; second, the flexibility of GONGO 
compared to bureaucratic institutions; and third, to attract foreign financial 
resources (Wu 2002, Wang and Sun 2001). Additionally, based on the work by 
Martens (2006), political background and the dominant role of the state are 
also factors influencing the establishment of GONGOs in China. In other parts 
of the world (such as in Malaysia, as this thesis presents in Chapter 7), it is 
becoming more common that GONGOs are involved in environmental issues.  
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Classifying actors of governance into state and non-state is not always straight 
forward. There are three examples related to waste management in Malaysia 
where classification of organizations into categories becomes quite blurry. The 
first example is regarding two profit-making companies - Alam Flora Sdn. Bhd 
(which is involved in solid waste management and is awarded a twenty years 
concession to manage waste in central and eastern area of Peninsular Malaysia) 
and Kualiti Alam Sdn Bhd (the only company managing hazardous waste 
disposal in Peninsular Malaysia) - which are very closely related to the ruling 
government. Kualiti Alam is a subsidiary company of UEM Group, and Alam 
Flora is a subsidiary company of DRB HICOM. Both UEM Group and DRB 
HICOM are Government-linked companies (GLCs) which are owned by 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad (www.khazanah.com.my). Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad (literally translated as National Treasury), is the investment holding 
arm of the Government of Malaysia and is empowered as the government's 
strategic investor in new industries and markets (www.khazanah.com.my). It is 
clear that these two companies are linked to the government, but yet they are 
still considered as a private company in Malaysia. 
The second example is in the case of a research institution called SERI (The 
Socio-Economic & Environmental Research Institute) in the state of Penang. 
SERI is established as an independent non-profit company with the primary 
objective is to help the Penang state to achieve a sustainable level of balanced 
development in the long term (www.seri.com.my). SERI claims itself as an 
NGO; however according to the classification used in this thesis, SERI does 
not possess the criteria to be an NGO based on two reasons. First, two 
representatives from the state government (two Deputy Chief Ministers) sit in 
the Board of Directors of SERI (www.seri.com.my), and second, all its 
financial needs are fulfilled by the state government. Due to these reasons, 
SERI is considered a GONGO in this research. SERI collaborates closely with 
the Penang state government, local government-linked agencies and several 
international organizations including UNDP (United Nations Development 
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Programme) in providing in-depth economic analysis, and also acts as a 
platform for disseminating information and facilitating community-centred 
projects (www.seri.com.my).  
The third example is related to an organization which is actively involved in 
waste management matters in Penang is PEWOG (Penang Environment 
Working Group). PEWOG is set up by the State Local Government Committee 
in 2000 to serve as a consultative and cooperative tripartite (Local Agenda 21 - 
LA21) forum for community, government and private sector to work together 
on environmental matters (http://pewog.org). It receives a monthly allowance 
of RM200 (£40) per month from the state government for operating cost, and 
is headed by a chairman who works voluntarily (Respondent # 55, NGO, 
interviewed on 18 December 2008). PEWOG has a very close relation to 
SERI. SERI is responsible to run the day-to-day business for PEWOG as 
PEWOG has neither paid staff nor an office (Respondent # 55, NGO, 
interviewed on 18 December 2008). As PEWOG is not a registered 
organization, it is undoubtedly not an NGO; it is just an extension of the 
government in an informal form. As a forum with members spreading from the 
private, public and community, PEWOG is in a way a partnership. However, in 
an interview, a respondent representing PEWOG strongly hold on to his view 
that PEWOG is an NGO. As a tripartite forum, PEWOG has a very close 
cooperation with the CBOs (the RTs and RAs). Moreover PEWOG’s chairman 
is also the chairman of RT of Penang. The sentiment of the chairman disclosed 
in an interview shows that PEWOG’s inclination is less towards the 
government. This could also be affected by the fact that the current chairman 
of PEWOG is a prominent member of the ex-ruling party of the state of 
Penang (The National Coalition or [Barisan Nasional]). After the general 
election on 8th March 2008, Penang state is ruled by the Pakatan Rakyat 
Coalition.   Based on the discussion above, PEWOG and SERI should be 
categorized in a separate group – GONGO (Government organised NGO) or 
QUANGO (Quasi NGO). Cases brought above are examples on how shadows 
 180 
 
of government and politics affect the classification of the non-state actors in 
the issue regarding waste management, which would eventually affect the 
management of waste in Malaysia. 
6.3 The Roles of PSAs in E-waste Governance 
 
PSAs in this research are classified into seven different groups based on their 
roles in e-waste governance. The types of PSAs and how they role is 
prominent in this study is summarized in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1: Types of PSAs and their roles in e-waste governance 
 
Type of PSA Role in e-waste governance 
Electrical and electronic equipment 
manufacturer 
• Generate e-waste in its business 
operation  
• Producer of electrical and electronic 
item which will turn into e-waste 
Electronic and electrical products 
retailer 
• Distributor of electrical and 
electronic item which will turn into 
e-waste 
Telecommunication service provider • Rapid advancement of services 
offered will increase the sale of new 
item, and thus increasing the end-of-
life products 
E-waste contractor/ Material Recovery 
Facilities (MRF)  
• Provides collection, treatment and 
disposal of e-waste 
Solid waste contractor • Provides collection and disposal of 
household waste. Certain amount of 
e-waste may be disposal of together 
with household waste 
Scrap dealer and scavenger • Buy and sell e-waste in the informal 
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Type of PSA Role in e-waste governance 
sector 
• Involve in cannibalizing of e-waste 
for spare parts and to recover 
precious metal  
Electronic and electrical items repair 
shop 
• Prolong the life of electrical and 
electronic item 
• Involve in cannibalizing of e-waste 
for spare parts and to recover 
precious metal 
 
The multiple roles of PSAs in e-waste governance in Malaysia appear to be 
developing in two prominent directions: firstly, in influencing and shaping 
policy making; and secondly in promoting proper disposal of e-waste through 
transformation of societal views and behaviour, and providing related facilities. 
These are discussed in greater detail below, beginning with their role in 
shaping policy making in hierarchical mode of governance (in Section 6.2.1), 
followed by their roles in promoting proper disposal of e-waste through 
persuasion (in Section 6.2.2) and self-governance (in Section 6.2.3). 
 
6.3.1 The Involvement of PSAs in Hierarchical Mode of Governance 
 
The roles of PSAs in e-waste governance are intricately linked to the modes of 
governance that it is involved. In this section, two examples of PSAs’ 
involvement in hierarchical mode of governance is discussed; firstly, their role 
is influencing the formulation of state policy and secondly, the effect of supra-
national law on national level PSAs. 
 
PSAs, as one of the prominent stakeholders in e-waste governance in Malaysia, 
have received special attention under e-waste law (for example, in the 
Environmental Quality [Scheduled Wastes] Regulation 2005). Two categories 
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of PSAs which are specifically mentioned and governed under the law are 
industrial e-waste generators and e-waste contractors (who are involved in 
buying, transporting and dismantling of e-waste for recovery of precious 
materials and recycling). It is commonly accepted that state actors are the 
major players in hierarchical mode of governance. As far as e-waste law in 
Malaysia is concerned, PSAs have no direct role in the formulation of existing 
law (Respondent # 1, 27 November 2008). However, there is evidence that the 
influence of PSAs is becoming more apparent in the process of drafting and 
formulating new pieces of legislation on e-waste control. 
 
One case in point concerns the development of ‘producer responsibility’ within 
the Malaysian e-waste policy framework. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
existing law on e-waste is not comprehensive as it does not have any provision 
to control and manage e-waste generated by households. Extended Producer 
Responsibility (EPR) or ‘take-back’ policy is seen as potentially able to 
provide an appropriate foundation for the formulation of new legislation to 
overcome the weakness of the existing law. The decision by the Malaysian 
government to formulate a law which is based on EPR principle was partially 
inspired by the proliferation of such an approach in many countries in the 
Global North (Respondent # 1, 27 November 2008). EPR is a policy principle 
that extends the responsibilities of the manufacturers of the product beyond the 
post consumer stage. Manufacturers are deemed responsible throughout the 
entire lifecycle of the product, hence shifting the end-of-life responsibility 
away from municipalities and consumers and onto the original producers 
(Walls 2006, OECD 2006, Widmer et al. 2005, OECD 2001, Lindhqvist 2000).  
 
Preliminary work on law formulation began with a meeting between the state 
actors and relevant PSAs (refer Section 5.2.4). Fifty-five people attended the 
first meeting which was conducted on 15 October 2008, with the following 
breakdown; three representatives from the DOE, thirty-eight representatives 
from the electrical and electronics industry (including manufacturers, sales and 
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services providers, importers and retailers), and fourteen representatives from 
the e-waste recovery industry (source: minutes of meeting between DOE and 
relevant private sector actors on draft formulation dated 15 October 2008). The 
draft (with the proposed title: Environmental Quality [Recycling and Disposal 
of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] Regulation 20__) was targeted to be 
ready by 2009 (Respondent # 1, 27 November 2008). However, the target was 
not met due to lack of agreement between the PSAs and DOE (Respondent # 
10, 12 November 2008; Respondent # 15, 19 January 2009) on certain matters. 
Among the matters which have hampered the process are concerns over the 
costs of setting up and maintaining  e-waste collection centres, logistics and 
transportation of e-waste (from collection centres to recovery plants) and the 
security and confidentiality of data and intellectual properties. During this 
process, large manufacturers proposed Individual Producer Responsibility 
(where individual producers are responsible for the disposal of their own 
brands only) instead of EPR to avoid taking responsibility for the disposal of 
products by ‘fly-by-night’ companies (a nickname given to small companies 
which assembled sub-standard parts to produce cheap products, normally 
ceasing operation after one batch of production) (see Section 5.2.3). The 
products are also known as ‘orphan’ equipment. 
 
These two issues (operating and maintaining costs and managing the ‘orphan’ 
equipment) continue to cause disagreement between state actors and PSAs. A 
respondent representing an international manufacturing company shared his 
opinion regarding this matter, and voiced his dissatisfaction and worries 
regarding how this matter is handled by the government; 
 
“DOE wants to us to bear the cost [of e-waste management], including 
those which are not produced by us. This is unfair”. (Respondent # 16, 
PSA, interviewed on 17 December 2008, emphasis added).  
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Another respondent (representing an electrical and electronic manufacturer 
headquartered in USA) voiced an almost similar concern during an interview 
session. 
 
“I’ve attended the first meeting, and I’m not going to attend any more 
meetings of this kind in the future. I think DOE just want to use us…I 
don’t believe this [the idea to control household e-waste by law 
adopting EPR principle] will go far. I don’t think DOE will listen to 
what we say. They just want private companies to pay for the expenses 
[the cost of collecting and treating e-waste in an environmentally sound 
manner].” (Respondent # 15, PSA, interviewed on 19 January 2009, 
emphasis added). 
 
These opinions signify that several PSAs are not willing to take the 
responsibility for an environmentally sound disposal of the electrical products, 
due to the ‘orphan’ products which are flooding the Malaysian market due to 
its cheaper price. PSAs, especially the MNCs (Multi National Companies) feel 
that they are the ‘victim’ where they are asked to be responsible in managing 
e-waste which is not produced by them. Another respondent (representing an 
electrical and electronic manufacturer headquartered in Japan) also voiced 
concerns about the ability of state actors to enforce the law (based on the poor 
enforcement of the existing law on industrial e-waste); 
 
“I think Malaysian DOE is too ambitious. EPR as in the West will not 
work here. At least not now, not even in the near future…” 
(Respondent # 12, PSA, interviewed on 22 January 2009, verbatim). 
 
Among the concerns voiced by the above respondent are the differences in the 
socio-economic landscape between Malaysia and the countries in the Global 
North, from which examples and experiences are being studied, and most 
probably adopted. In many prominent cases of the  application of EPR to 
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control e-waste such as in Switzerland (Khetriwal et al. 2009), Canada (Deathe 
et al. 2008), Maine, USA (Wagner 2009) and UK (Mohan et al. 2008), e-
wastes are collected from users or returned to producers for free, whereas in 
Malaysia householders expect payment for returning their e-waste for proper 
disposal process. A study by Kalana (2010) in Shah Alam, Malaysia, found 
that people are expecting payment for their e-waste because they are aware that 
it contains some valuable elements. Similar results were also found by 
Huisman et al. (2003) in China. The is due to the perspective of waste in the 
less economically developed countries; where waste is attached to economic 
values, and recycling is a source of income for some groups of the population 
(Visvanathan and Norbu 2006). In South Asia, waste is not only a source of 
income to scavengers, but it also provides an extra income for solid waste 
management staff (Visvanathan and Norbu 2006).  
 
Several disputes between state actors and PSAs as mentioned above have 
delayed the promulgation of the law (Environmental Quality [Recycling and 
Disposal of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] Regulation 20__), hence 
prolonging the potential of e-waste pollution to the environment. In an 
interview, a representative from DOE, Malaysia admits that the delay in 
introducing the law was due to requests by the PSAs.   
 
“We want it [voluntary e-waste recycling] to be changed to mandatory 
take-back so that the producers are responsible for their products. We 
want to get the law approved as soon as possible, but the manufacturers 
are asking for more time to get ready. They want the enforcement of 
this policy to be postponed.”  (Respondent # 1, Government, 
interviewed on 27 November 2008, emphasis added). 
 
This fact that the state is taking PSAs’ discontents into consideration indicates 
that PSAs are considered as important stakeholder in policy making. It is clear 
that PSAs are playing an influential role in shaping and formulating the new 
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law. The decision to ‘listen’ to the PSAs in this case could also be related to 
the economic downturn which has been affecting many industries worldwide, 
including electrical and electronic industries in Malaysia with several factories 
being closed down. Factories closed down have made headlines in newspapers; 
at least there were four reports of such in two months period (January and 
February 2009). Newspaper headlines such as ‘Intel to close two Penang plants 
but no layoffs’ (The Star, 23 January 2009), ‘Panasonic to close Malacca plant, 
relocate Selangor factory’ (The New Straits Times, 31 January 2009), ‘When 
chips are down, VSS may be best option’ (The New Straits Times, 9 February 
2009), and ‘More layoffs at Penang tech giants?’ (The New Straits Times, 24 
February 2009) might have influenced the government to halt their plan to 
‘keep’ the investors in the country. The inclusion of non-state actors in policy 
making in this case is not merely an option to increase public participation in 
governance process as might normally been expected (hence increasing 
democracy in decision making) but as a way of transferring the burden of 
waste management to PSAs. In the opinion of many PSAs, the opportunity 
given by state actors for them to get involved in policy making came with a 
cost, where the government is expecting that they bear all the financial burden 
of the policy in return. This finding signifies that waste governance decisions 
in Malaysia are significantly influenced by economic factor. As electrical and 
electronic manufacturing is one of the biggest economic contributors to the 
country, PSAs have the winning edge in e-waste policy making.  
 
Another example of an important role of PSAs in Malaysia, particularly the 
branches of MNCs with the headquarters are located in the Global North, is in 
implementing the ‘top-down’ company policies. One respondent from an 
electrical and electronic manufacturing plant mentioned in an interview that 
managing the expectation of the company’s headquarters in Japan regarding 
waste reduction policy is the greatest challenge for the company. He said; 
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“Our HQ in Japan ordered us to reduce the production of waste by 10% 
from 2004 level by 2010. This is not fair! Because in 2004, we 
produced CRT TV, which is heavy. Now we have stopped the 
production of CRT TV and turn to LCD, which is lighter. It would be 
difficult for us to reach this target”. (Respondent # 10, PSA, 
interviewed on 12 November 2008, verbatim). 
 
On the other hand, there are several evidence on the influence of supra-national 
laws on the ‘top-down’ intra-firm management of e-waste in several 
companies. For example, one electrical and electronic manufacturing plant 
which produces television for the Asia region’s market has to comply with 
RoHS directive due to the order by the headquarters in Japan. Another 
company, which produces parts for audio visual equipment, is also complying 
with RoHS, although it is not the policy of the company. This company is 
forced to comply with RoHS at the request of their customer, as all its 
customers are assemblers of electrical and electronic equipment which export 
their product to the EU. The policies and actions taken by the PSAs as 
mentioned above are intertwined with the global trend of e-waste governance; 
where manufacturers are obliged to be more environmentally responsible of 
their products under EU’s law, and the pressure from NGOs. This indicates 
two important points: first, e-waste governance transcends the political 
boundary, and PSAs are significant actors of the global e-waste governance 
because of their global presence; and second, e-waste governance involves the 
intricate interactions of government, PSAs and NGOs. The roles of PSAs in 
governance are also significant from the perspective of persuasion mode, to 
which the discussion now turns. 
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6.3.2 The Roles of PSAs in the Persuasion Mode of Governance 
 
Bell et al. (2010), and Bell and Hindmoor (2009) define persuasion as a mode 
of governance where actors seek to change both the behaviour of members of 
the society, and mindset of the members regarding how they ought to behave 
in order to achieve specific policy objectives (see  Section 3.2.2). There are 
many means through which persuasion is pursued as a mode of governance, 
and one most commonly used is the public education campaign (Bell et al. 
2010). Bell et al. (2010) specify two characteristics of campaign, as a 
mechanism of persuasion mode of governance; firstly, the activity must be 
collectively valued by the members of the society and secondly, it must be of 
immediate interest to the members of the society. They further elaborate, 
advertisers’ efforts to sell products are not considered as exercises in 
governance through persuasion as they do not fulfill these two characteristics. 
 
By adopting the persuasion mode, PSAs seek to raise awareness and to steer 
society towards safe disposal of e-waste, though without sanction or 
punishment. The PSAs role is to inform the public about the hazardous nature 
of e-waste, thus convincing them to adopt proper e-waste disposal methods. 
The public education campaigns on safe disposal of e-waste were targeted at 
the general public, who are consumers of electrical and electronic devices. 
Several evidence from this research show that the decision of PSAs to apply 
persuasion mode of governance is driven by the economic value of e-waste, 
and not environmental concerns. Four examples of the involvement of PSAs 
from different type of business industries, and targeting different groups in the 
society are discussed in the next paragraph.   
 
The first example is a campaign by a PSA to educate school children. One 
private e-waste recycling contractor in Penang sponsors recycling programmes 
in several schools in Penang, and conducts occasional talks on the danger of 
improper handling of e-waste. In these talks, school children were also 
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informed about proper e-waste disposal methods, and organized school visits 
to their plants to increase understanding of the recycling process. By doing 
this, the company involved hoped that the children would bring home the 
message on e-waste recycling to their parents and other family members, 
producing some kind of ripple effect in increasing the level of awareness 
(Respondent # 22, 1 March 2009). The Deputy Managing Director who was 
interviewed admits that the real motive behind the campaign is to increase the 
raw material for their business operation.  
 
“Of course we aim for profit for the company. We don’t work for 
charity for the sake of environment only. At the end of the day, status 
quo stays you see…” (Respondent # 22, PSA, interviewed on 1 March 
2009, verbatim). 
 
Another private sector actor involved in persuasion is a leading departmental 
store in Kuala Lumpur with branches in several big cities in the country, which 
sends messages on proper e-waste handling and disposal to its customer 
through an annual programme called “Eco Show Case” (Respondent # 20, 21 
January 2009). As the age of the customers is wide ranging, several different 
approaches were adopted such as story telling sessions and colouring contests 
related to the dangers of improper disposal of e-waste to attract younger 
children, inviting pop idols to give talks on e-waste issues to attract teenagers, 
and putting up e-waste related posters and organizing exhibitions to attract a 
wider spectrum of society. The company also provides e-waste collection 
facilities for mobile phones and computers. According to the representative of 
this company, the campaign which is conducted as a part of their CSR 
(Corporate Social Responsibility) programme, is also one of the marketing 
strategy to attract more customers (Respondent # 20, 21 January 2009). As in 
first example, this case proves that public education campaign by PSAs is 
meant to bring economic profit for the company.  
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The persuasion mode of governance adopted by PSAs in the third case, 
involves smaller target groups. Two Japanese international electrical and 
electronic manufacturers chose to educate the retailers (who are the distributors 
of their products) on e-waste related awareness and legislation (including the 
EU’s directives such as the WEEE and RoHS) through repeated seminars and 
conventions; the intention is that these dealers are then in a position to pass on 
their newly gained knowledge to their customers who are the end users of the 
devices, and so to persuade them to change their mindsets and behaviour 
regarding e-waste disposal (Respondent # 11, 19 January 2009; Respondent # 
18, 21 January 2009). According to the representative of one of the companies, 
the campaign was conducted purely for environmental conservation; while the 
representative from the other company agrees to the suggestion that the 
campaign is a way to strengthen their brand name as responsible producers, 
and hence attracting buyers and bring profit to the company. Recycling and 
recovery of materials from e-waste is financially significant to manufacturers, 
as recycled materials cost less than virgin materials (Visvanathan and Norbu 
2006), hence explaining the importance of public engagement to increase the 
volume of e-waste.  
 
The three cases above seek to send the same message – the importance of 
proper disposal of e-waste to avoid environmental and health hazard – to three 
different target groups in society, hence the different approaches adopted. The 
fourth case, which will be explained shortly, is slightly different where the 
actor involved uses cash incentive to stimulate the campaign. According to 
Enviros (2003, cited in Darby and Obara 2005), incentive is an important 
motivation if the recycling process is not convenient and/or the waste has high 
economic value.  
 
The ‘campaign plus incentive’ programme is conducted by a company based in 
Seremban, Malaysia, which is involved in recycling and producing CRT 
(Cathode Ray Tubes) monitors. This company (a joint-venture company of  
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Korean and American manufacturers) is a DOE-licensed e-waste contractor. 
The company launched a two-month campaign (from 28th March to 31st May 
2007) to collect Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) from TV and PC monitors in the 
town of Seremban. The programme was called ‘Local CRT Collection 
Campaign’. A buy-back method was adopted in this campaign, where 
participants bring their e-waste to company and be paid based on the weight of 
the items. The campaign set an ambitious target to collect 10 000 units of CRT 
monitors, but only managed to get 740 units of CRT monitors (or 7.4%); 
which involved total payment amounting to RM 7308 (₤ 1460) or 
approximately RM 9.88 (₤ 2) per unit of CRT monitor (Respondent # 15, 
interviewed on 19 January 2009). Among the obstacles noted by the company 
which have hindered the campaign from reaching the target are logistic and 
transportation problems and low level of environment awareness amongst the 
public. According to the company’s representative, other than expecting 
payment, the public expects e-waste to be collected from their home as that is 
more convenient to them. This agrees with the suggestions in many studies on 
recycling (see Nixon and Saphores 2009, Riley 2007, Barr 2004) that 
convenience is an important factor in determining the recycling behaviour.   
 
In an attempt to improve the campaign, the company launched another 
campaign in November 2008. The campaign called the ‘CRT Recycling 
Campaign’ adopted the same mechanism (buy-back), but extended this to 
include the involvement of two other PSAs – AB and YZ – both are solid 
waste concessionaires, and operate and manage several buy-back and recycling 
centres across the nation. By working with AB and YZ, the company expects 
to be able to overcome the shortcomings of the first campaign as participants 
have a wider choice of recycling centres to which to send their e-waste, and it 
will engage a broader population (although it is still geographically limited to 
the southern and central parts of Peninsular Malaysia). The outcome of this 
programme is too soon to be assessed during the data collection field trip, as 
the programme was started in November 2008, and interviews with one of the 
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PSAs was conducted in November 2008 and the with the other two in January 
2009. In this arrangement, AB and YZ act as intermediate agents (to collect 
and temporary store the CRTs), connecting the society and the e-waste 
contractor.  
 
Compared to the first campaign, the ‘CRT Recycling Campaign’ has an 
increased level of publicity. This includes an interview slot on a radio 
broadcasting programme, radio advertisement and newspaper advertisement. In 
the newspaper advertisement, the logo of Seremban Municipal Council (Majlis 
Perbandaran Seremban) appeared next to the logos of the three companies 
involved, suggesting the involvement of the state actor in this programme. 
However, when the Seremban Municipal Council was contacted, one officer 
denied their involvement in this programme. Clarification was then sought 
from the company which initiates the programme, who admitted that the 
Seremban Municipal Council is not involved and that the reason the logo was 
printed in the advertisement is to obtain the trust from the reader and to 
encourage them to participate and to emphasise that the programme is not a 
profit-oriented activity. This signifies that the role of state actors is so profound 
in Malaysia that their presence is required as a means of gaining trust, even in 
a campaign which is conducted solely by PSAs. Trust is an important factor in 
determining the decision of the public to recycle, and the public is said to 
respond better to recycling campaign if they trust the information and the 
actors involved (Davies et al. 2005).    
 
According to the representative from the company, two factors initiating and 
motivating the campaign are; first, to increase raw material for their business 
operation (which is the CRT) and second, to cut the cost of business operation. 
This programme is an option for the company to source more material for its 
recycling plant as it is now facing problems sourcing sufficient raw material 
due to the restrictions on the imports of e-waste following the introduction of 
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Environmental Quality (Hazardous Wastes) Regulations 2005 (as discussed in 
Section 5.2.3), while the use of virgin material is too expensive. 
 
“We need to use the cullet [used CRT glass] in our production to 
reduce the cost. The cost of using raw material is much expensive, and 
our business is going down every year…this is because of the declining 
trend of CRT market. Our profit margin is very low. We need at least 
5% profit margin to survive…recycling is a way to keep the cost of raw 
material down.” (Respondent # 15, interviewed on 19 January 2009, 
emphasis added in square bracket). 
 
According to the representatives from AB and YZ, their involvement in this 
campaign is a way to fulfil their social responsibility, although they did not 
deny that the involvement has some economic benefits to their business’ 
development such as free advertisement of their service. Financial incentives 
are also an attraction for householders to participate in this campaign. 
Therefore, based on four cases brought forth, a conclusion can be reached that 
economic reason is behind the involvement of PSAs in persuasion mode of e-
waste governance.  
 
6.3.3 Self-governance of E-waste by PSAs 
 
In a situation where the role of state actors is absent, insufficient or ineffective, 
it is not unusual for non-state actors to adopt self-governance modes to 
overcome the shortcomings. Self-governance is a situation where governing of 
any salient issue is done without the ‘purview of government’ (Kooiman and 
Jentoft 2009: 821, Kooiman 2003). In this section several examples where 
PSAs manage e-waste without the intervention from state actors are discussed. 
Two types of PSAs which are involved in self-governance of e-waste are the 
electrical and electronic equipment manufacturing companies and 
retailers/departmental stores. Evidence from this research suggests that reasons 
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for their involvement in self-governance mode are obligation under company’s 
policy and as CSR measures; which are influenced by the combination of the 
presence of law and the pressure of other actors. According to Auld et al. 
(2008) CSR is initiated by pressures and threats of NGOs and the government. 
Self-governance is an example of how modes of governance are interrelated to 
each other where persuasion mode adopted by NGOs led to self-governance by 
PSAs, which is monitored by hierarchical mode by the government or third 
party such as internal and external audit team. Self-governance also 
demonstrates the multiplicity in the actors involved in governance (PSAs, 
NGOs and the government) which goes beyond the boundary of a sovereign 
country.    
 
Three examples of PSAs involvement in self-governance mode are brought 
forth in this thesis; the first example involves managing of e-waste which is 
generated in the operation process of manufacturing companies; the second 
example is the management of end-of-life products by manufacturing 
companies; and the third example is related to the management of e-waste 
which is generated by the customers by retailers/departmental stores. Several 
PSAs in Malaysia have taken actions to self-govern e-waste which is produced 
by their own organizations. These e-wastes include the end-of-life equipment, 
faulty equipment or manufacturing by-products (including faulty parts and 
discontinued models) (Respondent # 10, 12 November 2009). Two companies, 
for example have set up in-house waste minimization policies which include a 
regulation which stated that only electrical equipment which is beyond repair 
should be replaced (Respondent #12, 22 January 2009; Respondent #22, 1 
March 2009). This is a two prong policy; firstly, it is an attempt to reduce 
operating expenditure, and secondly, to reduce the generation of e-waste. In 
another example, a Japanese manufacturing company developed a system 
(called Green Procurement System) as a ‘gate-keeper’ to ensure that only 
suppliers which conform to the RoHS requirements on chemical substances are 
chosen to supply parts and components to their company (Respondent # 11, 19 
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January 2009). This mechanism ensures that their products will not pose 
environmental and health threats upon end-of-life. Another Japanese 
manufacturer is governed by a very stringent policy imposed by the mother 
company in Japan which is known as ‘Eco Ideas’. Under its Eco Ideas Policy, 
the holding company sets a very strict waste generation limit to every branch 
offices in an attempt to reduce the production of e-waste of the whole group of 
companies (Respondent # 12, 22 January 2009). This is an example of how 
self-governance mode is intertwined with hierarchical mode of governance. 
Elements of multi-level governance are also apparent from the cases above as 
it involves companies which are located in different countries and involves 
multiple actors.  
 
Besides governing their own e-waste, several manufacturers in Malaysia are 
governing e-waste generated by their customers as a part of responsibility 
towards their products which have reached its end-of-life. The growth of self-
governance in the EU is induced by the introduction of WEEE directives; 
while the increase in USA in due to strong pressure from the NGOs.   For 
example, the ‘naming and shaming’ actions of NGOs in USA have resulted in 
the launching of worldwide voluntary take-back schemes by Dell (Wood and 
Schneider 2006). As such, Dell’s branch in Malaysia introduces an online 
recycling facility and receives all brands of computer and computer peripherals 
for free recycling, and offers payment for customers who recycle unwanted 
Dell branded products (http://www.dell.com.my). The factor of customers’ 
convenience is given consideration in this programme and Dell provides free 
collection, upon receiving some information on contact and pick up details 
together with preferred collection date which can be done online. Other than 
Dell, two well-known mobile phones manufacturers, Nokia and Motorola also 
adopt self-governance mode by providing disposal facilities for the users of 
their products. Nokia’s recycling facilities called ‘Nokia Kiosks’ was started in 
2001. ‘Nokia Kiosks’, however, are available only in three cities nationwide 
(Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya and Puchong) (www.nokia.com.my/nokiakiosk) 
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(see Plate 6.1). Another mobile phone manufacturer, Motorola provides 
recycling opportunity for the user of their mobile phones in a programme 
called ECOMOTO Take-back (www.motorola.com) (see Plate 6.2). 
Information on the Motorola website states that there are seven collection 
points for customers to choose from, but in reality (based on my observations 
which were confirmed by an officer from the company  who declined to be 
named or to take part in a full interview) there are only two (in Penang and 
Petaling Jaya). Both Nokia and Motorola’s efforts target society at large. 
Besides the influence of their experience in the Global North, these 
programmes are partially the result of failed negotiations for a partnership with 
the DOE (Respondent # 2, 27 November 2008). The negotiations ended with 
all the three parties (DOE, Nokia, Motorola) operating their own used mobile 
phones collection programmes. 
 
All these initiatives, however, are more impressive on paper than in practice. 
Based on conversations with several people from the private sector, it was 
evident that the programmes by Dell, Motorola and Nokia are not well known 
and thus not widely used (Respondent # 22, 1 March 2009; Respondent # 26, 4 
March 2009). This may indicate that the PSAs’ involvement in self-governance 
of e-waste is merely to fulfil their obligations to company’s CSR and policies, 
and to avoid further ‘naming and shaming’ actions from the NGOs; instead of 
to protect the environment from e-waste pollution. Other than manufacturers, a 
few electrical and electronic device retailers in Malaysia adopt self-governance 
mode to govern e-waste produced by their customer. Retailers such as Bangsar 
Village in Kuala Lumpur and Digital Mall in Petaling Jaya allocate space for 
customers to drop off their e-waste (see Plates 6.3 and 6.4). Collected devices 
are sold to licensed e-waste contractor for proper disposal and recycling.  
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Plate 6.1: Nokia drop-off bins for mobile 
phone recycling in The Curve Shopping 
Centre, Petaling Jaya. (Source: author) 
 
Plate 6.2: Motorola drop-off bins for 
mobile phone recycling at the entrance to 
Motorola’s Petaling Jaya office . (Source: 
Motorola (Malaysia)) 
 
Plate 6.3: A poster on e-waste recycling 
facility in Digital Mall, Petaling Jaya. 
(Source: author) 
 
Plate 6.4: E-waste collection/drop off 
point in Digital Mall, Petaling Jaya. 
(Source: author) 
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Although PSAs are adopting self-governance in managing e-waste, 
intervention from other actors to monitor the operation of the arrangement 
would be beneficial, especially if self governance is used by individual 
company (rather than the branch of an international company). Such forms of 
oversight are important to avoid e-waste falling into the wrong hands. 
According to Interpol Pollution Crime Working Group (Phase II) Report 
(2009), electrical and electronic equipment take-back schemes (of the type 
required by the WEEE Directive) have led to illegal activities in Holland and 
the UK, where criminals buy the returned equipment from shops (or sometimes 
get paid to take it away), under the pretence of re-use or recycling, and then 
ship it for illegal disposal. According to the report, the usual methods of illegal 
export of e-waste from the UK is through mislabelling of containers (often as 
personal items) or mixing e-waste with other commodities such as second hand 
and end-of-life vehicles. Although illegal export may not be the case in 
Malaysia, e-waste collected through self-governance mode may be sold to 
unlicensed scrap dealer due to its value, opening up the possibilities of 
improper e-waste treatment and disposal process.  
 
6.3.4 The Involvement of PSAs in E-waste Governance: Limitations and 
Implications 
 
As discussed Section 6.2, PSAs in Malaysia have been given an opportunity to 
be included in the law formulation process. However, the disputes between the 
state actor and PSAs in the process of formulating law on take-back scheme 
(Environmental Quality [Recycling and Disposal of Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment] Regulation 20__), has halted an important process in household e-
waste management in Malaysia. The longer it takes for both parties to reach an 
agreement, bring an important implication; the possibility of exposure to e-
waste pollution among members of the society is being prolonged. The fact 
that the state actor agrees on deeper deliberation as requested by the PSAs, 
despite the dominance of government in Malaysian politics (as apparent in the 
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case of centralization of solid waste management services studied by 
Agamuthu et al. [2010] see Section 3.3.3), signifies that PSAs are perceived as 
important governance actors; which could be related to its contribution to the 
country’s economic development. But, more important than the process of 
formulating a law is to ensure that it is implemented strictly. According to 
Widmer et al. (2005) and Streicher-Porte (2005), lack of effective enforcement 
of law is the reason for failure in hierarchical e-waste control in many 
countries. However, certain PSAs, such as the branches of international 
electrical and electronic equipment manufacturers, are obliged to comply with 
the policy determined at headquarters level which is located overseas.  The 
involvement of PSAs in top-down intra-firm e-waste governance which 
transcends beyond the boundary of sovereign states allows for the involvement 
of local PSAs into global environmental politics. In certain cases, intra-firm 
hierarchical mode of governance induces the birth of self-governance mode. 
Thus, conclusion can be made that the role of PSAs in hierarchical mode of 
governance, which is intricately linked to self-governance mode and intertwine 
with the multilevel governance perspective, has an important impact to e-waste 
governance and global environmental governance.     
 
PSAs’ involvement in persuasion mode of governance includes dissemination 
of information on safe disposal of e-waste and providing recycling facilities in 
some cases. All PSAs which are involved in persuasion mode in this research 
are doing so for economic-related self-interests reasons such as to obtain raw 
material at lower cost than mining of virgin material and to attract customer to 
their core business activity, rather than environmental concerns. Persuasion 
mode of governance has not been very successful, due to the economic value 
which is attached to e-waste (Visvanathan and Norbu 2006). Most people 
prefer to sell their e-waste to scrap dealer without giving any concern of its 
environmental effects. As such, one particular company gives out cash 
incentive as inducement to increase the level of success rate. As identified in 
past research (see for example, Darby and Obara 2005), cash incentive has 
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increased the rate of recycling. Persuasion mode of governance in the Global 
North (such as ‘Reduce Your Rubbish’ campaign in New Zealand in Davies 
2008), where waste is not attached to economic value, but rather as a ‘crisis’ 
that need to be tackled (Friends of the Earth 2002, in Riley 2008) has the 
potential to produce a better result. Therefore, adaptation of persuasion mode 
of waste governance in the Global South needs to be specially designed with 
considerations for cultural perceptions, to ensure that it is suitable. 
  
Two factors which have been influencing self-governance of e-waste by PSAs 
in Malaysia is the increasing ‘naming and shaming’ actions from NGOs in the 
USA (see Wood and Schneider 2006) and the introduction of WEEE directives 
in the EU. These two factors have triggered the growth of CSR and take-back 
schemes among MNCs; which are then transferred as company policy which 
all branches are obliged to comply. A study by Ronit and Schneider (1999) on 
self-governance by the Ecological and Toxicological Association of Dyes and 
Organic Pigments Manufacturers (ETAD) shows that sanctions have been used 
for non-conformance and non-compliance of members to the standard code of 
practice set by the organizations. Self-governance of e-waste by PSAs in 
Malaysia demonstrates how a blend of three modes (persuasion, hierarchical 
and self-governance) happens at multiple level of political entity, involving 
multiple actors.   
 
6.4 The Roles of CSOs in E-waste Governance 
 
As mentioned in Section 6.2, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in this 
chapter are referred to legally registered, not-for-profit organizations. CSOs are 
divided into two categories; the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
the Community based Organisations (CBOs) (see Figure 4.3). Although it is 
easy to define and divide these actors in theory, in practice the boundaries are 
often blurred (refer Section 6.2). CSOs play significant roles in e-waste 
governance in Malaysia, in both the hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of 
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governance. The remainder of this chapter discussed how CSOs play a role in 
influencing and shaping the policy making process (and therefore participate in 
the hierarchical mode of governance) and in transforming the values and 
behaviour of society (through the persuasion and self-governance modes). 
 
6.4.1 CSOs and their Roles in Policy Making  
 
CSOs have no authority to make policy. However, they may play a significant 
role in influencing policy making processes, shaping the form and formulation 
of policy and monitoring policy implementation (Glazebrook 2001, in 
Schwartz 2004). Lobbying approach is applied by CSOs in Malaysia in 
seeking to influence policy-making. Lobbying in this case refers to efforts that 
attempt to influence legislation. In this instance, lobbying is used as a strategy 
to pressure and influence state actors to act in more equitable and effective 
ways by formulating relevant legislation to address the roots of e-waste 
problems.  In the cases explored in the context of this thesis, it was mostly 
done through letter writing. Lobbying through writing is considered the best 
possible option as requests for a face to face discussion are usually turned 
down by government officers (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008), which 
may signifies that CSOs are not perceived to be important actors in governance 
by the government. The excuse commonly given to justify the refusal to meet 
is the tight schedules (of ministers and higher ranking government officers), 
and therefore communication through letter writing is the only option. This 
also avoids face to face confrontation which is generally avoided in Malaysia 
and many other East Asian societies. Street protests are discouraged, as 
protesters may be detained by the police for causing public unrest and may not 
be given a trial at all under the Internal Security Act (ISA). ISA also suggests 
that passive form of lobbying is the most suitable channel possible for CSOs to 
seek influence in hierarchy.  
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Between the two groups of CSOs (NGOs and CBOS), NGOs play a more 
active role in lobbying for the formulation and effective implementation of e-
waste related legislation, due to their relatively wider experience and 
knowledge on the matter. Three NGOs which are particularly prominent in 
their actions related to e-waste are the Consumers’ Association of Penang 
(CAP), the Federation of Malaysian Consumers’ Association (FOMCA), and 
Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM, translated as Friends of the Earth Malaysia). 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, these NGOs gained broad exposure and 
knowledge on e-waste from their involvement with international groups, which 
have inspired their actions (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008; Respondent 
# 53, 4 March 2009). NGOs have stronger abilities and capabilities to play the 
lobbying role due to the wide background knowledge of their staff (ranging 
from molecular science to social impacts and law) compared to CBOs (which 
accept all community members regardless of education background).  
 
CAP, as a consumer association, is concerned with the marginalized and 
powerless groups in society such as the scavengers, scrap dealers and low-paid 
workers in e-waste recycling plants. Triggered by the need to seek and uphold 
social and environmental justice, and alarmed by the lack of action by state 
actors in handling issues related to e-waste, CAP (together with SAM) 
pioneered lobbying actions to pressure the government to formulate a specific 
law on e-waste control (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008). They started 
this campaign around the year 2000 (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008). 
For example, CAP and SAM wrote a letter to the Director General of the DOE 
(dated 23 September 2004) and raised their concerns related to e-waste issues 
which encompassed justice for the workers in e-waste recycling and material 
recovery activities (and the public in general), and the proliferation of e-waste 
trading from the Global North to the Global South. Although CAP agrees that 
e-waste recycling is an efficient way to avoid the hazardous impacts of 
indiscriminate dumping, the group also stresses the importance of doing so in 
the right way (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008). CAP’s concern for the 
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impacts of e-waste recycling processes to the public’s health and the 
environment was highlighted in another letter to the Director General of DOE 
(dated 7 November 2003), concerning the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) for a proposed e-waste recycling plant in Seberang Perai, Penang. CAP 
proposed a more stringent law on approving the setting up of e-waste recycling 
plants, arguing that the proposed plant was located too close to a food 
manufacturing factory and a river.  
 
Another NGO which is actively involved in e-waste issues is FOMCA. 
FOMCA, in it website (www.fomca.org.my), claims that it has been playing a 
very active role in lobbying the government for the formulation of consumer 
related legislation such as the Food Act 1983, Direct Selling Act 1993, 
Consumer Protection Act 1999 and Water Services Industry Act 2006. 
FOMCA, working together with CAP, is pushing the DOE for legislation on 
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) - a policy which extends the 
responsibility to manage e-waste to the manufacturer. An EPR law is proposed 
by these NGOs as a means to manage e-waste generated by households, as the 
existing e-waste law does not have provision related to household generated e-
waste. As discussed above and in Section 6.2.1, the drafting of the new 
Malaysian law (which began in October 2008) is based on the principle of EPR 
and has involved state and private sectors actors (manufacturers, dealers, 
services, material recycling and recovery operators) (Respondent # 1, 27 
November 2008). Malaysian policy makers in this case have interpreted the 
law literally as the name suggests - Extended Producer Responsibility - and 
thus limited the invitation to participate in the policy making process to the 
producers and businesses related to the products only.  NGOs are excluded in 
this process as their role is seen as irrelevant and their locus standi in 
representing society is seen as questionable (Respondent # 1, 27 November 
2008).  
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Other than lobbying for the law on EPR, FOMCA is also involved in 
pressuring the government to make it mandatory for all producers to apply the 
energy efficiency rating practiced by many more developed countries such as 
the UK and Singapore to all of their products (Respondent # 48, 21 November 
2008). This is meant to encourage the public to buy energy efficient products 
which have a longer life span, which would also lead to less e-waste being 
generated.  
 
Lobbying for policy formation is a hard challenge in Malaysia. One of the 
greatest limitations that NGOs face in influencing policy making and policy 
implementation in Malaysia is a government which is claimed by NGOs to be 
too ‘authoritarian’ (Respondent # 48, 21 November 2008) and ‘not as 
democratic as it should be’ (Respondent # 49, 13 November 2008). According 
to these respondents, much legislation has been formulated without any 
consultation with the public. On this matter, one representative commented: 
 
“The people are a nation’s greatest resource for developing and 
implementing laws and policies. Ministries and government agencies 
should consult NGOs in managing this issue [e-waste] as stated in RIO 
declaration Principle 10. The law [Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulations 2005] was formulated behind the four walls of 
DOE’s office, that’s why it is facing problems in terms of 
implementation” (Respondent # 49, NGO, interviewed on 13 
November 2008, emphasis added in square bracket). 
 
Introduction of e-waste law (Environmental Quality (Hazardous Wastes) 
Regulations 2005), according to a respondent from the government 
department, was the result of the department’s constant review of existing law 
and not because of pressure from local NGOs (Respondent # 1, 27 November 
2008). From the evidence gathered, it is very difficult to determine whose 
claim bears more truth. However, NGOs actions are commonly politicized by 
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the political parties. There are times when an NGOs fight (such as in anti-
incineration campaign, anti-centralization and privatisation of solid waste 
management) has received support from the opposition party, and NGOs are 
labelled as anti government and their actions are subject to strict government 
control. This situation is also prevalent in China (refer the works of Shi and 
Zhang 2006, Martens 2006, and Schwartz 2004 in Section 3.3.2), and many 
other countries in the Global South where democracy is still emerging as a 
political system. In Malaysia, this has initiated the government to set up their 
own NGOs (Government Operated NGO – GONGO) such as SERI and 
PEWOG (see Section 3.3.2) which is also happening in China.  
 
NGOs’ role in influencing policy making in Malaysia is not restricted to 
lobbying the government; it also involves efforts to shape the policy of PSAs. 
A CAP representative said during an interview: 
 
“For the benefit of consumers, we target two groups in our 
programmes, the government and the private sectors. We want to make 
sure that relevant policies are in place and the companies are doing it 
right, and are not sending their e-waste into the incinerator and landfill. 
And the manufacturers are not using hazardous substances in their 
products” (Respondent # 49, NGO, interviewed on 13 November 2008, 
verbatim). 
 
Commercial firms whose policies have an adverse impact on the environment 
can be vulnerable to consumer boycotts organized by NGOs, which can in turn 
hurt sales and profit margins. On this issue, a representative from an 
international private sector company agreed in an interview: 
 
“We are not very worried about national policies or laws, because our 
company’s stand is never to go against any law in any country that we 
are operating. We are more concerned and worried with the actions by 
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huge international NGOs such as Greenpeace. I heard that our company 
in India has been badly attacked by them!” (Respondent # 12, PSA, 
interviewed on 22 January 2009, verbatim). 
 
However, the roles of NGOs in lobbying for the change in PSAs’ policies are 
not as prominent, as, for example, those of NGOs in the USA (Section 3.3.3) 
because most PSAs in Malaysia are branches of a big company (where the 
head offices are normally located in the Global North) and have no final say in 
companies’ decision making process. The NGOs action in USA is very much 
developed in activities and success rate. It is common that NGOs in the USA 
work in  network such as ‘Electronic Take Back Campaign’ (ETBC) which 
consists of four NGOs as members; Basel Action Network (BAN), Silicon 
Valley Toxic Coalition (SVTC), Centre for Environmental Health (CEH) and 
Clean Production Action (CPA); which increases their strength in terms of man 
power and other supports. Due to difficulties to get the government to change 
or formulate national policy, NGOs in USA are shifting their tactics from 
lobbying the government to naming and shaming of PSAs as a strategy to 
pressure PSAs to change environmental policies. 
 
6.4.2 CSOs and the Persuasion Mode of Governance  
 
Persuasion mode of governance is an action where governance actors persuade 
members of the society to change their mindset and behaviour on a certain 
matter in order to achieve specific policy objective (Bell et al. 2010, Bell and 
Hindmoor 2009) (see  Section 3.2.2). In Malaysia, persuasion mode of 
governance is applied by CSOs in seeking the public to dispose their 
household e-waste responsibly to avoid pollution and contamination to the 
environment.  Willingness of individuals to change behaviour is paramount 
determinant to the success of recycling initiatives (Darby and Obara 2005). In 
the USA, effective persuasion from NGOs such as Silicon Valley Toxic 
Coalition (SVTC), Campaign for Responsible Technology (CRT) and the 
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National Recycling Coalition has increase the level of e-waste recycling rate 
(Lepsoe 2006). Unlike in the USA, there is no specific CBO in Malaysia 
whose work is centred at the issue of e-waste. However, two consumer 
association NGOs are pioneering the initiative in persuasion mode of e-waste 
governance; Consumer Association of Penang (CAP) and Federation of 
Consumer Association of Malaysia (FOMCA). CAP and FOMCA conduct on-
going public education campaign to increase the awareness on the danger of e-
waste and target the general public from all ages and ethnic background as 
according to FOMCA’s representative; 
 
“…people from all walks of life are in one way or another, user of 
electrical and electronic devices…” (Respondent #48, NGO, 
interviewed on 21 November 2008, verbatim).    
 
According to Nixon and Saphores (2009), two most influential factors that 
determine household recycling are knowledge and convenience. Darby and 
Obara (2005) in their research on household recycling behaviour and attitude 
of small electrical and electronic items found that ‘householders wanted better 
information on how to dispose of appliances safely’ (Darby and Obara 
2005:24). Public education campaign is one of the important sources of 
information on recycling knowledge. CAP and FOMCA disseminate 
information to the public on e-waste disposal and e-waste recycling by 
applying two main strategies which are; face-to-face interaction and circulation 
of printed material. While FOMCA focuses more face-to-face strategies, CAP 
on the other hand chooses to focus on printed material. The representative from 
FOMCA believes that their strategy is effective. In an interview, he said; 
 
“…campaign by NGOs like us is more successful than the government 
campaigns because we really go down to the field. We went in the 
village, office, schools to inculcate awareness. Localised, face-to-face 
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campaigns are more successful than large scale ones” (Respondent # 
48, NGO, interviewed on 21 November 2008, verbatim). 
 
Face-to-face interactions are appropriate to reach more active and interested 
target groups as this provides the opportunity for questions and answers and 
deeper explanation. A study by Nixon and Saphores (2009) suggest that face-
to-face campaign may be more effective than other strategy, but it is more 
costly. 
 
CAP, on the other hand, use more printed materials than face-to-face 
interactions. Printed media are used extensively in information sharing 
activities which are intended to change the prevalent views in Malaysian 
society about the importance of proper e-waste disposal.  Freely distributed 
pamphlets, brochures, posters and newsletters are widely used, besides sales of 
books and magazines which are also common. CAP also sent articles to 
newspapers to reach their target groups. The same strategy is adopted by an 
NGO in India, Toxics Link. According to Lepsoe (2006), ‘Toxics Link has 
effectively engaged the media in carrying its message’ (Lepsoe 2006:5). Other 
than that, CAP printed bimonthly news magazines Utusan Pengguna 
(Consumer Bulletin) and Pengguna Kanak-kanak (Child Consumer) to educate 
the public on responsible consumerism, which includes awareness on potential 
pollution and hazards that they may encounter while handling their unwanted 
electrical and electronic devices. To ensure that this reaches as broad an 
audience as possible in a multi-racial country like Malaysia, the news 
magazine is printed in four editions which are in English, Malay, Chinese and 
Tamil.  
 
As a conclusion, the role of CSOs in persuasion mode of e-waste governance is 
still at its infancy stage. There is little amount of effort put and its effectiveness 
is not studied in this research. Thus, this is one of the areas where future 
research can be focused on.    
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6.4.3 CSOs and Self-governance of E-waste 
 
Self-governance by civil society in the form of local community-based 
initiatives is quite common in waste management in developing countries, with 
the literature on the topic including many examples from India, Bangladesh, 
Ghana, Burkina Faso (World Bank 2005), Indonesia (Pasang et al. 2007) and  
Pakistan (Ali and Snel 1999). It arises in response to local conditions where 
municipal authorities are unable to cope with the rapidly expanding demands 
of modern and formal waste management systems due to lack of financial 
capacities, insufficient equipment, staff and expertise (Ali and Snel 1999). 
Although solid waste management services in Malaysia are much more 
developed compared to those in Pakistan and Indonesia (Section 2.4), some 
elements of self-governance of waste by community associations do exist – 
especially in managing e-waste.  
 
Many community level recycling programmes in Malaysia introduced and 
managed by CBOs. Most of the recycling programme off by collecting basic 
recyclables such as paper, glass, metal, and plastic as a community project. 
Plate 6.5 and Plate 6.6 show recycling centres run by two CBOs in Petaling 
Jaya. Collection of e-waste was added around the year 2006. This is related to 
the introduction of e-waste legislation (Environmental Quality [Hazardous 
Wastes] Regulations 2005) on 15th of August 2005 which classified e-waste as 
a type of hazardous waste, hence restricting it from being collected by solid 
waste contractors. Unfortunately, there is no alternative means provided by the 
government for households to dispose of their unwanted electrical and 
electronic items, leaving the community at a loss as to how to dispose of such 
items. Self-governance in e-waste management was developed to provide 
facilities for the community to dispose of e-waste responsibly in the absence of 
state action. In this context many CBOs stepped in and offered to collect e-
waste from households to prevent indiscriminate dumping (Respondent # 42, 
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27 February 2009; Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008). Collected items are 
sold to contractors who are licensed by the DOE to manage e-waste. 
 
 
Plate 6.5: Recycling centre run by 
Petaling Jaya Residents’ Association 
(PJCC) in Seksyen 17, Petaling Jaya 
(Source: author) 
 
Plate 6.6: Recycling centre in Bandar Sri 
Damansara, Kuala Lumpur which is run 
by Bandar Sri Damansara Residents’ 
Association (BSDRA) (Source: author) 
 
 
The reasons for the involvement of CSOs in self-governance mode of e-waste 
management varies widely, including environmental concerns, a way to 
strengthen unity among residents, to expand the existing recycling programme 
and for charity purposes. For example, one respondent mentioned in an 
interview session that his organization decided to employ self-governance of e-
waste for environmental reasons, and that e-waste collection branches out 
organically from the existing recycling programme. 
 
“When we started [operating the recycling centre] about 6 years ago, 
we only collect paper, glass, aluminium cans and plastic…but lately 
people start bringing in computers, printers and other electrical 
items…we thought why don’t we collect e-waste as well. We know we 
should not let it go into the normal waste stream, because it can be 
dangerous. So, we started to receive e-waste at our centre too…because 
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if not, the residents will just throw them into the Alam Flora [solid 
waste management company] bin.” (Respondent #44, CBO, 
interviewed on 27 November 2008, emphasis added).  
 
Another respondent from a CBO cited a different reason for the organisation’s 
involvement in self-governance of e-waste. According to him, the organization 
that he represents opted to practice self-governance of e-waste as a community 
project (which is conducted every fortnight, on Sunday morning), to increase 
bonding among community members. In an interview, he said; 
 
“We want the community to know each other better. We conduct 
projects to bring community together. For example, we have tai-chi 
[oriental morning exercise] in the padang [field] in front of the tasik 
[lake] every Friday morning. But, people who work cannot come, that’s 
why we create another alternative. And e-waste recycling seems to be a 
suitable project.” (Respondent #35, CBO, interviewed on 18 November 
2008, partly translated where needed as interview was conducted in a 
mix of Malay and English languages).   
 
However, collection of e-waste is not always solely driven by environmental 
and health reasons; some are driven by a spirit of altruism. One particular CBO 
in Petaling Jaya for example, collects unwanted electrical items to be repaired, 
and puts them on the market as second hand items. The profit made from such 
sales is used to help the needy in several charity homes (Respondent # 45, 1 
April 2009). The concept of recycling for charity is not very common in 
Malaysia, but has been well accepted in the UK (Curan and Williams 2010, 
Horne 2000). Horne (2000), identifies two levels of charity recycling in the 
UK; the first level is where donated items are sold as it is (or termed ‘reuse’ in 
waste management hierarchy), and the second level is where donated goods 
which are not in saleable conditions are converted into resalable condition 
before putting into the market. This two-layer system of charity recycling as 
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practiced in the UK is similar the system applied by the Malaysian CBO; 
however, the item involves in the process in Malaysia is limited to electrical 
items only due to the high cost of new items. The recycling and re-use of bulky 
items (furniture and electrical items) in England and Wales is studied by Curan 
and Williams (2010). Curan and Williams (2010) argue that the involvement of 
CSO as collector and re-distributor of the used furniture and electrical items 
(on behalf of the Local Authority) has been successful in achieving two 
targets; to relieve hardship and improve waste management practices.    
 
Two main obstacles facing CBOs in self-governance are lack of funding and 
space. As non-profit organisations, CBOs and NGOs face difficulties in raising 
sufficient fund to run their programmes, such as to pay for the cost of printing 
(of brochures, posters and pamphlets) and communication (via telephone or 
internet) (Respondent # 50, 27 February 2009). Besides funding, space is also a 
problem as most of the CBOs do not have a proper office. Collection of e-
waste is normally carried out in a communal space, such as a school 
compound, play ground or a place of worship such as a church or surau 
(Muslim prayer hall). Items are kept in storage (usually at the house of the 
president) until a reasonable amount has been collected; only then is an 
arrangement for collection made with the e-waste contractor (Respondent # 37, 
1 March 2009). A respondent in Penang expressed their predicament in an 
interview: 
 
“Space is the biggest problem. Because this is a kampong [village] area. 
The housing pattern is scattered, not like housing estates which is 
easier. We used to gather the collection of recyclable items on the 2nd 
week of every month at the surau [Muslim prayer hall] but now we 
received complaints that this activity has messed the area. So we are 
not allowed to carry out that activity here anymore. Now I am doing the 
collection from my own house. We don’t have a specific place to put 
all the collection.” (Respondent # 40, CBO, interviewed on 2 March 
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2009, partly translated where needed as interview was conducted in a 
mix of Malay and English languages). 
 
6.4.4 The Limitations and Implications of CSOs Involvement in E-waste 
Governance 
 
As discussed above, CSOs in Malaysia are involved in the hierarchical, 
persuasion and self-governance of e-waste. NGOs’ involvements in 
hierarchical mode in lobbying for policy action are highly constrained by the 
state. Although some actions have been taken by state actors, which relate to 
NGOs lobbying actions, there is little evidence to claim it as the success of 
NGOs actions. The establishments of GONGOs are proof that government 
want to have more control on NGOs activities. As a result, NGOs in Malaysia 
are slowly changing their tactics in relation to the hierarchical mode by 
lobbying for the changes in PSAs policies, however this has not produced any 
significant outcome. CSOs actions through persuasion and self-governance 
modes are hindered mainly by financial constraints, particularly in spending 
for effective publicity through various media (in persuasion mode) and paying 
for disposal and treatment (in self-governance mode). Therefore, cooperation 
between CSOs and PSAs has the potential to overcome this problem in e-waste 
governance by the CSOs.   
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Interventions by non-state actors in e-waste governance through multiple 
modes of governing (hierarchical, persuasion, self-governance and co-
governance) have been induced by a combination of factors, but mainly; lack 
of and ineffective traditional hierarchical governance by state actors, 
inspiration drawn from the experience of like-minded bodies (in the case of 
NGOs and CBOs) or overseas offices (in the case of private sector actors), and 
current e-waste governance trends in the Global North (which is built on a 
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combination of several factors such as the introduction of EU Directives 
[WEEE and RoHS], the proliferation of the EPR principle and the increasing 
interest in Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR]). In this chapter, the modes 
of governance were analysed to understand the roles of non-state actors in the 
governance process. However, it is important to recognize that the boundary 
between governance modes in some approaches may be less distinct than 
others. An example is the self-governance mode of PSAs (Nokia, Motorola and 
Dell) (see Section 6.2.3), where PSAs provide an avenue for their customer to 
dispose of their end-of-life products responsibly. This effort can also be 
viewed as a form of persuasion from another perspective. This indicates two 
things: firstly, that multiple modes of governance occur at one particular time 
and secondly, one particular governing approach might have multiple 
categorization modes depending on the different lenses used. However, amidst 
these complexities, the ultimate objective of the interventions is to guide 
society in ensuring proper disposal of e-waste, hence minimizing the negative 
impacts that the process may bring to the environment and society. On these 
grounds, success must be viewed as limited thus far.  
 
Among the four governance modes in which PSAs are involved, the self-
governance mode is the most significant. Self-governance of e-waste by PSAs 
(which is expanded beyond governance of individual PSAs to include 
collection of their end-of-life products from consumers) has enabled the public 
to practice the responsible disposal of e-waste in the absence of hierarchical 
control (and associated facilities) from the government. However, the existence 
of these facilities is not widely known to society at large due to a lack of 
publicity, and weaknesses in the persuasion mode of governance. A 
combination of two modes – effective persuasion mode (including active 
announcement and advertisement in printed and electronic media) and 
(geographically) widespread self-governance mode by PSAs – has the potential 
to fill the void in e-waste governance which exists due to government failure. 
The role of PSAs in hierarchical mode of governance via their influence in 
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shaping the formulation of law is becoming stronger over time, reflected in 
their involvement in the drafting of a new law (on collection and recycling of 
household e-waste).  
 
CSOs have also been active in e-waste governance, however their role is 
slightly limited. Their most significant contribution (among the four modes of 
hierarchical, persuasion, self-governance and co-governance modes) is through 
the persuasion mode. Self-governance of e-waste was started by CSOs due to 
the lack of infrastructure for e-waste disposal provided by the government. In 
order to encourage and facilitate the public to dispose of e-waste responsibly, 
CSOs have conducted individual e-waste collection programmes. Although the 
volunteers are very committed, e-waste collection programmes are not a big 
attraction to the public. Another mode of governance where CSOs are making 
an impact is the hierarchical mode. The lobbying approach to influencing 
government policy making is a slow and bumpy journey in Malaysia. In fact, 
lobbying at times can be counterproductive if the issue raised is politicized by 
political parties and politicians. As a young nation, democracy in Malaysia is 
not as transparent as practised in the West. The availability of a wider space of 
democracy and recognition of public participation could possibly act as a 
lubricant for CSOs to excel as lobbyists.  
 
The involvement of non-state actors in e-waste governance has left a 
substantial mark in environmental governance in general. Their involvement 
has not taken power away from the government, but instead has strengthened 
the governance process by playing complementary roles in e-waste 
governance, by filling the gap left by state actors. Although the intervention of 
non-state actors may not have been able to compensate for all the weaknesses 
of the state actors (as drawn from discussions in this chapter), it has proved 
that multiplicity (in terms of actors and modes) in the governance process is a 
crucial factor in environmental governance in Malaysia. This however, could 
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be done to a better level should society and government be more open to this 
new (for Malaysia) approach to governance. 
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Chapter 7: Governing E-waste through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Managing e-waste is a challenge for the government and other stakeholders. 
Multiple modes of governance involving various state and non-state actors (as 
discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) have emerged to manage e-waste which 
is generated from two main sources: industries and households. However, 
issues of illegal and indiscriminate dumping of e-waste still prevail, which 
could lead to pollution of the environment and exposure of members of society 
to various health hazards. From the analysis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, a 
preliminary conclusion can be made that there is no single actor who has 
sufficient potential, power, capabilities and expertise to solve e-waste disposal 
problems on their own. Hence e-waste stakeholders have to rely on each other 
and establish modes of co-governance. There are examples of actors working 
in such a co-governance mode in the management of e-waste in Malaysia, such 
as the campaign on CRT recycling by three PSAs as discussed in Chapter 6. As 
there are overlapping characteristics between the co-governance and the 
persuasion modes in this example, it is discussed under the persuasion mode 
(in Chapter 6), while this chapter seeks to investigate how a variant of co-
governance – Public-Private Partnerships or PPPs – can be applied in 
managing e-waste generated by households in the context of Malaysia. PPPs 
have been chosen as the focus of this chapter in an attempt to comprehensively 
understand the roles of different actors in e-waste governance as PPPs involve 
both state and non-state actors, compared to other co-governance modes (such 
as communicative governance, co-management, regimes and network as 
identified by Kooiman (2003); see Section 3.2.2). 
 
The emergence of partnerships between the government, private sector actors 
and citizens is one of the most common themes in current discussions over 
environmental governance. Although the concept of partnership is said to be 
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unstable in terms of ‘definition, distinction and containment’ (Davies 2002: 
190), and lack of empirical underpinnings (e.g. Hudson et al. 1999), it has 
nonetheless been widely used in managing environmental issues in an attempt 
to materialize sustainable development goals. Partnership has been accepted as 
a new political domain involving various actors in environmental policy 
formulation and implementation, as a mechanism for governance where 
command and control mechanisms have failed, and as a means to increase the 
effectiveness of public services where the abilities of the state are restricted or 
limited.  
 
PPPs are also commonly praised for their ability to introduce a democratic 
element to environmental governance as they offer an opportunity for 
participation by non-state actors in the governing process (Smismans 2006). 
Another aspect of PPPs which is commonly highlighted is the interdependency 
of actors; where actors pool different resources (based on their different 
abilities) to be shared with other partners in running a programme. In the 
operation of PPPs, actors retain their operational autonomy in the sense that 
they are not commanded by superiors (Sørensen and Torfing 2009) in playing 
their various roles, and they share the risks and benefits from the process.  
 
This chapter seeks to explore how far the claims above are true in PPPs in 
Malaysia, based on two case studies. Moreover, as the claims are made in the 
context of more economically developed countries in the west, this chapter 
intends to investigate the suitability of importing the concept to be applied in 
less economically countries such as Malaysia. Two PPPs, one in Penang (a 
state in the north of Peninsular Malaysia) and one in Petaling Jaya (hereafter PJ 
– a town in the state of Selangor) were selected as case studies. Each of these 
case study PPPs involved government departments at the local level and non-
state actors from the private sector and civil society, in a joint effort to ensure 
proper disposal of household computers. The partners in these two PPPs, as the 
chapter will make clear, bring different skills and capabilities to the 
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partnerships, and are motivated by different desires and have different aims. 
This offers a suitable context to illuminate the question which this chapter 
seeks to answer: how do different partners interact and play their roles in each 
PPP, and what are the implications of this interaction for each PPP? 
 
Based on these questions, interviews were conducted to gather information 
from the actors involved. This chapter begins with an analysis of the 
emergence and entry of PPPs in to the landscape of e-waste governance in 
Malaysia (in Section 7.2). This is followed by descriptions of the two PPP case 
studies in Penang and PJ (in Section 7.3), focussing on the differences between 
the cases. The results of the analysis come next, where discussion focuses on 
how multiple actors interact and play their different roles in the PPPs, and the 
impacts and implications of their actions (Section 7.4 and Section 7.5).  
 
7.2 PPPs: Their Emergence and Entry Into the Landscape of E-waste 
Governance 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, public-private partnership (PPP) programmes 
proliferated in the 1980s due to increasing recognition of the interdependencies 
between state and non-state actors in the governance process (De Angelis 
2003, Kooiman 2003). Among the main reasons for the application of PPP in 
governance are to address the government failure in providing services and to 
increase democratic participation in governance process. In the more 
economically developed countries such as the UK, the PPP concept was 
applied most extensively by the local governments in the development and 
regeneration of cities in the United Kingdom during the 1980s to 1990s, and is 
seen as a way to strengthen local governance structures (Edelenbos and 
Teisman 2008, McCarthy 2007, Davies 2002, Darlow and Newby 1997). In 
many less economically developed countries (such as Bangladesh – refer the 
work of Ali and Ahmed (2006), and India and Philippines – refer Forsyth 
(2006, 2005) as discussed in Section 3.4.3), PPP is used as a common means of 
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implementation of development agendas, providing environmental 
infrastructure, and service provision where ‘state funds or expertise are 
lacking’ (Forsyth 2005: 429). Savas (2000) sees PPP as a collaboration that 
maximizes the different strengths of the partners to the benefit of the people, 
based on the idea that the state actor’s role is to ‘steer’ and not to ‘row’.  
 
Besides addressing the government failure, PPP is applied in policy 
formulation and implementation as a means to address the low levels of 
democratic participation and to avoid social exclusion (Putnam 2000), hence 
making policy-making process more legitimate. However there are many 
debates from governance scholars regarding this matter. For example, based on 
research in the field of occupational health and safety in the EU, Steffek and 
Smismans (2008) and Smismans (2006) raised two related concerns; firstly 
they revealed that there is no guarantee that PPP will be more participatory and 
inclusive, and secondly the rise of powerful private sector actors (resulting in 
lack of equality as some more resourceful actors are deemed to be more 
privileged than other actors) have exacerbated (instead of mitigated) 
democratic deficit. Bell et al. (2010) and Bell and Hindmoor (2009) critiqued 
on the selection of participants in PPP may not always be democratic, and 
stressed on the need for more transparency in PPP to enable it to be a 
democratic governing tool.  
 
In Malaysia, PPP (involving a combination of actors from the public sector, 
PSAs and CSOs) has emerged as the chosen mode to govern e-waste generated 
by households. There are three situations which have initiated this. The first is 
the existence of a gap in delegation of power and responsibilities among 
government agencies in managing the collection and disposal of e-waste from 
households. The Malaysian government allocates the power to manage 
household waste (excluding household hazardous waste) to the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Governance, and the power to manage hazardous waste 
(but not including the collection of household hazardous waste) to the Ministry 
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of Natural Resources and Environment. E-waste is stipulated under Malaysian 
law (Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulation 2005) as a type of 
hazardous waste. As such, the delegation of power and responsibilities as 
mentioned above has left the collection of e-waste from households under the 
responsibility of neither of the ministries.  
 
This led to the second situation; improper disposal of e-waste by the public. 
Due to the lack of facilities for disposal and a lack of knowledge regarding 
proper disposal, the majority of household e-waste is dumped together with 
other household wastes and ends in landfill, or channelled to the informal 
recycling activities which also ends up in landfill. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
these actions have the potential to cause significant environmental and health 
hazards, as the hazardous substances in electrical and electronic item may leak 
into the wider environment while workers in the informal recycling sector may 
be exposed to such toxic substances. Indiscriminate dumping of electrical and 
electronic equipment proliferated from early 2000 due to the introduction of 
newer technologies which have made many items obsolete.  
 
The third situation which has triggered the initiation of PPPs in e-waste 
governance was a particular local-level event in the state of Penang. The state 
government of Penang has a keen interest in e-waste management, and 
appointed two GONGOs (SERI and PEWOG – see Chapter 3 for details on the 
organisations) to conduct research on e-waste disposal in the state in 2004. The 
findings of the research indicated that the public have no means to dispose of 
e-waste properly, and are therefore forced to discard such waste together with 
other household waste, or to sell it to the door-to-door scrap buyer (‘orang 
surat khabar lama’) who dismantle the equipment, extract the working parts 
and precious metals, and dispose of the remainder in landfills or dumpsites. 
Based on this knowledge, the Penang state government initiated the first PPP 
to govern e-waste under the banner of the LA 21 commitment of Penang Island 
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Municipal Council (Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008), which is discussed 
in the following section.   
 
7.3 PPP Case Studies: The Computer Recycling Programme  
 
This section describes the background of two PPP programmes on e-waste 
governance in Malaysia, outlining the actors, their different roles, and the 
structures of the programmes. Two partnerships at local level were selected as 
case studies; one PPP in Penang and the other in PJ. Both PPPs are tripartite 
partnerships (involving the state actors, PSAs and CSOs), and are a part of the 
Local Agenda 21(LA 21) agenda of the municipalities involved. The PPP in 
Penang was chosen because it was the first PPP on e-waste governance in 
Malaysia. The PPP in PJ was chosen because it is a replication of the Penang’s 
programme, in terms of concept, structure and organisation. However, the PPP 
in PJ involves a smaller number of actors and gives out cash incentives 
(instead of shopping vouchers as used in Penang) to programme participants. 
Therefore, these two PPPs were chosen to examine how the similarities and 
differences might affect the operation and outcome of the programmes. 
 
7.3.1 The Computer Recycling Programme in Penang 
 
The state of Penang is one of the most developed states in Malaysia and has 
been dubbed ‘the Silicon Valley’ of Malaysia. Penang is governed by two local 
authorities, namely the Municipal Council of Penang Island (MPPP) and the 
Municipal Council of Seberang Perai (MPSP). Penang state, in contrast to the 
rest of Malaysia, has a relatively high level of concern about waste 
management and is leading in many activities related to recycling and waste 
management. This was evident in 2000 when the Penang State government set 
up a consultative platform called the Penang Local Government Consultative 
Forum (PLGCF) to provide an avenue for the residents to discuss issues related 
to local government including environmental issues. Five working groups 
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(each related to a specific issue) were formed; they are environment, housing, 
public education, governance and transportation working groups. The Penang 
Environment Working Group (PEWOG) is one of the groups which was 
formed under the environmental working group, and is the only group that 
remains operational today.  
 
PEWOG plays a significant role in the management of waste in Penang. Its 
main mission is to assist the Penang state government and the Malaysian 
federal government to achieve a clean and safe living environment for the 
people of Penang and Malaysia (http://pewog.org). PEWOG operates in the 
form of a consultative and cooperative tripartite (LA 21) forum, providing a 
platform for community, government and the private sector to work together in 
areas of environmental concern within the context of development. It is made 
up of more than 25 individuals and organisations from the community, 
government and private sector in Penang. The chairman of PEWOG in 2009 
was Dato’ Dr. Ong Hean Tee, who was also the State Recycling Programme 
Coordinator. It is significant, as we will see, that Dato’ Dr Ong is a very 
experienced and influential politician and a former EXCO (State Executive 
Council) member in the Penang state government. He is also the chairman of 
the Penang Island Neighbourhood Watch Association (Rukun Tetangga). 
 
Penang started seriously to manage e-waste starting from 2004, when an 
internal survey was commissioned by the (then) Right Honourable Chief 
Minister of Penang, Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, out of concern over the impact 
of electronic and electrical waste on the environment of the state. The study 
conducted by two GONGOs, SERI and PEWOG, revealed that facilities to 
dispose of e-waste generated by the community were lacking. Reacting to the 
results of the study, the state government of Penang through MPPP and MPSP 
approached Dell to form a public-private partnership to facilitate the recycling 
of computers. The partnership involved the two municipalities (MPPP & 
MPSP), Dell Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd. and Dell’s e-waste contractor, HMR 
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Resources (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. The MPPP programme was launched in 2004, 
adopting the drop-off method at collection centres managed by the 
municipalities. A similar programme in MPSP was launched in 2005, but 
unfortunately, it faded away and has been inactive since 2007 (Respondent # 
55, 18 December 2008). 
 
In 2006, the partnership in MPPP was revamped and rejuvenated to include 
new partners. The tripartite partnership was launched in 2006, with 
participating organizations comprising of MPPP, Dell Asia Pacific, Sunshine 
Wholesale Mart, PEWOG, IRM (Dell’s e-waste contractor), six CBOs and two 
NGOs, and was called the ‘MPPP – Dell PC Recycling Programme’. To 
encourage the public to participate, financial incentives were introduced. IRM 
pays RM0.50 (£0.10) per kilogram of e-waste, paid in the form of Sunshine 
Shopping Vouchers to participating citizens and RM30 (£5.50) per month to 
the collection centres. The partnership’s initial target was to collect 10% of 
unused computers in Penang Island, or about 21,000 kilograms, which was 
increased to 15% or 31,500 kilograms in 2009. The partnership collected 
11,580 kilograms in 2006, increasing to 14,280 kilograms in 2007, and almost 
reaching the target of 20,600 kilograms in 2008 (Respondent # 55, 18 
December 2008). Plates 7.2 to 7.6 show collection centres in Penang. 
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7.3.2 The Computer Recycling Programme in PJ 
   
The concept of partnership in the management of the disposal of used 
computers was then replicated (in terms of concept, structure and organisation) 
in PJ at end of 2006. However, quite contrary to a normal partnership, this 
arrangement was initiated by the private sector – by Dell. Dell approached 
MBPJ to set up a similar partnership, based on their experience in Penang (see 
Plate 7.1; a collection centre in the compound of MBPJ’s office). In this 
partnership, cash incentives were provided to encourage public participation. 
IRM paid RM0.80 (£0.15) per kilogram to the collection centres, with half 
being kept by the participating collection centres and the other half being paid 
to the public. According to the representative from MBPJ, they had received 
many invitations to work in partnerships from the private sector prior to Dell’s 
offer. However, none of the companies was able to prove that their method of 
disposing of e-waste was not causing pollution to the environment. The 
decision to work in partnership with Dell and IRM was taken after officers of 
MBPJ went to visit the IRM premises in Penang and were satisfied with their 
proper way of handling e-waste.  
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 Plate 7.1: Collection day at Menara 
MBPJ on 28th February 2009. The 
men are staff of IRM. They waited 
from 9 a.m - 12 p.m and went back to 
Penang empty handed. (Source: 
author). 
 
Plate 7.2: Collection day at MPPP 
office in Padang Kota Lama, Penang 
on 6th March 2009. There is no sign at 
all to indicate location of collection. 
(Source: author). 
Plate 7.3: Collection point at Sunshine 
Farlim Hypermarket on 5th March 
2009 was manned by the IRM staff. 
They collected one computer after 
three hours. (Source: author). 
 
 
Plate 7.4: Two IRM staff on 
collection day (3rd March 2009) at 
Sunshine Jelutong Supermarket. 
(Source: author). 
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Plate 7.5: Collection centre in Batu 
Lanchang Penang is actually 
someone’s house. (Source: author). 
 
 
Plate 7.6: MPPP’s store in Kampung 
Jawa is another collection centre in 
Penang. (Source: author). 
Subsequent to the visit, as IRM has managed to fulfil MBPJ’s standard and 
requirement of environmentally sound disposal of e-waste, MBPJ extended the 
invitation to all community organizations in the PJ area to be involved in the 
programme. Seven CBOs and one NGO agreed to participate. However, a few 
turned down the offer, as according to the representative from MBPJ, they 
could sell the e-waste at higher prices to scrap buyers compared to what they 
will get from the programme. This disappointment was expressed by the 
officer during the interview. He said;  
 
“Although we encourage all community collection centres to 
participate, I must tell you that there are groups who prefer to sell it to 
individual vendor for better return although they are not aware and 
bother about how the vendor treats the e-waste.” (Respondent # 8, 
Government, interviewed on 26 November 2008, verbatim) 
 
This implies that the decision to be involved as partners in the PPP is 
determined – at least for some CBOs - by economic factors rather than 
environmental concerns. Recycling as it is understood is a means to gain 
money to fund the organisation’s activities. However, as we can see later in 
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Section 7.5, several CBOs stated that they did not receive the invitation as 
claimed by the MBPJ; which signifies some level of dissatisfaction among 
potential partners. Finger pointing between representatives from the 
government and the CBOs shows that frictions among actors occurred and this 
may weakened the PPP; where this chapter now turns.  
 
7.4 The Interaction of Multiple Actors and its Impact  
 
One of the most essential elements in co-governance is the recognition of 
mutual interdependencies of partners by means of co-operation (Kooiman 
2003, Kouwenhoven 1993). One variant of co-governance – PPPs – operates 
based on the principle that partners co-operate in the governing process 
autonomously (without giving up anything of their identity), by exploiting 
mutually available resources to reach a common and win-win outcome 
(Kooiman 2003). This section seeks to discuss issues of interaction among the 
actors in the two PPP case studies. Several issues which have the potential to 
shake the stability of a PPP, hence affecting its operation and performance, 
surfaced from the interviews with multiple actors. Discussion begins by 
focusing on the power struggles and conflicts among representatives, followed 
by an analysis of interdependency and interaction between PPP partners before 
ending with a closing remark on how these have affected the operation of the 
PPPs as a governing mode.   
 
7.4.1 Power Struggles, Tensions and Conflicts  
 
In both the PPPs in Penang and PJ, state actors are represented by the local 
authority, or more specifically the head of the department in charge of the 
implementation of LA 21. In Penang, the responsibility goes to the Department 
of Town Services while in PJ the Department of Town Planning is in-charge 
(Respondent # 6, 16 December 2008; Respondent # 8, 26 November 2008). In 
most cases where the state is involved in PPPs in Malaysia, state representative 
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will act as the leader or coordinator of the programme. As such in both case 
studies (PPPs in Penang and PJ), the heads of the said departments are 
assumed to be the coordinators of each PPP, hence holding the power to lead 
the PPP although in neither case was there any official appointment or 
agreement to this effect.   
 
This arrangement has caused strains in the Penang PPP. This is because the 
officer representing the local authority has shown a lack of interest in the PPP, 
and at the same time has not been willing to share power to lead and coordinate 
the PPP with partners who might be more committed. Below is his reply when 
asked about his opinion of the PPP: 
 
“For us, this programme is just an extra work, unnecessary burden. It is 
just a waste of time and money” (Respondent # 7,Government, 
interviewed on 6 March 2009, verbatim). 
 
His lack of knowledge about the PPP is apparent in the following response 
regarding the target group of the PPP. 
 
“The programme’s target groups are offices, government and corporate, 
and definitely not individuals. To target the individuals is just not 
suitable. We can collect from the offices, and let the offices know that 
we have the avenue to recycle computers. Not collecting them from the 
public.” (Respondent # 7,Government, interviewed on 6 March 2009, 
verbatim). 
 
These statements show that the officer concerned did not share any great 
enthusiasm for the programme – quite the reverse – and indeed, seemed to lack 
essential, basic knowledge of its aims and objectives. The PPP was specifically 
designed to tackle the problem of lack of facilities for collection of e-waste 
generated by households. We can surmise that this lack of interest and 
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knowledge on the part of a key actor in the partnership will weaken the PPP. 
Indeed, it was the reason for the collapse of one PPP in the district of Seberang 
Prai (Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008). The sentiment that ‘government 
lead and others follow’ is very strong among the staff of the concerned 
government agencies. State actors believe that the baton of power is in their 
hands and they are not ready to share power with other partners. This is 
common in PPPs where states are known to be reluctant to share power with 
other partners (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, Ahmed and Ali 2006). Several 
partners expressed their disappointment during interviews regarding the role 
played by MPPP (especially regarding its inability to coordinate the PPP 
effectively), although most were unwilling to express it openly. Implicit 
signals were sent by other partners that they felt the public sector was not 
coordinating the programme but dictating to the other partners what work they 
should do, avoiding undertaking the necessary day-to-day coordinating work. 
One partner said: 
 
“Government feels that other partners work for them, not alongside 
them” (Respondent # 26, private sector actor, interviewed on 4 March 
2009, verbatim). 
 
The state partner (the MPPP representative) was also seen as lacking the 
necessary skills to be a leader (such as not having a clear vision of the future of 
the partnership), and not fully committed to the partnership (Respondent # 55, 
interviewed on 18 December 2008). In an attempt to improve this situation, the 
chairman of PEWOG stepped in to save the PPP and offered to lead the 
partnership. He believed that ‘roles must follow the person, and not the office’ 
(Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008). His offer, however, was turned down 
by the local authority (MPPP), and has resulted in him being summoned by the 
State Executive Council (EXCO) member to provide an explanation over the 
matter. In an interview, he expressed: 
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“Many government officers are envious of the publicity that PEWOG is 
getting. My God….. I went to see the EXCO [state executive council 
member] and straighten things out. I have to explain to him that we are 
not after the publicity, but taking care of the environment is what we 
are after. Ridiculous!! Well that’s the price that you have to pay for 
trying to make a partnership works.” (Respondent # 55, NGO, 
interviewed on 18 December 2008, emphasis added in square bracket). 
 
Several times during the interview, he kept stressing the need for the right 
leader to hold power and to guide the PPP in the right direction. The following 
excerpts from the interview transcripts clearly reflect his sentiments towards 
this matter:  
 
“The leader of a partnership is like the driver of a bus. Without a driver, 
how would the bus move?” (Respondent #55, NGO, interviewed on 18 
December 2008, verbatim). 
 
“In a partnership, the people are important. It is the singer that counts 
not the song. The person can come from anywhere. Any representative 
from any partner stands the chance to lead the partnership, as long as 
the person is prepared to dedicate his time and has the leadership 
quality” (Respondent #55, NGO, interviewed on 18 December 2008, 
verbatim). 
  
During separate interviews, clarification was sought over the matter of who 
leads the PPP and both representatives from the MPPP and from PEWOG 
claimed that they were the current leader – implying that the conflict was far 
from over! However a partnership meeting (on 3rd March 2009) was chaired 
by the representative of PEWOG and conducted at the MPPP’s office, 
indicating that PEWOG had, at that time,  taken over de facto leadership of the 
partnership. 
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In partnerships, all partners should work side by side by retaining their 
operational autonomy and not be commanded by other ‘partners’. However, 
the presence of a responsible leader to coordinate the programme and oversee 
its day-to-day operation is needed. A valuable lesson learned from this case 
study is that a leader has to be appointed at the outset of a partnership 
programme. For a partnership to be effective, a list of prerequisite criteria for 
the leader should be prepared and agreed by all partners. A representative who 
fulfils or comes closest to fulfilling all the requirements deserves to be 
appointed as the leader at the commencement of the collaboration provided 
that she or he can gain the support of the majority of the representatives. This 
is essential to ensure that the leader is not manipulating the arrangement to 
meet his or her own ends (Darlow and Newby 1997). Kooiman (2003) suggests 
that delegation of responsibilities and authorities should be fairly expressed to 
all partners for a PPP to function successfully. As a process, a PPP is dynamic; 
especially with regard to participants, power structures and rules of the game. 
As such, the roles and responsibilities of partners should be restated each time 
change occurs. In this case study, power struggles among partners (especially 
among the two bodies representing state actors), was not contributing towards 
the stability of the PPP. It is very challenging for a non-stable partnership to be 
effective. The discussion now turns to a set of related issues concerning partner 
interactions, and the roles of effective communication, trust and commitment. 
 
7.4.2 Conflicts between State and Non-state Actors 
 
As discussed in the section above, the pressing problems which surfaced from 
interviews with actors in the two case study PPPs are not between the actors of 
governance and wider society, as one might have imagined, but between the 
actors of governance themselves. There are interaction-related issues among 
and between the partners. In PPPs, actors interact through negotiation that 
possibly combines hard-nosed bargaining with consensus-seeking deliberation 
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(Sørensen and Torfing 2009). In unstable PPPs where there is a lack of 
communication, trust and commitment among partners, consensus-making 
might be more problematic. The following discussion seeks to explore the 
impact of the lack of these vital elements in the case study PPPs.  
 
Recognition of Interdependency 
 
The state actors in the studied PPPs act as the coordinators of the programme 
and offer to provide venues and refreshments for related events and functions 
such as partner meetings, exhibitions, seminars, carnivals and expositions. 
They also assist, for example, in cutting through the red tape when it comes to 
approving permits to hang promotional banners, posters and bunting, and 
setting up collection centres for the partnerships (Respondent # 6, 16 
December 2008). In both case studies, the partnerships depended on Dell to 
pay for the printing costs of promotional and publicity items such as banners, 
posters, pamphlets and t-shirts for volunteers. Dell also contributed prizes for 
competitions, contests and lucky draws which were conducted regularly by the 
partnerships to increase the visibility of the programme among the public. IRM 
Sdn. Bhd. – a company licensed by the DOE to manage e-waste – not only 
shared their knowledge and expertise in helping with the disposal of the e-
waste, but also collected and transported the e-waste from all collection centres 
in Penang and PJ for free. Apart from that, IRM paid incentives to the 
participating public (in terms of cash in PJ and shopping vouchers in Penang) 
and provided a monthly allowance to the organizations who managed 
collection centres. Association with Sunshine Supermarkets (in Penang PPP 
only), CBOs and NGOs has widened the scope of this partnership in terms of 
the area of collection and target groups. The close links that CBOs and NGOs 
have established with the public were manipulated to persuade more people in 
society to participate in the programme. In this respect, state actors depended 
on non-state actors as allies in governing e-waste. Similarly, the non-state 
actors benefited from the partnership with state actors. Dell, IRM and Sunshine 
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Supermarkets utilized this partnership as a free advertising opportunity for 
their products and services, and a part of their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) programme, while CSOs (NGOs and CBOs) maximized the opportunity 
to increase unity among community members and ensure proper disposal of 
unwanted computers. This partnership also provided an opportunity for IRM to 
access another source of raw material for its e-waste recycling industry as the 
amount of e-waste had reduced dramatically upon the implementation of 
Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005 (Respondent # 
26, 4 March 2009) (see Chapter 5 – Section 5.2.3). 
 
It is apparent that interdependence exists and is the backbone of these 
partnerships. Weighing all the resources pooled by all partners into these 
partnerships, and the benefits that they gained out of it, the state actors were 
gaining more than other partners. Although win-win situations do occur in 
these partnerships, the existence of asymmetrical power relations between state 
and non-state actors will tend to produce both winners and losers (Sørensen 
and Torfing 2009: 241). In a study by Bell and Hindmoor (2009), they suggest 
that where there is interdependency in a relationship between states and non-
state actors, it is often asymmetrical where states gain more than the non-state 
partners.  
 
Although interdependence between actors is very prominent in both case 
studies, the state actor in Penang (MPPP) refused to recognize that they 
depended on the contributions of other partners in ensuring that the partnership 
functioned effectively (based on interview with respondent # 6), and was still 
trapped in the traditional view that local authorities work in isolation from 
other actors. Based on this research, it would seem that the public sector in 
Malaysia fails to view the private sector and civil society groups as true 
‘partners’, and there was no felt need among the government agencies to work 
with other partners. As one state actor explained:  
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“This programme is straight forward. People send computers to 
recyclers and get money. Like we sell old newspapers. DELL can do 
this with their contractor, IRM, why do they need to include us. This is 
because they want to ride on us. But to MPPP, this programme is a 
huge burden.” (Respondent # 7, Government, interviewed on 6 March 
2009, verbatim). 
 
These findings chime with the findings of Ahmed and Ali (2006) in a study of 
solid waste management in Bangladesh. A study by Ikiara et al. (2004) in 
Kenya also revealed that municipal officers do not see NGOs/CBOs as 
potential partners, where there was a prevailing negative attitude among 
government officials toward non-state initiatives.  
 
The issues discussed above have significant implications. Recognition of 
interdependency is one of the key requirements to ensure a partnership can 
progress well (Stoker and Young 1993). Every partner should appreciate the 
contribution of other partners as they work in a team. Recognition from fellow 
partners will lift the morale of every partner and motivate them to work harder 
for the partnerships. Lack of recognition of interdependency from the 
government for the efforts of voluntary CBOs was also raised by a 
representative in PJ. He suggested that recognition should not only go to the 
organization but also the individual volunteers to lift their spirits and heighten 
their motivation (Respondent # 42, 27 February 2009). Lack of recognition of 
interdependency could create a sense of unequal treatment and frustration 
among partners that will, in turn, lead to a lack of support for the partnerships, 
which could eventually cause them to collapse. Ahmed and Ali (2006) found in 
their research that the success of a partnership is a function of support from the 
public sector, the private sector, citizens and also politicians. 
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Lack of Communication, Trust and Commitment among Partners 
 
Good communication among partners is an important aspect to keep partners 
together. Communication between partners includes the exchange of 
information, planning and strategizing and sharing feedback on partnership 
activities with the other partners (Stoker and Young 1993, Waddock and 
Bannister 1991). The two most common communication methods in the case 
studies were face-to-face meetings and email exchanges. There is also a similar 
trend among the partnerships studied regarding the frequency of meetings. 
Face-to-face meetings were more frequent at the early stages of partnership 
formation, and reduced slightly afterwards as the partnerships became more 
stable. In the PJ case study, several meetings were conducted to discuss the 
formation of the partnership but thereafter there were no more meetings 
between the partners after the partnership commenced.  
 
Lack of face-to-face meetings in the PJ case study was due to logistical and 
cost issues as two of the partners were based in Penang. However, partners 
were kept informed and updated with the progress of the partnerships via e-
mail communications. This is important to ensure that interest is not lost and 
fades with time. Miscommunication or lack of communication will have a toll 
on the progress of a partnership. For example, in the Penang case study, MPPP 
and PEWOG both disapproved of the idea of a grand launching of the 
partnership, yet accused each other as being the promoter of the idea. This 
issue should not arise if parties communicate and discuss the matter openly. 
Miscommunication among partners also resulted in a group of MPPP 
enforcement officers taking down a banner of the computer recycling 
programme which was hung near a collection centre operated by a CBO in 
Penang. 
 
Goodwill and trust are important elements in partnerships. Successful 
partnerships often grow incrementally and evolve based on establishment of 
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trust (Slater et.al. 2007, Waddock and Bannister 1991). In the Penang case 
study, the CBOs were entrusted with pre-signed voucher booklets, which could 
easily have been misused without trust. The strains in the relationship of MPPP 
and PEWOG could be due to lack of trust. Lack of trust between partners made 
the MPPP representative sceptical of any decision agreed by the partnership, 
and this lead to misinterpretation and misconception that could have 
endangered trust. Lack of trust among partners might lead to lack of 
commitment of partners towards the partnership. In their work on partnership, 
Darlow and Newby (1997) found that the management of partnerships is time 
consuming and unrewarding at the early stages, and therefore needs a high 
level of commitment from all partners. Hudson and Hardy (2002) claim that 
partnership is more likely to be sustained with ongoing commitment from the 
most senior levels of the partner organizations, whilst also acknowledging the 
importance of linking middle level management with operations. In the 
partnerships studied, the CBOs have shown an impressive level of commitment 
to the partnerships. However, several representatives from CBOs, have 
expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the level of commitment from other 
partners. Representatives from CBOs felt that both the public sector partner 
and the private sector partner were less committed to the partnership compared 
to the CSOs.  
 
7.4.3 The Issues of Interaction and their Impact on the Operation          
of PPPs  
 
Issues related to the interaction of actors such as power struggles, lack of 
recognition of interdependency and lack of bonding among partners discussed 
above have the potential to destabilise a partnership. Unstable partnerships 
may de-motivate partners and decrease interest to commit to the success of the 
programme. According to Roberts (2000), PPPs allow the public sector to 
achieve both effectiveness (when partners strive to pursue common objectives) 
and efficiency (when partners cooperate through common means) in service 
 238 
 
provision to the public. If cooperation and strong bonding among partners 
cannot be achieved, it is highly unlikely that effectiveness and efficiency 
through PPPs can be achieved. For a PPP to be effective and efficient, its 
foundation - built on tight cooperation - must be strong and stable. It is 
challenging to persuade wider society to participate in a programme when the 
partners of the programme themselves do not trust each other, and this will 
likely have a significant effect on the performance of a PPP.  
 
The problems that surfaced in the PPPs in the case studies were partly rooted 
in differences in the work culture of the state and non-state actors. The 
different work cultures among the state and non-state actors led to 
misunderstandings and conflicts among actors which threatened to paralyse the 
PPP. Many government staff in the PPPs studied were not ready to accept the 
new concept of governance in PPPs where participants from outside of the 
traditional government structure are involved in the governance process. The 
public sector partners were perceived by the other partners as passive partners 
who were still gripped by an old management style that prevented any 
improvement from the traditional path of isolation from the private sector and 
the wider community. This might affect the performance of the PPP as, 
according to March and Olsen (1995), the ability of partners to adjust to 
change is one of the factors that contributed to the effectiveness of PPPs. State 
actors were also perceived by other actors in the case studies as being less 
dedicated and committed in their work. A respondent vented his frustration 
towards the state actors in one PPP during an interview session: 
 
“Government officers work from 9 to 5, while NGO and CBO work 
from 5 to 9. They are working in different time zone, and never the two 
could cooperate. You try and call the government officer to work on 
Sundays or call for a meeting in the evening after office hours and 
you’ll understand what I’ve just meant. And that is why NGO 
succeeded when others fail. Because they work wholeheartedly and 
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dedicate their time and effort to the programme.” (Respondent # 55, 
NGO, interviewed on 18 December 2008, verbatim). 
 
Lack of commitment towards the PPP among partners could be due to the lack 
of a formal agreement and the absence of formal documentation. In 
Bangladesh, the introduction of a formal instrument in the form of a 
memorandum of understanding signed by the partners worked well in solid 
waste management in the town of Khulna (Ahmed and Ali 2006). As this 
would formalise the concept of partnership, it could make partners more 
committed to the programme.  
 
7.5 Lack of Democracy and the Dominant Role of the State Actors in 
PPP 
 
PPPs, like other co-governance modes is claimed by governance proponents 
and advocates as being more democratic than the hierarchical mode of 
governance as it offers an opportunity for civil society to take part in the 
governing process (Smismans 2006). By facilitating political participation of 
non-state actors, PPPs help to widen the scope for inter-discursive contestation 
and deliberation (Dryzek 2000). However, according to Sørensen and Torfing 
(2009), the positive contribution of PPPs to the democratic functioning of 
society can only be fully appreciated if PPPs themselves are democratic. A 
PPP is deemed to be democratic if the setting up process and its operation are 
done based on equal opportunity to all potential partners. The following 
discussion addresses this question based on the analysis of the two case 
studies. 
 
The first e-waste management PPP in Malaysia was founded by the Municipal 
Council of Penang Island (MPPP). It serves as a means to achieve two aims; to 
overcome the problems regarding management of collection, transport, storage 
and disposal of waste computers generated by household users and to promote 
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public participation in decision making (to fulfil the commitment of LA 21 
arrangement) (Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008). To achieve these 
objectives, the state actor offers selected non-state actors an opportunity to be 
involved in governing action along with them in persuading society to dispose 
of e-waste responsibly. The first offer for cooperation was sent to Dell, due to 
its experience and expertise (Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008). At the 
time the offer was made (around 2004), Dell already had an online e-waste 
recycling programme which it ran (and continues to do so) in collaboration 
with its e-waste contractor. Normally, at any one time, there are several e-
waste contractors working with Dell. Dell is given the right to bring in any one 
of its e-waste contractors as partners of the PPP. The current contractor (IRM) 
is the third company chosen by Dell after the contracts with two earlier 
companies were terminated due to poor performance (Respondent # 55, 18 
December 2008). Two things are apparent in this process; firstly, the lack of 
democracy in selecting the PSA partner by the PPP proponent (MPPP) as Dell 
is offered the opportunity and not elected; and secondly, there is also clear 
evidence of lack of democracy where the PSA (Dell) is given the freedom to 
choose another PSA (e-waste contractor) to be a partner of the PPP. This 
indicates that there is no equal opportunity among the potential PSAs to 
participate in the PPP. According to Sørensen and Torfing (2009), this is 
common in cases where PPPs are formed as part of a deliberate political 
strategy and where the primary motive is to enhance the effectiveness of 
governance, and not to increase participation. In such cases, the assumed 
democratic credentials of PPPs are not met. However, from the respect of the 
effectiveness of a partnership, this might not necessarily be negative. In fact it 
might bring a desirable impact (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). According to 
Sørensen and Torfing (2009), a partnership which consists of close knit and 
like-minded actors, who know each other well, might be more effective in its 
operation as all actors are comfortable with each other, compared to a more 
democratic partnership with less positive coordination among actors.  
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The decision to select the partners from among the CSOs was also done by the 
state actors. In both the cases of the PPPs in Penang and in PJ, participants 
from the CSOs were chosen based on their experience in organising recycling 
programmes (Respondent # 55, 18 December 2008; Respondent # 8, 26 
November 2008). However a random counter check with CBOs in PJ revealed 
that two CBOs that run recycling programmes did not receive any invitation to 
join the PPP as claimed by the state actors (Respondent # 45, 1 April 2009; 
Respondents # 46, 2 April 2009). This is another indication that non-state 
actors did not receive equal opportunity to participate in these PPPs; a contrast 
to what PPPs are normally praised for – namely, their democratic functioning. 
In these two cases, democratic control and accountability was weak due to the 
fact that partners were not elected or selected through open competition, but 
rather were appointed.  
 
The impact of the undemocratic process of selecting partners to the overall 
effectiveness of the partnership in the case studies was not explicitly studied. 
However, the undemocratic nature of the partner selection process could cause 
dissatisfaction among the potential partners which were not selected. Although 
these groups were not part of the PPP and therefore did not affect the operation 
of the PPPs concerned directly, their sense of dissatisfaction could spread to 
society and thus reduced the participation rate and the performance of the PPP.  
 
The undemocratic nature of the PPPs was also prevalent in their operation. The 
roles of different partners was not discussed and agreed among partners, but 
rather determined by the state actors, who acted as the coordinators of the PPPs 
(Respondent # 6, 16 December 2008; Respondent # 8, 26 November 2008). 
This resulted in a prominent and dominant role for the state actors (as the 
coordinator of the programme) compared to the roles of other actors. There 
was also the common perception among the CBOs that certain partners 
(especially PSAs) were considered as more privileged partners in the PPP by 
the state actors, as indicated by one respondent:  
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 “We are just small partner…not like Dell. If we don’t take part also, the 
partnership won’t die one…” (Respondent # 37, CBO, interviewed on 1 
March 2009, verbatim). 
 
According to the state actors, most decision making meetings of the PPP were 
only attended by the state actors and the PSA (Respondent # 6, 16 December 
2008; Respondent # 8, 26 November 2008). This was reinforced in the 
partners’ meeting (of PPP Penang) which I attended on 3rd March 2009. The 
outputs of the meetings and any related information were conveyed to the 
leader of the CBOs by the representatives from the state - the officer from the 
local government in PJ and PEWOG in Penang (Respondent # 55, 18 
December 2008; Respondent # 8, 26 November 2008).  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
PPPs in e-waste management in the case studies in Penang and PJ are 
examples of how partnerships were used as an available governing option to 
address an environmental issue where policy was absent and the government 
was not capable of handling the issue alone. This chapter contributes to the 
understanding of how governance works in managing e-waste at the local level 
in Malaysia via providing facilities for society to dispose of its e-waste 
responsibly. The operation of PPPs in the case studies were influenced by other 
factors such as the lack of bonding among actors, internal crises relating to 
power struggles over PPP leadership, lack of recognition of interdependencies 
and refusal to change on the part of the actors. Rather than consensus and 
cooperation, differences in perspective among partners instead led to strain and 
tension especially between MPPP and PEWOG in the Penang case study. 
Darlow and Newby (1997) suggest two ways to avoid a partnership from 
wallowing in indecision and inactivity due to strains and tensions among 
actors. Firstly, by balancing inequality between partners; and secondly, by 
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actively managing leadership crises. These are, of course, not easy to achieve. 
For the state actors this would mean opening up to the idea of working together 
and giving equal treatment to the private sector and the wider public in 
building a more consensual way of working. The analysis has shown that 
pooling of resources from different partners has contributed to the many 
advantages and benefits received by partners, and was the primary motive for 
setting up partnerships in the case studies. However, the benefits gained by 
partners were not equal, with the state actors gaining the most out of the 
partnerships despite their lack of contribution towards their operation.  
These two case studies of PPPs in Penang and PJ have shown that the roles of 
state actors in both PPPs are very dominant. The state can choose the partners, 
dominate and set the agenda, and hold central positions as programme 
coordinators. Non-state actors’ roles in both the case study PPPs are as 
governing allies to state actors in providing facilities for the public to dispose 
of e-waste responsibly and to persuade the public to participate in the 
programme through sharing of information and paying out incentives. State 
actors were still playing the pivotal role in the governance process although 
PPPs involve multiple actors. It was apparent that the state was not hollowed 
out in the PPPs studied; instead its roles were reinforced and extended with the 
help of non-state actors. Moreover (as far as the operation of the PPPs is 
concerned), state actors gained more benefit from the PPPs compared to other 
actors although they were not the greatest contributors to the pool of resources. 
 
Contrary to the popular belief that PPPs are a way to increase democracy in the 
governing process, these two case studies in Penang and PJ have proved to be 
otherwise. The case studies show that there is lack of democracy both in the 
process of initiating the PPP and in its subsequent operation. Besides being an 
undemocratic governing process, PPPs in both case studies also demonstrated 
the dominant role of state actors over non-state actor in the co-governance 
process. State actors were playing the pivotal roles in decision making and 
were definitely not hollowed out in this mode of governing as suggested by 
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many new governance advocates (see Section 3.3). Notwithstanding these 
tensions and deficiencies, it is worth ending by highlighting that PPPs, 
although they have not been fully successful in governing e-waste in Malaysia, 
have been successful in providing facilities for society to dispose of their used 
e-waste responsibly.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The transformation of Malaysia’s economic and social landscape due to the 
progressive shift from an agricultural-based to an industrial-based economy 
dating from the early 1980s, has triggered the growth of a new and significant 
environmental ‘crisis’ in the country (Khoo and Rau 2009, Sonnenfeld and 
Mol 2006). At about the same time, the rise of neoliberalism at a global level 
resulted in the increasing involvement of NGOs and PSAs in decision making 
and society steering processes (De Angelis 2003). The combination of these 
two processes has led to the penetration of new actors into the governing 
process, thus germinating increasingly complex governance arrangements 
where the authority to govern does not rely exclusively on the authority, 
legitimacy and sanctions of governments (Hysing 2009, De Angelis 2003).   
 
The shift from government to governance, distinguishable by the presence of a 
multiplicity of levels, actors and modes of governance, is apparent in the 
environmental domain in Malaysia. A central aim of this research was to 
explore the emergence of governance with regard to one aspect of the 
environment in Malaysia - e-waste - which is not only a local concern, but also 
resonates with global level concerns, actors and interests. More particularly, 
the aim of the research was to investigate the roles, significance and 
implications of state and non-state actors in environmental governance in 
Malaysia. From this core research aim, five research questions emanate. The 
first research question relates to the need to identify the multiple actors of e-
waste governance. This is followed by the second research question which 
concerns the deeper investigation of how and why these actors are involved in 
e-waste governance, and the implications of their involvement. The third 
research question pertains to the roles and modes of e-waste governance by 
various actors, and their respective significance. The fourth research question 
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deals with a specific type of co-governance mode - Public Private Partnerships 
or PPPs. And finally, the fifth research question tries to determine the 
dominant and significant mode of e-waste governance in Malaysia, and the 
consequent implications of this restructuring of governance. A qualitative 
methodology, using case studies, was adopted to explore these research 
questions, utilizing a combination of three methods – interviews, observation 
and the review of documents – to collect data, which were then analysed 
thematically.  
 
This final chapter of the thesis will return to the research questions set out in 
Chapter 1 and summarised above, to reflect on the extent to which the aims of 
the research have been met. This is done by reflecting on the empirical 
evidence (presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7), and integrating this evidence with 
the work of other scholars working in other country contexts (Chapter 3). The 
section which follows (Section 8.2) seeks to reflect on the first three research 
questions. In this section, the actors of governance are identified, and the 
concept of multiplicity in governance is elaborated and deliberated. 
 
Section 8.3 focuses on the involvement of state and non-state actors in a 
specific type of co-governance mode – PPP – summarizing the reasons for 
their involvement, and using this to make comparisons with the experience of 
other countries. This comparison will then lead to a wider consideration of the 
application and nature of co-governance to countries like Malaysia. In the 
following section (Section 8.4), the relative dominance and significance of the 
different modes of governance will be highlighted and explored, leading to a 
contemplation of the theoretical and empirical limitations in Section 8.5. This 
is followed by a discussion of the policy relevance of the research findings in 
Section 8.6, policy reflections and recommendations in Section 8.7, before 
finally ending it with a conclusion in Section 8.8.   
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8.2 Reflections on Multiplicity in E-waste Governance 
 
Evidence from this study has shown that there is multiplicity in e-waste 
governance in Malaysia in terms of levels, actors (and their roles) and modes. 
This sub-section will discuss this issue, thus addressing the first three research 
questions set out in the opening chapter.   
 
8.2.1 The Multiple Actors of E-waste Governance and the Reasons for 
their Involvement 
 
The first research question focused on the identification of the actors in e-
waste governance. Empirical evidence from this research has shown that a 
multiplicity of actors is involved in e-waste governance in Malaysia (see 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). This echoes research undertaken in other 
countries, such as the USA, China and Switzerland (see Section 3.5.3), 
demonstrating that one of the characteristics of governance, namely the 
multispheres of governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006) or Type II Multilevel 
governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003) – marked by the involvement of 
multiple actors - is present in e-waste governance in Malaysia.  
The multiple actors involved in e-waste governance in Malaysia are 
categorised into two broad groups: state actors (the government) and non-state 
actors (CSOs and PSAs); while CSOs are further divided into NGOs and 
CBOs (see Section 4.3.1 and Figure 4.3). As there is no standard definition for 
the term ‘non-state actors’ (Schwartz 2004), it is used in this thesis to refer to 
actors in the governance process who are independent of the state and legally 
registered. However, evidence from this study clearly shows the problems 
connected with such a definition: simply put, some of the non-state actors are 
not totally independent from the government. These include GONGOs 
(government operated NGOs) such as PEWOG and SERI, and GLCs 
(government-linked companies) such as Kualiti Alam and Alam Flora which 
are involved in waste management services. These examples show that the 
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state exerts its presence, or casts a shadow over, so-styled non-state actors of 
governance in Malaysia. Developing this point further, it also indicates that 
there is lack of democracy in the way the governance concept has been adopted 
and applied in Malaysia. Democracy (through inclusion) is one of the 
underlying expectations connected with ‘new’ governance (see Trubek and 
Trubek 2005), and yet in Malaysia there are strong reasons to question the 
presence of such a democratisation process. 
 
One aspect of governance which needs further clarification, and which links to 
research question two, concerns the reasons for the involvement of these actors 
in governance. The empirical evidence collected has shown that the reasons 
differ significantly among each group of actors. A key reason for the 
involvement of state actors is their sense of responsibility to external pressures 
(which are discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Malaysia’s first step to adopt the 
hierarchical mode of governance in 1996 was taken out of its responsibilities 
as a party to the Basel Convention. Other countries such as China (Zhang 
2009, Yang 2008) and India (Bandyopadhyay 2008, Mohan 2008) took such 
action for similar reason. This shows that while the authority to govern may 
remain state-centred (and even that is becoming more diffuse), the initiative 
and momentum for change now emanates from international fora and 
agreements on the one hand, and from local level and community pressures on 
the other. This condition has been termed multiple tiers of governance by 
Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) or Type I Multilevel governance by Hooghe and 
Marks (2003), and is another characteristic of governance.  
 
Another set of legal instruments with such capacity (the trickle down of 
authority) is the EU directives, which has been found to be a factor shaping 
solid waste management law in the UK (Bulkeley et al. 2007) and Ireland 
(Davies 2008). Two of the EU directives on e-waste (WEEE and RoHS – see 
Section 3.5.1) have had significant, albeit indirect effects on Malaysian e-waste 
policy and control, for two reasons. Firstly, WEEE and RoHS are influencing 
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the formulation of law on e-waste control in EU countries, and this is then 
filtering through to shape Malaysian policy. The widespread application of the 
EPR principle, as one of the requirements under WEEE, requires producers to 
take-back their end-of-life products. Malaysia, in its attempt to improve the 
regulation of e-waste, is learning from the experience (and tools) used in the 
EU, thus explaining the currently on-going (as of December 2010) drafting of 
an EPR-based law. Secondly, one of the targets of WEEE and RoHS is the 
manufacturing sector. Many international manufacturers (which are operating 
in Malaysia) design and produce products for the global market; as a result, 
strict internal policies on e-waste control are formulated as a way of self-
governing their own waste. Many of these companies are ‘ahead’ of Malaysia 
in terms of the requirements of currently active regulations.  
 
The involvement of state actors in e-waste governance is Malaysia is also due 
to the pressure from domestic NGOs (such as CAP and SAM), and external 
pressure from international NGOs such as BAN). Zhang (2009) has reported 
much the same set of pressures operating in China, where pressure from other 
countries as well as from international NGOs have encouraged the Chinese 
government to restructure the operation of e-waste dismantling activities in the 
country. This thesis has suggested that the involvement of non-state actors in e-
waste governance is driven by three factors: first of all, lack of or ineffective 
traditional hierarchical governance by state actors; second, inspiration drawn 
from the experience of like-minded bodies (in the case of NGOs and CBOs) or 
overseas offices (in the case of private sector actors) in other countries; and 
third, current e-waste governance trends in the Global North (which is built on 
a combination of several factors such as the introduction of EU Directives 
[WEEE and RoHS], the proliferation of the EPR principle and the increasing 
interest in Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR]). Taken together, then, we 
see in Malaysia the shaping of an e-waste policy environment which in no 
small way is linked to international-level processes, whether in the private 
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sector, among NGOs, or in evolving national and regional (EU) legal 
frameworks. 
 
8.2.2 The Roles of Actors in Multiple Modes of E-waste Governing 
 
The remaining parts of this section will seek to illuminate research questions 
two and three, regarding the roles of actors and modes of governance. It is 
impossible to discuss this two elements of governance (roles of actors and 
modes of governance) in isolation from each other as actors behave differently 
(and play different roles) according to the mode of governance. Based on the 
empirical evidence collected, e-waste in Malaysia is governed through multiple 
modes; the conventional hierarchical modes, and the ‘new’ non-hierarchical 
modes (such as persuasion, self-governance and co-governance). Although all 
actors are involved in all modes of governance mentioned, the roles of state 
actors are more prominent in the hierarchical modes, while the roles on non-
state actors are more significant in the non-hierarchical modes. This is another 
manifestation of multiplicity in governance, which is a characteristic of 
governance. 
 
The findings of this research demonstrate two significant characteristics of 
governance modes in Malaysian e-waste: firstly, that the modes of governance 
are not mutually exclusive, but share some overlapping criteria or 
characteristics, and hence are not distinctly different from one another. 
Furthermore, we can view governance from a number of perspectives; one 
particular governing approach might have multiple categorization modes 
depending on the perspective used. Secondly, the modes of governance often 
co-exist, so that multiple modes of governance are in operation simultaneously. 
State actors in e-waste governance in Malaysia are involved in three governing 
modes, namely hierarchical, persuasion and co-governance, where its 
involvement in the hierarchical mode is the most significant. It is in the 
hierarchical mode where state actors formulate and enforce law. Evidence from 
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this study shows that the hierarchical mode of controlling e-waste has been 
only partially effective, for two main reasons; first, because of loopholes in the 
statutes and second due to lack of (or ineffective) enforcement (see Section 
5.2.2). Similar limitations are reported to be evident in the performance of 
hierarchical mode of governance by the Chinese government (Zhang 2009, 
Yang 2008). In both countries, limited results and the many restrictions in 
governing e-waste via the hierarchical mode have led to the two things; first, 
the intervention of non-state actors and second, the application of other modes 
of governance by the state actors. 
 
Another governing mode that state actors in Malaysia are involved in is the 
persuasion mode (where its main role is as the enabler). As reported in Section 
5.3, this has had limited success due to lack of staff, funding, publicity and 
awareness among wider society. However, Davies (2008) has shown through 
her study on governance of waste management in New Zealand (through 
‘Reduce Your Rubbish’ campaign in 2003) that such an approach can be 
highly effective. This infers that the persuasion mode of governance by state 
actors can succeed if all the limitations are overcome; and is done continuously 
instead of as a one-off event (Davies 2008).   
 
In responding to questions about the factors that limit their ability to play their 
roles effectively in both hierarchical and persuasion modes of governance, 
many state actor respondents pointed to insufficient staff as the main reason. 
How far this is true is hard to measure, but one significant weakness relating to 
government staff is a lack of cooperation between state entities and 
communication breakdown among government staff at all levels.  
 
On the other hand, PSAs are involved in four modes of e-waste governance in 
Malaysia (hierarchy, persuasion, self-governance and co-governance), but in 
contrast to state actors it is in the self-governance mode where their role is the 
most significant. E-waste which is governed by PSAs, includes that generated 
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by the PSAs (in their operation) and also the end-of-life products of 
consumers. PSAs’ capability in self-governing has helped to facilitate the 
public to practice responsible disposal of e-waste in the absence of effective 
hierarchical control (and associated facilities) from the government, and thus, 
in turn, has supported state actors in carrying out their responsibilites. PSAs in 
other country have also shown similar capacities such as Dell in the USA 
(Wood and Schneider 2006). However, Dell USA’s commitment in self-
governing of e-waste expanded further to include phasing out the use of certain 
hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment such as 
Brominated Flame Retardants (BFRs) and Polyvinyl Chloride (PVCs). Judging 
from the evidence in cases in Malaysia, coupled with the experience of the 
USA (as mentioned above), self-governance mode by PSAs has the potential to 
fill the void in e-waste governance which exists due to government failure. 
Other than self-governance, the role of PSAs in hierarchical mode of 
governance is becoming relatively stronger in Malaysia, which is reflected in 
the process of drafting of a new law (on collection and recycling of household 
e-waste based on EPR principle) where PSAs have been (and are being) 
consulted by the DOE (see Section 5.2.3). Even though sceptics see this as a 
way to transfer the burden and responsibility of managing e-waste to the PSAs 
(from the state-actors), rather than a move to share power and authority, it 
nonetheless illustrates the way in which PSAs’ are being drawn more fully into 
the hierarchical governance mode. (PSAs’ role in co-governance mode is 
discussed in Section 8.3.)  
CSOs have also been active in e-waste governance, and their significant 
contributions are through the persuasion mode and hierarchical mode (through 
lobbying). In governing through persuasion mode, the main target of CSOs is 
the wider society. The lobbying approach has been used by CSOs to influence 
state actors in decision making; such as the lobbying carried out by CAP and 
SAM which contributed (along with other factors) to the formulation of 
Malaysia’s first law on e-waste control (Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulation 2005 – see Section 5.2.1). However, lack of democracy in 
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the landscape of Malaysian politics, which is characteristic of other Asian 
countries such as China (see Martens 2006 and Schwartz 2004, Section 3.4.2) 
has made this action more daunting compared to the action of CSOs in western 
countries (more economically developed countries). CSOs’ persuasion actions 
which are targeted to the general public and PSAs have not shown any positive 
outcome thus far. There are two prominent differences with how CSOs in more 
economically developed countries work, compared to CSOs in Malaysia. 
Firstly, many CSOs in the more economically developed countries (which are 
fighting for the same issue) work together in networks to increase their 
influence; two such networks are the ‘e-waste network’ (founded in late 1990s) 
and Computer Take-Back Campaign (CTBC – founded in 2001). CSOs in 
Malaysia, by contrast, commonly work individually. Secondly, many CSOs in 
the more economically developed countries have altered their tactics in 
persuasion mode of governance (particularly the lobbying approach) by 
targeting corporations/PSAs instead of state actors, as they feel that getting 
large corporations to change their policies can often be easier than changing 
government policies (Vogel 2005).   
 
The reflections above demonstrate that multiple actors are involved in e-waste 
governance in Malaysia, where each plays their own roles (based on individual 
capacities and abilities) in multiple governing modes. However, every actor 
has established a more prominent role in one particular mode (although while 
being involved in multiple modes of governing). Empirical evidence from this 
study has shown that the roles of state actors are most significant in the 
hierarchical mode of governance, the PSAs’ roles are dominant in self-
governing, while the roles of CSOs are most prominent in the persuasion mode 
of governance. This pattern has emerged because each actor has different 
abilities; for example, state actors have the power and authority, therefore 
excel in the hierarchical mode compared to other modes; the PSAs have money 
and expertise – which has given them the edge to self-govern their own e-
waste; while the CSOs have close links to penetrate society, and the 
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persistence to pursue the PSAs and state actors. Logically, a governing mode 
which is built upon the different strengths of each actor should create a 
‘perfect’ governing complex; is this so in practice? This chapter now turns to 
reflect on this matter. 
 
8.3 Reflections on PPP as a Mode of E-waste Governance 
 
PPP is a mode of governing (a sub-set of the co-governance mode), where its 
distinctive characteristic compared to other modes is that it operates on the 
basis of the pooled abilities of different actors. It has been adopted as a mode 
of waste governance in both less economically developed countries (Global 
South) (see for example Ahmed and Ali 2006 and 2004), and Forsyth 2006 and 
2005) and in more economically developed countries (Global North) (see 
Wagner 2009, Deathe et al. 2008, Renckens 2008, Slater et al. 2007, Binica 
and Bressers 2004).  
 
There are different reasons why PPPs have been used as a governing mode; 
these include to provide services (or to improve available services), to solve 
issues related to waste management (and thus to strengthen local government), 
and to include (or increase) public participation in the decision making process 
(and thus increase democracy), or some or all of these. The reasons for the 
establishment of PPPs in Malaysia (based on the two cases studied in Penang 
and PJ) are split between the state and non-state actors. Interview evidence 
shows that non-state actors are of the opinion that PPPs are established due to 
the inability of government to handle the issue of e-waste alone. They are thus 
seen by the non-state actors as a way to improve services and to address 
government failure. State actors, on the other hand, view PPPs as another 
tripartite project under LA 21 (one of the objective of LA 21 is to increase 
democracy through participation). 
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There are many success stories of PPPs in waste management. For example, 
Ahmed and Ali (2006) found that PPPs in Bangladesh have increased the 
quality of solid waste disposal services; Wagner (2009) discovered that the 
adoption of a PPP in Maine, USA successfully diverted e-waste from landfill 
and from being exported; while Deathe et al. (2008) uncovered a similar 
finding in Canada. In Malaysia, PPPs have provided facilities for proper 
disposal of e-waste. However, evidence presented in this thesis shows that 
there are several weaknesses in PPPs in Malaysia. Among the main 
weaknesses identified are lack of bonding among actors, internal crises relating 
to power struggles over PPP leadership, a lack of recognition of the 
interdependencies between actors (particularly on the part of state actors), and 
a refusal to change on the part of some of the actors (see Section 7.4).  
 
8.3.1 The Implications of PPPs to E-waste Governance  
 
According to Trubek and Trubek (2005), governance is expected to increase 
democracy and legitimacy in the decision making process through the 
involvement of non-state actors. Renckens (2008), who explores PPP in the 
USA, discovered that partnership is a practical approach to governing e-waste 
due to its ability to move a conflict stance to a constructive dialogue, and to 
increase the legitimacy and democracy of the PPP by the participation of 
multiple stakeholders. However, the case studies presented in this thesis have 
shown that there is lack of democracy in PPPs in Malaysia; both in the process 
of initiating them and in their subsequent operation, and thus inclusion of non-
state actors in PPP cannot be seen as a cure for a democratic ‘deficit’. This 
conclusion resonates with the work of several scholars such as Bell et al. 
(2010), Bell and Hindmoor (2009), Steffek and Smismans (2008), and 
Smismans (2006). Evidence presented in this study shows that PPPs are not 
‘co-owned’, but rather dominated by government, and actors in the PPPs are 
not elected but selected by the dominant state actors.  
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This finding is similar to Forsyth’s (2006) in his work on waste-to-energy 
projects in India and the Philippines. He found that PPPs are not a cure for a 
democratic deficit in decision making. Instead, he found evidence of a lack of 
democracy, legitimacy and accountability in PPPs in both countries due to the 
political environment in the two countries where open access to political 
debate by actors is restricted, and where PPP’s participants are chosen (not 
elected) by the most powerful partner. This not only means that PPPs lack a 
democratic ethos but sometimes the participants are selected not based on their 
abilities but based on whether they can provide support to the most powerful 
partner. These factors (which are very similar to the Malaysian examples 
discussed here), besides indicating a lack of democracy, also imply a lack of 
legitimacy and accountability in decision making. To take this one step further, 
this reinforces that public participation and inclusion in decision making does 
not necessarily mean that this is part of a democratic process (Smismans 2006).  
  
Besides being part of an undemocratic governing process, PPPs in both case 
studies also demonstrated the dominant role of state actors over non-state actor 
in the co-governance process. State actors played the pivotal roles in decision 
making (as argued by Bell et al. 2010, and Bell and Hindmoor 2009) and were 
definitely not hollowed out in this mode of governing as suggested by many 
governance advocates (such as Macleod and Goodwin 1999, Rhodes 1997, and 
Jessop 1994).  
 
The involvement of non-state actors in governance (through PPPs and other 
modes) shows that the reliance on state actors in governance is not exclusive 
(Karkkainen 2004), and may not be as predominant as before (Rosenau and 
Durfee 1999). Evidence from this study suggests that the state is undergoing a 
transformation (rather than a decline in state authority) with the presence of 
non-state actors alongside them in the governing process. This resonates with 
the view of Bell et al (2010), Davies (2008) and Pierre (2000). Davies (2008) 
sees this trend as part of a strategy to renegotiate the power and authority of the 
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state while devolving responsibilities to other actors. Similarly, Bell et al. 
(2010) view the relationship between state and non-state actors in governance 
as having enhanced the state’s capacity, instead of emasculating it. This is true 
in the case of two PPPs studied in this research, where interdependency among 
state and non-state actors has resulted in the introduction of a new service 
(collection of e-waste in exchange for cash/shopping voucher as an incentive) 
that has never been provided by the local government before. 
 
8.4 Relative Dominance and Significance of Modes of E-waste 
Governance 
 
Deliberation and comparison of all the four modes (hierarchy, persuasion, self-
governance and co-governance modes) involved in e-waste governance in 
Malaysia have shown that each mode has unique strengths and weaknesses. 
Therefore, in this study no one mode can be distilled out as the most dominant, 
significant and effective. Dominance and significance in this context are 
assessed based on their impact on e-waste control. However, a relatively more 
prominent mode in term of impact is the hierarchical mode by state actors, 
through the formulation and enforcement of Environmental Quality (Scheduled 
Wastes) Regulation 2005 which came into force on 15th August 2005, even 
though – as deliberated in Chapter 5 – the regulation’s effectiveness is 
restricted due to loopholes in the law itself and in its subsequent enforcement. 
Arguably, as a young nation (Malaysia secured independence from British rule 
in 1957), Malaysian society responded better to command-and-control tools of 
governance, than to campaigns of voluntary action. Not only in the issue of e-
waste management as discussed in this thesis but also in other environmental 
issues such as open burning, most people adapt and change their actions and 
behaviours in response to sanctions and not out of environmental awareness 
and concerns. However, the hierarchical tool in this case (the way it was 
formulated) is only applicable to e-waste generated from industrial sources, 
hence leaving household e-waste outside the ambit of hierarchical control. 
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PPP (a sub-set of co-governance mode) is another dominant and significant 
mode of e-waste governance when compared to other modes, especially in 
governance of households’ e-waste. Its strength lies in the combination of 
resources from different actors (which are unique and complement each other), 
into the PPP. PPPs in Penang and PJ, Selangor have successfully provided 
facilities for proper disposal of e-waste (particularly computers and peripheral 
equipment), reducing the possibilities of such waste being disposed of together 
with normal household waste and ending up in landfill. This action has not 
only diverted the route of e-waste to landfill, but it has halted it from being 
exported and thereby prevented e-waste from causing detrimental effects to the 
people and environment of other countries. However, as discussed in Chapter 
7, the effectiveness of this mode is hindered by state actors, who are not ready 
fully to open up to this new way of working, in tandem with other actors. The 
thesis has shown that many state actors are reluctant to change their working 
style, and demonstrate a lack of enthusiasm and readiness to share power and 
authority with the other partners. This reduces the motivation of other partners 
and the momentum of the PPP. The PPPs in the case studies are also facing 
challenges from informal ‘door-to-door’ e-waste buyers who pay higher prices 
to the consumer (the public). If these problems can be countered, PPPs may 
become the best mode to manage e-waste from household sources.  
 
8.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
Although this research has produced a detailed account of the roles of multiple 
actors of governance based on the governance concept, there are limitations, in 
both the methodological and theoretical aspects of the work, which should be 
acknowledged.  
 
Qualitative research methods were applied to this research, using interviews as 
the main data collection method. There were two main limitations with 
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applying this method in the research; firstly, there were difficulties related to 
getting consent from key actors to be respondents for this study. Most difficult 
was getting cooperation from PSA actors, where requests were either rejected 
outright or approved after a very long wait. Therefore, to overcome the 
problem, the strategy was changed, and much data was gained from 
information available in the public domain such as PSAs’ websites. Another 
methodological concern was that several interviews (or parts of interviews) 
were conducted in another language (Malay language) or a mix of Malay 
language and English, while the thesis is written in English. The task of 
translating Malay into English, or a mixture of Malay and English into English 
may have resulted in a loss of meaning or led to unwarranted emphasis, 
reducing the precision of the material presented. 
 
Apart from these methodological limitations, which were addressed as best as 
possible at the time, the governance concept applied in this thesis has not been 
able to provide detailed explanation of the impacts and consequences of e-
waste governance (through multiple modes) to the minor actors of governance. 
For example, there is lack of information on the role and significance of 
informal e-waste recycling and re-cyclers. Questions such as what drives such 
recyclers into the business, whether they are aware of the consequent health 
hazards that they are facing, and do they know the effects of their actions on 
the environment and other people, would have enriched and enhanced this 
thesis. As such, a deeper analysis using ethnographic methods of such informal 
actors would have illuminated the socio-ecological consequences of such 
activities, widening the analysis into spheres of environmental and social 
justice. 
 
As Malaysia is currently working on a new law (which is based on the EPR 
concept) and is learning from the experience of other countries, a study from 
another angle and perspective, such as looking into how does policy diffusion 
occur in the Malaysian context would have usefully complemented the 
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material presented here. Policy diffusion by learning (where actors learn from 
policy examples from abroad and draw lessons from such examples for their 
own jurisdiction) has the potential to reduce the cost and uncertainties when it 
comes to shaping and implementing policy. A detailed examination of the roles 
of state and non-state actors in policy diffusion processes would have 
complemented the findings of this research and contributed to a more 
comprehensive outcome.    
 
8.6 Research Findings: Policy Relevance and Recommendations  
 
The findings of this research indicate that available policy on e-waste 
governance in Malaysia has neglected to take account of e-waste generated by 
households, and instead focused only on industrial e-waste. From this, it is 
possible to infer that state actors are more concerned with controlling e-waste 
from being exported out of Malaysia, than managing e-waste being generated 
from other sources within the country (which may be leaching in the landfill or 
being treated illegally by informal recyclers). Another significant finding of the 
research is that a law is only effective if it is complemented by strict 
enforcement. Based on this understanding, coupled with the findings on the 
relative relevance and dominance of governance modes, a conclusion can be 
made that a new policy (or more effective implementation of the existing 
policy) which includes household e-waste control, and implemented using the 
PPP mode could be helpful in the current e-waste landscape in Malaysia.    
 
Although more improvement actions are needed to iron out creases in the 
governance of industrial-generated e-waste, more immediate attention must be 
given to governing household-generated e-waste. A policy strategy which is 
able to divert e-waste from its route to landfill disposal or halt it from being 
exported, and which at the same time ensures that the collected e-waste (which 
is being ‘rescued’ from landfill or from being exported) is treated in an 
environmentally sound manner should be considered by governance actors in 
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Malaysia. Establishment of licensed collection centres which are run by non-
state actors (informal actors such as scavengers and illegal scrap dealers could 
be employed as workers at such centres) should be considered. Also 
recommended here is the use of redeemable certificates upon purchasing of 
any electrical and electronic equipment, where the certificate is produced at the 
point of purchase for a fee and is redeemable once the item is returned to a 
licensed collection centre. This would serve two purposes; firstly, it would 
prevent people from selling stolen goods at e-waste collection centres, and 
secondly, it would encourage people to send their e-waste to registered and 
licensed collection centres. 
 
The role of state actors is particularly relevant and significant considering the 
current political, social and economic landscape of Malaysia. Three factors that 
make state actors’ role highly relevant in the Malaysian context are: firstly, 
only state actors have the power to exercise authority and formulate legitimate 
law; secondly, state actors through the hierarchical mode of governance may 
impose sanctions for non-conformers (and Malaysian society responds better to 
sanctions than voluntary calls); and finally, the use of the hierarchical mode by 
state actors will send a signal to society that the issue is serious and the 
government is determined to tackle the problem. However, the research 
findings also indicate that the Malaysian government is facing a number of 
obstacles in managing the process of e-waste collection, transportation and 
treatment due to a lack of human (including expertise) and financial resources. 
These could be overcome with cooperation of non-state actors. This provides 
support for the view that the implementation of the law is best pursued on the 
basis of partnership. Governing without government is not an appropriate or 
realistic option in the context of Malaysia at the current time.  
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8.7 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
E-waste governance is a relatively new environmental issue. This research has 
produced a number of valuable insights into one aspect of its governance in 
Malaysia by looking at the roles of multiple actors through the lens of multiple 
modes of governance. More research is needed to enrich our understanding of 
this matter, hence contributing towards the better governance of e-waste. I 
suggest that future research in this field should consider the following 
recommendations. 
 
The first recommendation is to continue conducting research along similar 
lines to note and mark out the evolution (or revolution) of e-waste governance, 
and the implications of the changes. This would be valuable as a learning 
process not only for Malaysia and the e-waste issue in the country, but also for 
other countries and other environmental/non-environmental governance issues 
so that mistakes will not be repeated and useful lessons can be drawn to 
increase the effectiveness of governance process. A detailed account of the role 
of the informal sector in e-waste governance should be given priority in future 
research as it has a potentially significant impact on e-waste governance. 
 
My second recommendation for future research is to repeat this study in other 
countries, especially in the less economically developed countries of the 
Global South, by adopting a comparative framework (such as the study on 
solid waste governance in New Zealand and Ireland conducted by Davies 
(2008)). Due to similarities between the e-waste governing process in Malaysia 
and China, I suggest a comparative study with China should be conducted in 
the future. A comparative study of another country (with different economic 
and socio-political background) in the more economically developed world 
such as the UK or USA would also have the potential to produce insights for 
the improvement of e-waste governance in Malaysia, and possibly vice versa 
as well.  
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My third recommendation concerns methodology. A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods should be considered for research 
in the future as these two methods complement each other, and thus will 
increase the strength of the research findings – and particularly their strength in 
the eyes of policy-makers. Besides that, more detailed qualitative methods, 
such as ethnography, would be useful in studying the socio-economic impact 
of e-waste governance. Finally, I would also like to recommend this method of 
study be adopted in studying other forms of waste, such as medical waste. The 
issue of medical waste has not been given sufficient attention in Malaysia, 
despite its hazardous nature. 
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Appendices 
 
  Appendix 1 
 
Interview Template for Respondents from the Government Sector. 
 
A:  Policies and legislation, plans and activities 
 
1. Are there any unit which is specifically responsible in e-waste 
management in your department? How many staffs are in charge? 
2. What are the programmes and activities that your department has taken 
in managing e-waste? When and how did it start? 
3. What are your department’s responsibilities with regard to e-waste 
management? 
4. Do your department have any policy regarding e-waste management? 
5. How have these policies evolved over time? 
6. How are these policies and legislations set? 
7. How are they monitored? (in terms of enforcement and compliance). 
Who are monitoring? 
8. What are the effects of these policy and legislations to the overall 
management of e-waste? 
9. Are there any policy and legislation on e-waste management at the state 
and federal government level that you are aware of? How did these 
policies affect the decision and action taken in your department? 
10. Have the policies of foreign countries (eg: WEEE Directive in Europe) 
affected your department’s policy? 
11. Do your department conduct any trainings/workshops to the recycling 
companies or organisations? (to update knowledge on current policies, 
technologies, know-how etc..) 
12. What are the types of permit/licence issued by your department 
regarding e-waste management? 
13. What would you say are the main challenges your department faces in 
managing the e-waste issue? 
 
B: Partnerships 
 
1. Has your department established any links or associations with any 
other organisation, whether private or public with regard to e-waste 
management? 
2. What form do these links/associations take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How did they come about/what were the motivating factors? 
5. What is the purpose of the partnerships? 
6. Do you involve the public in your policies/programmes? How do you 
involve the public (what mechanism)? Who is ‘the public’ in this 
instance?  
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7. In your department’s opinion, what is the role of public participation in 
e-waste management? 
8. How do these partnerships function (committees, actors, regularity of 
meetings)? 
9. From your point of view, what is the function of such partnership? Why 
do they exist, and why do you promote them? 
 
 
C: Information, transparency and accountability 
 
1. In managing e-waste, do you share information with other parties? 
2. What is the purpose of sharing this information? 
3. What limits are there on the kinds of information that can be shared, 
and who it can be shared with? 
4. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency about the 
activities of your department? 
5. How do you manage issues of accountability? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview Template for Respondents from the Private Sectors (Non- 
manufacturer : contractors, recyclers, etc…) 
 
A: Company programmes, policies, plans and activities 
 
1. What is the nature of your business?  
2. What products does your company manufacture? Do you use or 
generate e-waste in your business? Could you explain the process 
involving e-waste in your daily business? 
3. What are the types of e-waste involve in your business? (What are the 
amounts of each type?) 
4. Do you import any of the raw materials in your business? 
5. Do you export the products/waste from your business? 
6. Have you been given any training on know-how and techniques to deal 
with e-waste? By whom? 
7. What strategies of managing e-waste is your company involved in? 
(Redesign, repair, refurbish, recycle and recover?) 
8. Is there any policy on e-waste in your company? When did you first 
introduce an e-waste policy? (Do you have any documentation on your 
policies and programmes that I can take away with me?) 
9. How has this policy evolved over time? What were the influences that 
led to this pattern of evolution (internal mechanisms, Malaysian 
government legislation, international regulation or voluntary 
standards…)? 
10. Beyond the company itself, who is involved in dealing with the e-waste 
generated by your firm? 
11. Does your company have e-waste targets? How are these targets set, 
how are they monitored, and by whom (within or outside the 
company)? 
12. What would you say are the main challenges your company faces in the 
achievement of its e-waste targets? 
 
 
B: Partnerships 
 
1. In establishing and pursuing its e-waste policies, has your company 
established links or associations with any other organisation, whether 
private or public? 
2. What form do these links/associations take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How did they come about/what were the motivating factors? 
5. What is the purpose of the partnerships? 
6. Do you involve the public in your policies/programmes? How do you 
involve the public (what mechanism)? Who is ‘the public in this 
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instance? In your company’s opinion, what is the role of public 
participation in e-waste management? 
 
7. How do these partnerships function (committees, actors, regularity of 
meetings)? 
8. Who control the partnership? 
9. From your point of view, what is the function of such partnership? Why 
do they exist, and why do you promote them? 
 
 
C: Information, transparency and accountability 
 
1. In managing e-waste, do you share information with other parties? 
(Which parties, how is it shared, what type of information is shared…?) 
2. Do you know what happened to the products from your company once 
its left your compound? 
3. What is the purpose of sharing this information? (To improve 
transparency, to foster learning among companies …?) 
4. What limits are there on the kinds of information that can be shared, 
and who it can be shared with? (Is some information commercially 
sensitive? Are other organisations – civil society – interested in the 
information? Is there enough expertise to ‘deal’ with the information 
produced?) 
5. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency about the 
activities of your company? (Site visits by other organisations? 
Educational initiatives? Use of (global) voluntary reporting/standards? 
Interaction with the media?) 
6. How do you manage issues of accountability? (Are government 
regulations sufficient to foster a sense of accountability? Or are global 
reporting standards more important? How about local accountability – 
to the places where your operations are based – do you have specific 
strategies in place to address these issues?) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Interview Template for Respondents from the Private Sectors  
(Manufacturers) 
 
 
A: Company programmes, policies, plans and activities 
 
1. What products does your company manufacture? 
2. What post-production and after-sales e-waste does this production 
process generate? (Types, amounts) 
3. What are the strategies used to manage e-waste in your company? 
(Redesign, take back policy, reuse, recycle?) 
4. When did you first introduce an e-waste policy? (Do you have any 
documentation on your policies and programmes that I can take away 
with me?) 
5. How has this policy evolved over time? What were the influences that 
led to this pattern of evolution (internal mechanisms, Malaysian 
government legislation, international regulation or voluntary 
standards…)? 
6. How has the policy effects the profit and sales of your company? 
7. How has the rules and regulations imposed by the Malaysian 
Government and foreign government ( eg: EU’s WEEE Directive, 
Japan’s Law on e-waste) effect your company? 
8. Beyond the company itself, who is involved in dealing with the e-waste 
generated by your firm? 
9. Does your company have e-waste targets? How are these targets set, 
how are they monitored, and by whom (within or outside the 
company)? 
10. What would you say are the main challenges your company faces in the 
achievement of its e-waste targets? 
 
B: Partnerships 
 
1. In establishing and pursuing its e-waste policies, has your company 
established links or associations with any other organisation, whether 
private or public? 
2. What form do these links/associations take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How did they come about/what were the motivating factors? 
5. What is the purpose of the partnerships? 
6. Do you involve the public in your policies/programmes? How do you 
involve the public (what mechanism)? Who is ‘the public in this 
instance? In your company’s opinion, what is the role of public 
participation in e-waste management? 
 269 
 
7. How do these partnerships function (committees, actors, regularity of 
meetings)? Which party is having the control over the partnership? 
8. From your point of view, what is the function of such partnership? Why 
do they exist, and why do you promote them? 
 
C: Information, transparency and accountability 
 
1. In managing e-waste, do you share information with other parties? 
(Which parties, how is it shared, what type of information is shared…?) 
2. What is the purpose of sharing this information? (To improve 
transparency, to foster learning among companies …?) 
3. What limits are there on the kinds of information that can be shared, 
and who it can be shared with? (Is some information commercially 
sensitive? Are other organisations – civil society – interested in the 
information? Is there enough expertise to ‘deal’ with the information 
produced?) 
4. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency about the 
activities of your company? (Site visits by other organisations? 
Educational initatives? Use of (global) voluntary reporting/standards? 
Interaction with the media?) 
5. How do you manage issues of accountability? (Are government 
regulations sufficient to foster a sense of accountability? Or are global 
reporting standards more important? How about local accountability – 
to the places where your operations are based – do you have specific 
strategies in place to address these issues?) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Interview Template for Respondents from the Civil Society Organisation 
(CBOs & NGOs) 
 
A: Organisations programmes, policies, plans and activities 
 
1. Can you briefly tell me the history of  your organisation? 
2. What are the objectives of your organisation? 
3. What is the status of your organisation? (Locally registered or are there 
any affiliations with any international organisations). 
4. How is your organisations funded? ( Do you have any documentation/ 
written source of info on your organisations that I can refer to/ take 
with me?) 
5. What are the main activities and programmes carried out by your 
organisation, with regard to e-waste? (Who are involved in these 
programmes) 
6. When did you organisation first launch an e-waste related 
activities/programmes? (Do you have any documentation on your 
programmes that I can take away with me?) 
7. Has your activities/programme evolved? How has this programmes 
evolved over time? What were the influences that led to this pattern of 
evolution (internal mechanisms, Malaysian government legislation, 
international regulation or voluntary standards…)? 
8. What e-waste management strategies does your organisation promote? 
(Redesign, reuse, recycle?) 
9. What are the targets of your organisation in dealing with e-waste? 
10. What would you say are the main challenges your organisation faces in 
the achievement of these targets? 
 
B: Partnerships 
 
1. In organising your e-waste programmes, has your organisation 
established links or associations with any other organisation, whether 
private or public? 
2. What form do these links/associations take? 
3. When were the links/associations established? 
4. How did they come about/what were the motivating factors? 
5. What is the purpose of the partnerships? 
6. Do you involve the public in your programmes? How do you involve 
the public (what mechanism)? Who is ‘the public’ in this instance? In 
your organisation’s opinion, what is the role of public participation in 
e-waste management? 
7. How do these partnerships function (committees, actors, regularity of 
meetings)? 
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8. From your point of view, what is the function of such partnership? Why 
do they exist, and why do you promote them? 
 
C: Information, transparency and accountability 
 
1. How do you/your organisation gather information regarding e-waste? 
2. Have you received any information / been informed on the 
government’s plan and action regarding management of e-waste? How? 
Have you been invited to meetings etc..  
3. In your opinion, is the transparency level of the government dept 
sufficient? 
4. What about information from private companies (manufacturer, 
recycling companies, licensed recovery company? ( About their 
strategies and plan to manage e-waste, what they are doing etc…) 
5. How do you rate the level of transparency in the companies? 
6. In managing e-waste, do you share information with other parties? 
(Which parties, how is it shared, what type of information is shared…?) 
7. What is the purpose of sharing this information? (To improve 
transparency, to foster learning among actors and civil society …?) 
8. What limits are there on the kinds of information that can be shared, 
and who it can be shared with? (Is some information sensitive? Are 
other organisations – civil society – interested in the information? Is 
there enough expertise to ‘deal’ with the information produced?) 
9. What other strategies do you undertake to foster transparency about the 
activities of your organisation? (Visits by other organisations? 
Educational initiatives? Use of (global) voluntary reporting/standards? 
Interaction with the media?) 
10. How do you manage issues of accountability? (Are government 
regulations sufficient to foster a sense of accountability? Or are global 
reporting standards more important? How about local accountability – 
to the places where your operations are based – do you have specific 
strategies in place to address these issues?) 
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Appendix 5 
 
Interview Transcripts’ Reference List 
 
Category  
of actors 
Sub-category Transcripts 
reference 
number 
Date of 
interview 
Respondents reference as 
appeared in text 
State  Federal 
government 
 
1 27 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 1, government, 
interviewed on 27 November 
2008 
2 27 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 2, government, 
interviewed on 27 November 
2008 
3 13 
December 
2008 
Respondent # 3, government, 
interviewed on 13 December 
2008 
4 3 
September 
2009 
Respondent # 4, government, 
interviewed on 27 November 
2008 
State 
government 
5 17 March 
2009 
 
Respondent # 5, government, 
interviewed on 17 March 2009 
 
Local 
government 
(Municipalities/ 
local councils) 
6 16 
December 
2008 
Respondent # 6, government, 
interviewed on 16 December 
2008 
7 6 March 
2009 
Respondent # 7, government, 
interviewed on 6 March 2009 
8 26 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 8, government, 
interviewed on 26 November 
2008 
9 20 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 9, government, 
interviewed on 20 January 
2009 
Non-
state: 
Private 
sector 
actor 
Electrical and 
electronic 
equipment 
manufacturers 
 
 
10 12 
November 
2009 
Respondent # 10, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 12 
November 2009 
11 19 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 11, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 19 
January 2009 
12 22 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 12, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 22 
January 2009 
13 25 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 13, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 25 
November 2008 
14 24 Respondent # 14, private 
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Category  
of actors 
Sub-category Transcripts 
reference 
number 
Date of 
interview 
Respondents reference as 
appeared in text 
November 
2008 
sector actor, interviewed on 24 
November 2008 
15 19 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 15, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 19 
January 2009 
16 17 
December 
2008 
Respondent # 16, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 17 
December 2008 
17 28 
October 
2008 
Respondent # 17, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 28 
October 2008 
Retailers, sales 
and services 
 
18 21 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 18, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 21 
January 2009 
19 23 
February 
2008 
Respondent # 19, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 23 
February 2008 
20 21 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 20, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 21 
January 2009 
Tele-
communication 
service provider 
(Telco) 
21 23 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 21, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 23 
February 2009 
E-waste 
contractors 
 
22 1 March 
2009 
Respondent # 22, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 1 
March 2009 
23 20 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 23, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 20 
November 2008 
24 27 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 24, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 27 
November 2008 
25 19 
December 
2008 
Respondent # 25, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 19 
December 2008 
26 4 March 
2009 
Respondent # 26, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 4 
March 2009 
Solid waste 
concessionaires 
 
27 
 
19 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 27, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 19 
January 2009 
28 18 Respondent # 28, private 
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Category  
of actors 
Sub-category Transcripts 
reference 
number 
Date of 
interview 
Respondents reference as 
appeared in text 
November 
2008 
sector actor, interviewed on 18 
November 2008 
Scrap dealers, 
scavengers 
 
29 
 
17 March 
2009 
Respondent # 29, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 17 
March 2009 
30 2 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 30, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 2 
February 2009 
31 18 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 31, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 18 
February 2009 
Second hand 
items shops, 
repair shops 
32 8 March 
2009 
Respondent # 32, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 8 
March 2009 
33 
 
25 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 33, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 25 
February 2009 
34 17 March 
2009 
Respondent # 34, private 
sector actor, interviewed on 17 
March 2009 
Non-
state:  
CBOs 
Neighbourhood 
Watch Groups 
(Rukun 
Tetangga) 
 
35 18 Nov 
2008 
Respondent # 35, CBO, 
interviewed on 18 Nov 2008 
36 1 March 
2009 
Respondent # 36, CBO, 
interviewed on 1 March 2009 
37 1 March 
2009 
Respondent # 37, CBO, 
interviewed on 1 March 2009 
38 1 March 
2009 
Respondent # 38, CBO, 
interviewed on 1 March 2009 
39 1 March 
2009 
Respondent # 39, CBO, 
interviewed on 1 March 2009 
40 2 March 
2009 
Respondent # 40, CBO, 
interviewed on 2 March 2009 
Residents’ 
Associations 
 
41 2 April 
2009 
Respondent # 41, CBO, 
interviewed on 2 April 2009 
42 27 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 42, CBO, 
interviewed on 27 February 
2009 
43 2 April 
2009 
Respondent # 43, CBO, 
interviewed on 2 April 2009 
44 27 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 44, CBO, 
interviewed on 27 November 
2008 
45 1 April Respondent # 45, CBO, 
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Category  
of actors 
Sub-category Transcripts 
reference 
number 
Date of 
interview 
Respondents reference as 
appeared in text 
2009 interviewed on 1 April 2009 
46 2 April 
2009 
Respondent # 46, CBO, 
interviewed on 2 April 2009 
Non-
state: 
NGOs 
Associations 47 22 
January 
2009 
Respondent # 47, NGO, 
interviewed on 22 January 
2009 
48 21 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 48, NGO, 
interviewed on 21 November 
2008 
49 13 
November 
2008 
Respondent # 49, NGO, 
interviewed on 13 November 
2008 
50 27 
February 
2009 
Respondent # 50, NGO, 
interviewed on 27 February 
2009 
Charity 51 27 Oct 
2008 
Respondent # 51, NGO, 
interviewed on 27 Oct 2008 
52 3 March 
2009 
Respondent # 52, NGO, 
interviewed on 3 March 2009 
Environmental 
groups 
53 4 March 
2009 
Respondent # 53, NGO, 
interviewed on 4 March 2009 
54 28 
October 
2008 
Respondent # 54, NGO, 
interviewed on 28 October 
2008 
GONGO 55  18 
December 
2008 
Respondent # 55, NGO, 
interviewed on 18 December 
2008 
56  3 March 
2009 
Respondent # 56, NGO, 
interviewed on 3 March 2009 
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Appendix 6 
 
Coding Categories for Data Analysis 
 
Related research question Category Sub-category Category 
code 
How independent are the NSA 
from government’s influence? 
 
What capacities and abilities do 
NSA have that shapes their role in 
environmental governance. 
Actors/ 
organisations’ 
background 
Characteristics 
 
 
Capacities 
Abilities 
 
Characteri
stics 
 
Capacities 
Abilities 
 
Are there any policies regarding 
e-waste? 
What are the implications of the 
implementation of the policies? 
Policy  Policy 
How are actors involved in 
environmental governance 
Roles  Policy making 
Influence policy 
making 
Promote values 
transformation 
Facilitate public 
participation 
RoPM 
RoIPM 
 
RoVT 
 
RoFPP  
 
How NSA facilitate public 
participation 
Public 
participation 
Mediator 
Collection 
centres 
CSR 
PPM 
PPCC 
 
PPCSR 
Why are actors involved in 
environmental governance 
Reasons Responsibility 
Environmental 
concerns 
Social concerns 
Political 
concerns 
Economic 
reasons 
Self interest 
ReR 
ReEnv 
 
ReSoc 
RePol 
 
ReEcon 
 
ReSI 
What are the motivating factors 
for actors to be involved in e-
waste governance? 
Motivating factor  Motivate 
What are the challenges in 
playing their roles in e-waste 
governance 
Challenges Funding 
Social barriers 
Space 
Political 
ChF 
ChSoc 
ChSpace 
ChPol 
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Appendix 7 
 
Coding Categories for Data Analysis on PPP (Transcripts of PPP 
Partners) 
 
Related research question category Sub- category code 
What are the arrangements and 
structure of the PPP? 
Arrangements 
and structure 
 
 
Partnership 1 
 
Partnership 2 
PPP A&S –
P1 
PPP A&S-
P2 
Why do actors work in PPP? Reasons   PPP Re 
 
What are the motivating factors 
to participate in the partnership? 
Motivating 
Factor 
 PPP 
Motivate 
What are the implications of 
PPP? 
Implications  PPP 
Implications 
What are the roles of actors in 
PPP? Are partners aware of 
their own roles and the roles of 
other partners in the PPP? 
Roles  
 
 PPP Roles 
What shapes the roles of actors 
in PPP? 
Capacities and 
abilities  
 PPP C&A 
How and why is the PPP 
important to participants? 
Importance of 
issue  
 PPP Issue 
How concern are partners with 
the partnership? Are partners 
aware of the partnerships goals 
and objectives? 
Goals and 
objectives 
 PPP Goal 
How transparent is the 
communication among partners?  
Communication  PPP Comm 
How is transparency achieved? Transparency  PPP Trans 
 
How committed are partners to 
PPP? 
Commitment  PPP 
Commitment 
What are the levels of trust and 
interdependency among partners 
Interdependency 
 
Trust 
 PPP Depent 
 
PPP Trust 
What are the challenges faced 
by the participants?   
Challenges  PPP 
Challenge 
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Appendix 8 
Sample Coded Transcript (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q: Is your department involves in any kind of partnership regarding e-
waste. I mean, does your department have any link and association with other 
government agencies, commercial firms, NGOs, or with community-based 
organizations.  
A: I have to tell you very frankly that there is not much that we have 
regarding e-waste. [ PPP Issue ] What we have done so far is to partner with 
XX to recycle computer and computer peripherals. That’s all. 
 
Q: Could you please explain more about the partnership such as the 
structure and mechanism. 
A: XX approached us under the LA 21 partnership programme. They not 
started it anywhere else except in Penang. Show how to dispose off e-waste 
with their partner, YY in Penang. YY is the e-waste contractor for XX. They 
are accredited by DOE and KA (Kualiti Alam). Then we create the partnership. 
Then we call the RA(Residents’ Associations) and RT(Rukun Tetangga- 
Neighbourhood Watch Group) to join us. This programme was started in 2006. 
At this moment, there are nine centres been put up to collect used computers at 
scheduled time table. What happened is that, YY will pay 80 cents, 40 cents 
will be kept by the RT for their activities and 40 cents given to individual. So 
to encourage and to keep up the momentum, lucky draws were carried once a 
year. For this year, this activity was carried out for the whole of last month 
(November 2008) with conjunction with national recycling day. 10 prizes were 
given away. [ PPP A&S – P2 ] 
 
Q: What is the objective of this programme? 
A: To ensure disposal of e-waste is done in a proper manner. [ PPP Obj ] 
 
Q: Why do you take part in this partnership? 
A: Responsibility under LA 21. [PPP Re] 
 
Q: Can you explain your role in this partnership?. 
A: Recycling is the major activity for our department. We are constantly 
finding and exploring new way of doing things.[PPP Re] We also work in 
partnership with other partners in other programme other than e-waste. 
 
Q: What are the motivating factors for your department to be a part of this 
partnership? 
Transcript reference number: 8 
Respondent’s reference: Respondent # 8, government, interviewed 
on 26 November 2008 
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A: We (ZZ and other partners) felt that the awareness on e-waste, their 
hazardous effect and the need for proper disposal is still low in our community. 
That’s the common motivating factor that I believed is shared by all partners. 
[PPP Motivate] 
 
Apart from that there are also other motivating factors which are unique to 
each partner. For example, to us in ZZ this programme is a way for us to 
promote SD. To explore new ideas that people constantly overlook. [PPP 
Motivate] In line with implementation of SD.For XX, I think it is more for 
their CSR. For YY, its for profit of course. For CBOs and NGOs, it is mainly 
because they want to add new type of recyclable items since most of them have 
started with recycling programme. They need money to fund their activities. 
[PPP Motivate+PPP Re] 
  
Q: How frequent do all members or partners meet? 
A:  We had a few meeting when we first start on the mechanism of the 
programme. Some were conducted here, others in Penang. We were also 
invited to visit XX and YY. After the programme was launched and is running 
smoothly now, then we just let it go on. There is no more meeting between us 
now. Now that the programme has sail off smoothly, we rarely meet. Once a 
month I met people from YY when they came over for collection. [PPP 
Comm+PPP Commitment] 
 
Q: How about the commitment of other actors in your opinion? 
A: Ok. [PPP Commitment] 
 
Q: Could you please elaborate on the communication with other partners. 
A: Communicating with XX can be quiet difficult. As a big organization 
with a regional office based in Singapore, deciding on simple things than take 
a long time. XX they have the corporate comm (communication) section. 
Everything must go through several levels. For example all the speeches for 
our launching day have to be vetted by the legal department. Even, the 
publicity brochure has to go through their corporate comm. They check if logo 
correct or not. The colour correct or not. [PPP Comm] 
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Appendix 9 
Sample Coded Transcript (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Q: Could you please explain about the mechanism of the partnership. 
A: When we first started in 2006, XX paid RM0.50/kg for the public. But 
in 2007 until now, XX introduced a 50:50 formula, where RM0.80 is paid/kg, 
half will go to the public and half is for the collection centre to keep. But, even 
though XX gave us RM0.80/kg now, we still give the public RM0.50/kg and 
keep only RM0.30/kg instead. On top of that on our own initiative, we 
managed to partner up with a publishing house, and they gave us unsold 
magazines to be distributed to the public.  When the public sent in their 
computers, they will receive money and magazines. Five various titled 
magazines for a monitor and ten magazines for a set of computer. When we 
have collected a good amount, I will call XX or YY, and we will arrange time 
and date for collection. [PPP A&S-P2] 
 
Most of the time, I call YY. Because normally I use my handphone to make 
calls. My mobile service provider cannot reach XX toll free number. [PPP 
Comm] 
 
Q: How often do you call YY to come down? 
A: It really depends on how much is your collection. I will only call them 
to come down if I feel we have got a sensible amount. [PPP Comm]  
 
They came all the way from Butterworth you know. [PPP Commitment] I 
don’t think it is worth it for them to travel all the way to collect just 3 
monitors! 
 
Q: How was the response from the public towards this partnership 
programme so far? 
A: No particular trend. There was once, someone sent in 12 sets of 
computer at a time. During bad time, we just collected 3 units in a month. It 
really depend on your luck. Overall we collected about 100 kilograms in 2007, 
maybe slightly less…. and in 2008 we collected more than 1000 kilograms. I 
consider that a huge success. 
 
Q: How about your communication with the other partners of this 
partnership? How often do you meet other partners?  
A: We never meet in formal meetings. My tight schedule and heavy 
responsibility as a teacher in a school just wouldn’t allow me to. However we 
frequently used other type of communication, via telefon and sms (text 
messaging system) for example. Anyway, our major partners such as XX and 
Transcript reference number: 42 
Respondent’s reference: Respondent # 42, CBO, interviewed on 27 
February 2009 
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YY are based in Penang. Meeting up physically wouldn’t be that easy. And 
whenever there are functions such as exhibitions we will meet.[PPP 
Comm+PPP Commitment] 
 
Q: How are you kept updated on the progress of the programme? 
A: Normally Mr LLS of ZZ will sms or call us to inform of any progress 
or invite us for any function. For example, there are lucky draw competition 
carried out every year, and XX will normally follow-up by calling us up to 
ensure that we are kept informed and are invited.[PPP Comm] 
 
Q: How do you trust other partners?  
A: Trust is a very important element in partnership.Because of trust this 
programme can grow and recycling habits existed. We give full trust to XX 
and ZZ to plan, develop and control this programme. [PPP Trust] We just help 
them. If we don’t trust them we can always sell the e-waste directly to 
recycling company at a much higher rate. But we cannot be sure where would 
it end? Whether it will be disposed properly?[PPP Trust] 
 
That is why we agree to be a part of this partnership programme. We trust that 
XX and ZZ know well how to handle this. This is actually their expertise.[PPP 
Trust] 
  
There are times when I received computers which are not so old, that I give 
them free to another CBO. This is because they have the people who know 
how to repair and upgrade computer to serve normal users. They will repair 
and sell the computers. The money will be distributed for donation at the end 
of every year.  
 
Q: Do you know what is the objective of this programme? 
A: I am not very sure. [PPP Obj] I was invited by Mr LLS to join. I’ve 
known Mr LLS. We met in 2004 during the launching of Recycling 
Programme at Menara ZZ. I think it is a way to let more people know that by 
recycling they can help to conserve the environment, and also as a way to 
support the Recycling Programme.[PPP Obj] 
 
Q: Why did you decided to take part and be a partner in this programme. 
Objectives of involvement 
A: We want to take proactive measures before we are ordered to do 
so.[PPP Re] 
 
Q: Can you describe the participation and commitment from all partners. 
A: Different kind of contribution from different partners. For example, for 
us who operate the collection centres, [PPP Roles]even though we have tried 
our best and put all our energy in, it may not produce the desired results….the 
results that truly manifested our effort. We can promote (this programme) very 
well, but if the public doesn’t have any computers to throw away, how do you 
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thick we can increase our collection rate. For example if you are located at a 
rural area, or sub-urban area, things may be more diffucult. Location and target 
group is crucial.[PPP Challenge] 
 
For example, DJROA, even without much effort, they can collect huge amount 
of computer because it is an elite area. For areas like here, the strategy that we 
can adapt is to avoid residence from selling e-waste to old newspaper man, 
because we can’t be sure how it is being disposed. 
 
Methods of operation also play a role. The collection centre in SS3 for 
example use only drop-off mechanism. People come and drop their computers 
and no cash is given, and this centre is managed by aged man. Many of them 
are not able to carry the computers. The place can be a mess at time. 
Sometimes I brought my SR team to help them organized the place.[PPP 
Challenge+PPP Commitment] 
 
Q: Commitment of partners and sense of belongings. 
A: As far as promotion, we have given our best. [PPP Commitment] I 
can’t answer for other partners. But because we operated at limited time, as 
this is a voluntary work. [PPP Challenge] 
 
Many people complain. They said they are not aware of the schedule. When 
they are ready to dispose, the date of collection is end of the month, for 
example….and the waste will mess their house until next collection date next 
month, as many collection centres only open once a month. That is so not 
convenient for many people.[PPP Challenge] 
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Appendix 10 
 
 
The responsibilities of waste generators according to the Environmental 
Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005: 
 
• To notify the Director General of Environment of the categories and 
quantities of wastes generated within 30 days of generation (Regulation 
3) 
• To ensure proper storage, treatment, disposal and recovery of material. 
To make sure that treatment and recovery of material, and disposal of 
waste and residual of treatment and recovery are done only at 
prescribed premises (Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 8) 
• To ensure that labelling and transportation are done in accordance with 
the guidelines prescribed by the Director General (Regulations 8 and 
10) 
• To keep accurate and up-to-date inventories of the categories and 
quantities of waste generated, treated and disposed of, and materials 
recovered for a period up to three years from the date the waste was 
generated (Regulation 11) 
• To complete part 1 of the Sixth Schedule and retain a signed copy as a 
record for at least three years (Regulation 12) 
• To provide information in accordance with the Seventh Schedule in 
respect of each category of waste to be delivered to a contractor 
(Regulation 13) 
• To provide technical expertise and supporting assistance in any clean-
up operation in the event of a spill or accidental discharge (Regulation 
14)  
• To ensure that all employees who are involved in handling e-waste 
attend training programmes (Regulation 15)  
 
Source: Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulation 2005  
 
The responsibilities of waste contractors according to the Environmental 
Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 2005: 
 
• To provide information in accordance with the Sixth Schedule and to 
complete Part II (Regulation 11), and to retain a signed copy for three 
years (Regulation 12) 
• To deliver the waste within 10 days from the date of receipt of 
scheduled waste to prescribed premises (Regulation 12) 
• To avoid densely populated areas, water catchment areas and other 
environmentally sensitive areas during transportation of scheduled 
wastes between any two points and to carry the Seventh Schedule and 
comply with the instruction contained in the schedule (Regulation 13) 
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• To ensure that all employees attend training programmes and are well 
informed of the purpose and use of the Seventh Schedule (Regulation 
13) 
• In case of a spill or accidental discharge (Regulation 14), the waste 
contractor should immediately inform the Director General, and do 
everything that is practicable to contain, cleanse or abate the spill or 
accidental discharge and to recover substances involved in the spill or 
accidental discharge, and undertake studies to determine the impact of 
the spillage or accidental discharge on the environment over a period of 
time to be determined by the Director General. 
 
Source: Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) Regulation 2005  
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